21st century trade agreements: implications for long-run development policy

This repository item contains a single issue of The Pardee Papers, a series papers that began publishing in 2008 by the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. The Pardee Papers series features working papers by Pardee Center Fellows and other invited authors. Papers in this series explore current and future challenges by anticipating the pathways to human progress, human development, and human well-being. This series includes papers on a wide range of topics, with a special emphasis on interdisciplinary perspectives and a development orientation.This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world trading regime leaves nations the “policy space” to deploy effective policy for long-run diversification and development and the extent to which there is a convergence of such policy space under global and regional trade regimes. We examine the economic theory of trade and long-run growth and underscore the fact that traditional theories lose luster in the presence of the need for long-run dynamic comparative advantages and when market failures are rife. We then review a “toolbox” of policies that have been deployed by developed and developing countries past and present to kick-start diversity and development with the hope of achieving longrun growth. Next, we examine the extent to which rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO), trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and developing countries, trade agreements between the United States (US) and developing countries, and those among developing countries (South-South, or S-S, agreements) allow for the use of such policies. We demonstrate that there is a great divergence among trade regimes over this question. While S-S agreements provide ample policy space for industrial development, the WTO and EU agreements largely represent the middle of the spectrum in terms of constraining policy space choices. On the far end, opposite S-S agreements, US agreements place considerably more constraints by binding parties both broadly and deeply in their trade commitments. Rachel Denae Thrasher holds a master’s degree in International Relations and a law degree, both from Boston University, and she is a Research Fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. Her recent research has focused on policy issues related to regional trade agreements, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and on global forests governance. Kevin P. Gallagher is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations and Research Fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, both at Boston University. He is also a fellow at the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University. He has written extensively on trade and global development. Also see related publication The Future of the WTO, by Kevin Gallagher

NASA technology utilization program: The small business market

Technology transfer programs were studied to determine how they might be more useful to the small business community. The status, needs, and technology use patterns of small firms are reported. Small business problems and failures are considered. Innovation, capitalization, R and D, and market share problems are discussed. Pocket, captive, and new markets are summarized. Small manufacturers and technology acquisition are discussed, covering external and internal sources, and NASA technology. Small business and the technology utilization program are discussed, covering publications and industrial applications centers. Observations and recommendations include small business market development and contracting, and NASA management technology

The EU as Provider of Frames and Scripts: Evidence on Law and Courts from Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) differ a great deal in both their legal and judicial dimensions. Accounting for RTAs means, in good part, to explain those differences. A rationalist approach focused on interests, calculations, and utility-maximizing outcomes can offer limited insight into those differences. RTA officials do not operate in a vacuum. First, at the intra-regional level, they work in environments with established, and often similar, national legal and judicial traditions. Those traditions, rather than the EU, provide the frames through which officials interpret and solve the regulatory challenges associated with integration: officials develop legal frameworks and judicial mechanisms that mirror, in their overall character, what is already in place in the member states. But, second, officials are aware of RTAs elsewhere in the world – above all, the EU. The EU provides ready-made detailed instructions, or scripts, for the formulation of specific laws and judicial processes in other RTAs. If consistent with the national traditions in a given RTA, officials often adopt or mimic those scripts. Thus, overall, choices about legal and judicial design have little to do with what is ‘best’ for trade liberalization and the fulfillment of national interests. They have a lot more to do with continuity, legitimacy, and expediency

The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger Cases-Emerging Decisions Force the Issue

The following discussion explores the interaction between law and economics as these two disciplines relate to the issues which arise under section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, and examines the correlative problems implicit in the working arrangements between lawyers and economists when they are asked to counsel an enforcement agency or an acquiring or acquired company concerning the potential competitive consequences of a merger

The Clean Development Mechanism: Institutionalizing New Power Relations

The differences in the way climate change mitigation projects are facilitated under the Kyoto Protocol as compared to the financial mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) demonstrate institutional change processes that evolved from global climate change negotiations. Institutional change happens when new practices become accepted and interactions between organizations carry new meanings. Models of the two policy options are presented in this paper depicting organizational interactions to demonstrate the evolution of rule-setting in this arena. A discussion of power implications is provided with the conclusion that countries of the North as well as business corporations have increased their influence in the institutional framework of international climate change mitigation. Institutional theory needs to be further developed to be able to explain the dynamic changes that led to this shift in power potential.Institutional change;Climate change;Institutional theory;Environmental policy;Power relations

Recent Chinese Buyout Activity and the Implications for Global Architecture

We discuss recent cases of Chinese buyout activity in the OECD (especially in the US and the EU) in resource and manufacturing sectors. While most of the buyout attempts have been unsuccessful, they can serve as a catalyst for a wider discussion on the implications for global arrangements over cross border acquisitions. Three specific issues are discussed. The first is the subsidization of purchase raised in the OECD in response to the advancing of low- or no-interest loans by the Chinese Central Bank to companies investing abroad. The second is the transparency of entities involved in the buyout attempt. Most Chinese companies have close ties to the multiple levels of government and are not subject to the standard reporting requirements as required of OECD companies. The third involves national security concerns in the OECD and the possibility of acquiring sensitive technology by Chinese companies when they purchase companies abroad. These issues have not been addressed in the existing OECD/WTO investment policy initiatives and have yet to be discussed in the global fora.