Compétition et coopération chez les psittacidés (implication des processus cognitifs)

Les animaux vivant au sein de groupe sociaux doivent gérer des interactions diverses et multiples avec leurs congénères. L objectif de ma thèse portait sur les comportements sociaux chez les psittacidés et plus précisément l évaluation de leur aptitude à adapter leurs comportements vis-à-vis d un congénère ou d un humain, qu il s agisse d actions conjointes, d attributions d états mentaux ou de comportements prosociaux. Les oiseaux testés (perruche et gris du Gabon) ont été capables de coope rer et les perroquets ont appris à attendre le partenaire et à prendre en compte la nécessité de la présence d un partenaire mais pas son rôle. Les quatre espèces de psittacidés testées n ont pas profité de l opportunité de récompenser un partenaire sans coût supplémentaire. Les gris du Gabon ont montré qu ils étaient capables d adapter leurs comportements en fonction de l état attentionnel et des intentions d un expérimentateur.Animals living in social groups have to manage divers and multiple interactions with their conspecifics. My thesis dealt with social behaviours in psittacids and more precisely the valuation of their ability to adapt their behaviours according to a partner whether it was cooperative actions, mental states attribution or prosocial behaviours. Tested birds (budgerigars and grey parrots) were able to cooperate and grey parrots learned to wait for the partner and took into account the necessity of the presence of a partner but not his role. The four psittacids species tested did not take the advantage to deliver food to a partner at no supplementary cost. Grey parrots showed that they were able to adapt their behaviours according to the attentional state and the intentions of an experimenter.NANTERRE-PARIS10-Bib. élec. (920509901) / SudocSudocFranceF

Perspektiven von Mensch-Hund-Interaktionen

In comparative psychology we draw inferences about the evolution of cognition by investigating the similarities and differences between human and non-human animals. I am especially interested in which cognitive skills have evolved in different species that allow them to be optimally adapted to their environment. Dogs, due to their high sociality and the fact that they were subject to a special domestication process, represent a highly promising model to investigate social cognition from a comparative perspective. Studying dog cognition not only sheds light on the question on what skills humans share with other animal species, but also what kind of selection pressures lead to human-like skills. Dogs are not simply pets that live in the human environment, but they also form a close relationship to humans and cooperate with them. Thus, studying dogs living in that special niche will not only inform us about their cognitive skills but might also help us to better understand the selection pressures that led to the unique cognition of humans. The aim of this habilitation thesis is to characterize the dog-human relationship taking diverse perspectives on dog cognition and the dog-human bond. During their long domestication process, dogs have evolved special cognitive skills that help them to function effectively in human societies. In this thesis, I present experimental evidence for these skills and I suggest that the skills have evolved in a domain-specific manner, independently from each other. Dogs show outstanding cognitive skills in the domain of (1.) communication, (2.) perspective taking, (3.) cooperation and (4.) olfaction processing, but perform poorly or average in other domains such as (5.) metacognition and (6.) behavioral matching. Regarding (1.) communication I present experimental evidence that dogs without special training are able to successfully show a human a hidden object and that this showing behavior in dogs is a means to communicate the location of that hidden object. I argue that successful communication between dog and humans in general is the consequence of four preconditions in dogs: (i) they are extremely attentive and interested in what humans are doing, (ii) they have excellent learning abilities, (iii) they are able to read subtle cues of human behavior and (iv) they have extensive experience with different communicative situations. Furthermore, I present an experiment about (2.) perspective taking – defined as the ability to assess what others can perceive. Here I found that dogs are able conceal auditory but not visual information from humans when they approach forbidden food. Taken together with findings from previous studies, I conclude that dogs use certain strategies when they assess what a human can and cannot perceive. I studied (3.) cooperation both within dogs and between dogs and humans. Within dogs I used a problem-solving paradigm that involved aspects of a hunting-like situation. I compared the performances of dogs with those of wolves. My results suggest that the abilities needed to coordinate their actions were already present in the dog-wolf ancestor. Dogs and wolves may show similar cooperative skills when cooperating with their conspecifics, but dogs might cooperate better with humans than wolves do, as it is likely that during the domestication process dogs have been selected to cooperate specifically with humans. Consequently, I investigated the cognitive and motivational skills required for a dog to support a human. From the results I conclude that dogs display a number of prosocial behaviors towards a human when they are able to infer the goal of the human and when they understand how to fullfill it. In contrast to communicative, cooperative and perspective taking skills, (4.) the special olfactory skills of dogs probably did not evolve during domestication, but could be one of the reasons why dogs were domesticated. Here I present evidence that dogs can use olfactory information in an adaptable way: Dogs were presented with a violation-of-expectation paradigm in which they could track the odor trail of one target, but at the end of the trail, they found another target. I found that they are able to represent what they smell—that is, when they follow a trail they have an expectation of something or someone at the end of the trail. Thus, not only is dogs’ sense of smell itself quite outstanding, but so are also their related cognitive skills. In contrast, in their (5.) metacognitive skills and in (6.) behavioral matching, dogs do not show unique skills but perform similarly to other social mammals. Regarding (5.) metacognition I investigated whether dogs were sensitive to the information that they themselves had or had not acquired. I found that dogs seek additional information in uncertain situations, but their behavior in these situations is less flexible compared to great apes or human children. Finally, I did not find evidence for (6.) behavioral matching, ie. whether dogs develop an increased affiliation towards a human who mimics them. Dogs in my study showed no increased preference for one of two human experimenter who matched the dogs’ walk. In this thesis I present a view on dog cognition that differentiates individual cognitive skills, pointing out how exactly they are adapted to their special human environment. Thus, I emphasize the unique closeness of the dog-human relationship. I also point out where current findings are incomplete or show limits of their paradigms and call for further research. Firstly, I criticize the fact that most data on dogs’ understanding of their social and physical environment is based on performance in the visual or sometimes in the auditory modality. As dogs’ olfaction is their most relevant sense, I therefore call for more dog studies that are based on olfaction. Secondly, regarding the dog-human relationship, there are many open questions that have not yet been considered well enough: for example, whether dogs are capable of skills like empathy, the human perspective on dogs, and cultural differences in dog-human interactions. Thirdly, to better understand the dog-human bond it is crucial to further investigate when, where and how domestication started. This is also needed in order to understand why dogs were domesticated and what made and makes them valuable for humans. To answer the above mentioned questions, an interdisciplinary approach is crucial, in which scientists from the fields of archaeology, linguistics, paleoclimatology, genetics, anatomy, ethology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology work together

The parent?infant dyad and the construction of the subjective self

Developmental psychology and psychopathology has in the past been more concerned with the quality of self-representation than with the development of the subjective agency which underpins our experience of feeling, thought and action, a key function of mentalisation. This review begins by contrasting a Cartesian view of pre-wired introspective subjectivity with a constructionist model based on the assumption of an innate contingency detector which orients the infant towards aspects of the social world that react congruently and in a specifically cued informative manner that expresses and facilitates the assimilation of cultural knowledge. Research on the neural mechanisms associated with mentalisation and social influences on its development are reviewed. It is suggested that the infant focuses on the attachment figure as a source of reliable information about the world. The construction of the sense of a subjective self is then an aspect of acquiring knowledge about the world through the caregiver's pedagogical communicative displays which in this context focuses on the child's thoughts and feelings. We argue that a number of possible mechanisms, including complementary activation of attachment and mentalisation, the disruptive effect of maltreatment on parent-child communication, the biobehavioural overlap of cues for learning and cues for attachment, may have a role in ensuring that the quality of relationship with the caregiver influences the development of the child's experience of thoughts and feelings

The nature, ontogeny, and phylogeny of episodic foresight

ii Much attention has recently been given to the psychological capacity for ‘episodic foresight’, which involves imagining, preparing for, and actively shaping specific future events. Because of the relative youth of the field, however, many questions about the nature, ontogeny, and phylogeny of this capacity remain unanswered. Here I present a number of theoretical perspectives and empirical investigations that attempt to answer some of these questions. In Chapter 2, I provide the first review of evidence for the development of numerous cognitive components that have been implicated in episodic foresight, and the future-oriented behaviours these components enable. I find that the components develop along varying trajectories throughout childhood and beyond, but between ages three and five critical milestones are achieved in each of them. And indeed, around this time children also begin to show evidence of flexible future-oriented behaviour in diverse contexts. I then present four chapters describing empirical studies of novel future-oriented behaviours in children around these ages. In Chapter 3’s study, I measured children’s capacity to recall a problem from the past an

Morality as natural history

What are moral values and where do they come from? David Hume argued that moral values were the product of a range of passions, inherent to human nature, that aim at the common good of society. Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour, psychology and neuroscience suggest that Hume was right to suppose that humans have such passions. This dissertation reviews these developments, and considers their implications for moral philosophy. I first explain what Darwinian adaptations are, and how they generate behaviour. I then explain that, contrary to the Hobbesian caricature of life in the state of nature, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic under certain circumstances. I introduce four main types of cooperation: kin altruism, coordination to mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution and provide examples of "adaptations for cooperation" from nonhuman species. I then review the evidence for equivalent adaptations for cooperation in humans. Next, I show how this Humean-Darwinian account of the moral sentiments can be used to make sense of traditional positions in meta-ethics; how it provides a rich deductive framework in which to locate and make sense of a wide variety of apparently contradictory positions in traditional normative ethics; and how it clearly demarcates the problems of applied ethics. I defend this version of ethical naturalism against the charge that it commits "the naturalistic fallacy". I conclude that evolutionary theory provides the best account yet of the origins and status of moral values, and that moral philosophy should be thought of as a branch of natural history

Cave Art and the Evolution of the Human Mind

The discovery of cave paintings made by our Upper Paleolithic ancestors in Western Europe was an astonishing find – so astonishing, that they were originally believed to have been fakes. However, as more sites were uncovered, their authenticity was confirmed. But how could these people, who at the time of the discovery were believed to be merely dumb brutes, create such beautiful and naturalistic representations? And an even more difficult question to answer was, why? In this thesis I examine the phenomenon of Paleolithic cave art and what it might be able to tell us about the minds of the Cro-Magnon artists who produced it. I survey the paintings that have so far been discovered, as well as the processes involved in creating them. I also discuss and critique a selection of the many theories that have attempted to explain the motivation behind this radically different type of human behaviour. But due to the lack of hard evidence, none of these theories are ever likely to be fully substantiated. So a more promising line of investigation I take is to appraise the cognitive abilities Cro-Magnons would have needed to produce the paintings – and this then allows me to consider whether cave art was indicating any new cognitive development. I therefore highlight one of the effects that creating cave paintings had: it allowed information from the brain to be stored in the environment. But the manner in which this form of epistemic engineering might enhance human cognition is a hotly debated subject. I examine two theories: the extended mind hypothesis, and the theory of niche construction. In concluding this thesis, I argue that cave art seems more like an example of epistemic niche construction than a constituent of an extended mind

On the granting of moral standing to artificial intelligence: a pragmatic, empirically-informed, desire-based approach

Ever-increasingly complex AI technology is being introduced into society, with ever-more impressive capabilities. As AI tech advances, it will become harder to tell whether machines are relevantly different from human beings in terms of the moral consideration they are owed. This is a significant practical concern. As more advanced AIs become part of our daily lives, we could face moral dilemmas where we are forced to choose between harming a human, or harming one or several of these machines. Given these possibilities, we cannot withhold judgement about AI moral standing until we achieve logical certainty, but need guidance to make decisions. I will present a pragmatic framework that will enable us to have sufficient evidence for decision-making, even if it does not definitively prove which entities have moral standing. First, I defend adopting a welfarist moral theory, where having the capacity for well-being determines that a being has moral standing. I then argue that a desire-based theory of welfare is acceptable to a wide range of positions and should be adopted. It is therefore necessary to articulate a theory of desire, and I demonstrate by reference to discourse in ethics that a phenomenological conception of desire is most compatible with the way ethical theory has been discussed. From there, we need to establish a test for possessing the capacity for phenomenological desire. This can be accomplished by finding observed cases where a lack of specific morally-relevant phenomenal states inhibits the performance of a certain task in humans. If a machine can consistently exhibit the behaviour in question, we have evidence that it has the phenomenal states necessary for moral standing. With reference to recent experimental results, I present clear and testable criteria such that if an AI were to succeed at certain tasks, we would have a reason to treat it as though it did have moral standing, and demonstrate that modern-day AI has given no evidence as yet that it has the phenomenal experiences that would give it moral standing. The tasks in question are tests of moral and social aptitude. Success at these tests would not be certain proof of moral standing, but it would be sufficient to base our decisions on, which is the best we can hope for at the moment. Finally, I examine the practical consequences of these conclusions for our future actions. The use of this particular criterion has significant and interesting results that might change things significantly in terms of whether applications of this research are worth the cost and risks

Integrative Levels of Knowing

Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit einer systematischen Organisation der epistemologischen Dimension des menschlichen Wissens in Bezug auf Perspektiven und Methoden. Insbesondere wird untersucht inwieweit das bekannte Organisationsprinzip der integrativen Ebenen, das eine Hierarchie zunehmender Komplexität und Integration beschreibt, geeignet ist für eine grundlegende Klassifikation von Perspektiven bzw. epistemischen Bezugsrahmen. Die zentrale These dieser Dissertation geht davon aus, dass eine angemessene Analyse solcher epistemischen Kontexte in der Lage sein sollte, unterschiedliche oder gar konfligierende Bezugsrahmen anhand von kontextübergreifenden Standards und Kriterien vergleichen und bewerten zu können. Diese Aufgabe erfordert theoretische und methodologische Grundlagen, welche die Beschränkungen eines radikalen Kontextualismus vermeiden, insbesondere die ihm innewohnende Gefahr einer Fragmentierung des Wissens aufgrund der angeblichen Inkommensurabilität epistemischer Kontexte. Basierend auf Jürgen Habermas‘ Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns und seiner Methodologie des hermeneutischen Rekonstruktionismus, wird argumentiert, dass epistemischer Pluralismus nicht zwangsläufig zu epistemischem Relativismus führen muss und dass eine systematische Organisation der Perspektivenvielfalt von bereits existierenden Modellen zur kognitiven Entwicklung profitieren kann, wie sie etwa in der Psychologie oder den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften rekonstruiert werden. Der vorgestellte Ansatz versteht sich als ein Beitrag zur multi-perspektivischen Wissensorganisation, der sowohl neue analytische Werkzeuge für kulturvergleichende Betrachtungen von Wissensorganisationssystemen bereitstellt als auch neue Organisationsprinzipien vorstellt für eine Kontexterschließung, die dazu beitragen kann die Ausdrucksstärke bereits vorhandener Dokumentationssprachen zu erhöhen. Zudem enthält der Anhang eine umfangreiche Zusammenstellung von Modellen integrativer Wissensebenen.This dissertation is concerned with a systematic organization of the epistemological dimension of human knowledge in terms of viewpoints and methods. In particular, it will be explored to what extent the well-known organizing principle of integrative levels that presents a developmental hierarchy of complexity and integration can be applied for a basic classification of viewpoints or epistemic outlooks. The central thesis pursued in this investigation is that an adequate analysis of such epistemic contexts requires tools that allow to compare and evaluate divergent or even conflicting frames of reference according to context-transcending standards and criteria. This task demands a theoretical and methodological foundation that avoids the limitation of radical contextualism and its inherent threat of a fragmentation of knowledge due to the alleged incommensurability of the underlying frames of reference. Based on Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and his methodology of hermeneutic reconstructionism, it will be argued that epistemic pluralism does not necessarily imply epistemic relativism and that a systematic organization of the multiplicity of perspectives can benefit from already existing models of cognitive development as reconstructed in research fields like psychology, social sciences, and humanities. The proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization aims to contribute to a multi-perspective knowledge organization by offering both analytical tools for cross-cultural comparisons of knowledge organization systems (e.g., Seven Epitomes and Dewey Decimal Classification) and organizing principles for context representation that help to improve the expressiveness of existing documentary languages (e.g., Integrative Levels Classification). Additionally, the appendix includes an extensive compilation of conceptions and models of Integrative Levels of Knowing from a broad multidisciplinary field