1,608 research outputs found
Power Side Channels in Security ICs: Hardware Countermeasures
Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that
can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption.
Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a
major threat to many cryptographic-equipped devices including smart cards,
encrypted FPGA designs, and mobile phones. Designers and manufacturers of
cryptographic devices have in response developed various countermeasures for
protection. Attacking methods have also evolved to counteract resistant
implementations. This paper reviews foundational power analysis attack
techniques and examines a variety of hardware design mitigations. The aim is to
highlight exposed vulnerabilities in hardware-based countermeasures for future
more secure implementations
On the Duality of Probing and Fault Attacks
In this work we investigate the problem of simultaneous privacy and integrity
protection in cryptographic circuits. We consider a white-box scenario with a
powerful, yet limited attacker. A concise metric for the level of probing and
fault security is introduced, which is directly related to the capabilities of
a realistic attacker. In order to investigate the interrelation of probing and
fault security we introduce a common mathematical framework based on the
formalism of information and coding theory. The framework unifies the known
linear masking schemes. We proof a central theorem about the properties of
linear codes which leads to optimal secret sharing schemes. These schemes
provide the lower bound for the number of masks needed to counteract an
attacker with a given strength. The new formalism reveals an intriguing duality
principle between the problems of probing and fault security, and provides a
unified view on privacy and integrity protection using error detecting codes.
Finally, we introduce a new class of linear tamper-resistant codes. These are
eligible to preserve security against an attacker mounting simultaneous probing
and fault attacks
A new countermeasure against side-channel attacks based on hardware-software co-design
This paper aims at presenting a new countermeasure against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks, whose implementation is based on a hardware-software co-design. The hardware architecture consists of a microprocessor, which executes the algorithm using a false key, and a coprocessor that performs several operations that are necessary to retrieve the original text that was encrypted with the real key. The coprocessor hardly affects the power consumption of the device, so that any classical attack based on such power consumption would reveal a false key. Additionally, as the operations carried out by the coprocessor are performed in parallel with the microprocessor, the execution time devoted for encrypting a specific text is not affected by the proposed countermeasure. In order to verify the correctness of our proposal, the system was implemented on a Virtex 5 FPGA. Different SCA attacks were performed on several functions of AES algorithm. Experimental results show in all cases that the system is effectively protected by revealing a false encryption key.Peer ReviewedPreprin
Higher-Order Threshold Implementation of the AES S-Box
In this paper we present a threshold implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard’s S-box which is secure against first- and second-order power analysis attacks. This security guarantee holds even in the presence of glitches, and includes resistance against bivariate attacks. The design requires an area of 7849 Gate Equivalents and 126 bits of randomness per S-box execution. The implementation is tested on an FPGA platform and its security claim is supported by practical leakage detection tests
KLEIN: A New Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers
Resource-efficient cryptographic primitives become fundamental for realizing both security and efficiency in embedded systems like RFID tags and sensor nodes. Among those primitives, lightweight block cipher plays a major role as a building block for security protocols. In this paper, we describe a new family of lightweight block ciphers named KLEIN, which is designed for resource-constrained devices such as wireless sensors and RFID tags. Compared to the related proposals, KLEIN has advantage in the software performance on legacy sensor platforms, while in the same time its hardware implementation can also be compact
An Efficient Side-Channel Protected AES Implementation with Arbitrary Protection Order
Passive physical attacks, like power analysis, pose a serious threat to the security of digital circuits. In this work, we introduce an efficient sidechannel protected Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) hardware design that is completely scalable in terms of protection order. Therefore, we revisit the private circuits scheme of Ishai et al. [13] which is known to be vulnerable to glitches. We demonstrate how to achieve resistance against multivariate higher-order attacks in the presence of glitches for the same randomness cost as the private circuits scheme. Although our AES design is scalable, it is smaller, faster, and less randomness demanding than other side-channel protected AES implementations. Our first-order secure AES design, for example, requires only 18 bits of randomness per S-box operation and 6 kGE of chip area. We demonstrate the flexibility of our AES implementation by synthesizing it up to the 15th protection order
Obfuscating Against Side-Channel Power Analysis Using Hiding Techniques for AES
The transfer of information has always been an integral part of military and civilian operations, and remains so today. Because not all information we share is public, it is important to secure our data from unwanted parties. Message encryption serves to prevent all but the sender and recipient from viewing any encrypted information as long as the key stays hidden. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the current industry and military standard for symmetric-key encryption. While AES remains computationally infeasible to break the encrypted message stream, it is susceptible to side-channel attacks if an adversary has access to the appropriate hardware. The most common and effective side-channel attack on AES is Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Thus, countermeasures to DPA are crucial to data security. This research attempts to evaluate and combine two hiding DPA countermeasures in an attempt to further hinder side-channel analysis of AES encryption. Analysis of DPA attack success before and after the countermeasures is used to determine effectiveness of the protection techniques. The results are measured by evaluating the number of traces required to attack the circuit and by measuring the signal-to-noise ratios
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