An analysis of manpower requirements for the United States Marine Corps Tiers II & III unmanned aerial systems family of systems program

This research was conducted to examine the quantitative and qualitative component requirements for the Tier II and Tier III of the United States Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Systems Program. The main objective of this research is to develop a proposed manpower structure for a composite squadron in order to improve current UAS capabilities while minimizing manpower requirements. This was accomplished by conducting an independent assessment of manpower requirements of the different strategies being considered under the Unmanned Aerial Systems Family of Systems (UAS FoS) for the Marine Corps for the Tier II and III. In the final analysis, the research recommends the consolidation of the Tiers II and III to form a composite UAV squadron, reduce the logistics footprint by relegating the support mission to the MWSS and the MALS, and combining operational and maintenance billets within the current VMU structure to consolidate manpower requirements and optimize UAS force structures.http://archive.org/details/annalysisofmanpo109453465US Marine Corps (USMC) author.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Intra-service politics in the United States Army

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008.Includes bibliographical references (p. 309-346).Intra-service politics can help explain many behaviors and outcomes across a variety of military services and countries. The thesis begins by developing a framework for understanding intra-service politics based on a review of organization theory. Every military service contains a variety of communities or unions organized by specific missions, functions or technologies. These communities compete with one another to determine a service's dominant culture and missions; and the distribution of a service's budgets, equipment and personnel. Three patterns intra-service relations are proposed: a strong and independent central leadership capable of acting as an honest broker between competing communities (e.g., the German Army of the interwar period); a single monarchical community dominating a service (e.g., the U.S. Air Force); and an oligarchy of communities controlling a service (e.g., the U.S. Army). In the latter two patterns, doctrinal developments, capabilities, and distribution of resources will mirror and tend to reinforce the power of the dominant unions. In order to test the relevancy and plausibility of the oligarchic pattern, the bulk of the thesis is taken up with three case studies examining the division design process in the U.S. Army during the 1970s and 1980s: the Division 86 design, the High Technology Light Division, and the Light Infantry Division. Overall, the evidence from these three case studies suggests the utility of an explanation based on intra-service community politics for certain behaviors. Moreover, it suggests a U.S. Army dominated by an oligarchy composed of an armored/mechanized infantry ("heavy") community, an artillery community, an aviation community and a light infantry community. The oligarchy itself has a multi-tiered structure, one where the light infantry community has the least power and influence, while the heavy and artillery communities have the most; the aviation community occupies a position in-between, wielding considerable power but never being the equal of the two dominant ground force communities.by Robert Allen Zirkle.Ph.D

Analysis of System Training Impact for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs): Training Systems Acquisition

This work was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under contract W91WAW-09-C-0003, Task BE-2-3376, “Analysis of Systems Training Impact for Major Defense Acquisition Programs,” for the Director, Training Readiness and Strategy, in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.W91WAW-09-C-0003, Task BE-2-337

Iowa Department of Public Defense Performance Plan FY2017, December 15, 2017

Agency Performance Plan for the Iowa Department of Public Defense

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Over the past year, the overall size of DOD's major defense acquisition program portfolio decreased, from 85 programs to 80, while the estimated cost has increased by $14.1 billion. The average time to deliver initial capability to the warfighter also increased by 2 months. The slight cost increase can be attributed to the addition of one program, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. This furthers a trend for decreased portfolio size seen for the past three years. Although the overall cost of the 2013 portfolio increased, 50 of the 80 programs decreased costs, and 64 percent of programs increased their buying power. There are still some programs that have performed poorly, both over the past year and in the longer term. Fifty-five percent of the current portfolio funding has been appropriated, leaving approximately$682 billion needed for future funding. About forty-five percent of this remaining funding represents cost growth from initial estimates, a clear indicator that DOD needs to do more to control cost growth.

The British Royal Navy. English Language

В настоящем пособии излагается организация Военно-морских сил Великобритании, их структура и вооружение. Цель учебного пособия – изучение военной лексики, формирование навыков и умений в выполнении письменного и устного перевода текстов военного и военно-технического содержания. Учебное пособие предназначено для курсантов Учебного военного центра Института военного образования Национального исследовательского Томского государственного университета, обучающихся по специальности «Лингвистическое обеспечение военной деятельности»

What were the effects of the post-colonial experience of counterinsurgency on UK forces in southern Iraq? Were the lessons absorbed and implemented?

This thesis examines the British army and its legacy of counterinsurgency from the 20th century. It analyses the effects of post-colonial counterinsurgency and the army’s ability to learn from previous counterinsurgency conflicts to create new doctrine from earlier examples that could have had lessons for the UK forces in southern Iraq. Doctrine (both official and unofficial) ranges from endorsed army field manuals to theory written by experts while on defence fellowships. The army’s ability to create new doctrine from previous campaigns lessons and how it is diffused across the armed forces is also assessed. The conflicts used as post-colonial counterinsurgencies scrutinise Oman and Northern Ireland. These two case studies provide mixed lessons, that should advance and expand British counterinsurgency theory and models. The previous historical occurrences of counterinsurgency have created a British approach which has established a four-pillar framework which encompasses minimum force, civil-military co-operation, use of intelligence and tactical flexibility. This approach could identify lessons for a modern British army deployed to Iraq. If lessons and previous outcomes are analysed to create new doctrine, strategy and tactics that encompass the four pillars framework, what went wrong in southern Iraq? Could lessons from earlier campaigns have assisted British efforts

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) 2012 portfolio of 86 major defense acquisition programs is estimated to cost a total of $1.6 trillion, reflecting decreases in both size and cost from the 2011 portfolio. Those decreases are largely the result of more programs exiting than entering the portfolio, as well as reductions in procurement quantities due to program cancelations and restructurings. Notably a majority of programs in the portfolio gained buying power in the last year as their acquisition unit costs decreased. DOD's 10 costliest programs, excluding the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), drive most of the portfolio's cost performance and funding needs. The majority (65 percent) of the funding that DOD estimates it will need to complete its current programs is associated with those 10 programs, and almost all of that funding is for procurement.

1995 BRAC Commission

Commission Correspondence - Maelstrom and Reese AFB and Fort Chaffee. Box 83, L-005

1995 BRAC Commission

Air Force/Army - Site Visit Presentations, May 1995. Presentations to the Commission by Air Force and Army facilities during May 1995. Box 86, L-008