Achieving an optimal trade-off between revenue and energy peak within a smart grid environment

We consider an energy provider whose goal is to simultaneously set revenue-maximizing prices and meet a peak load constraint. In our bilevel setting, the provider acts as a leader (upper level) that takes into account a smart grid (lower level) that minimizes the sum of users' disutilities. The latter bases its decisions on the hourly prices set by the leader, as well as the schedule preferences set by the users for each task. Considering both the monopolistic and competitive situations, we illustrate numerically the validity of the approach, which achieves an 'optimal' trade-off between three objectives: revenue, user cost, and peak demand

Market Design for Generation Adequacy: Healing Causes rather than Symptoms

Keywords JEL Classification This paper argues that electricity market reform – particularly the need for complementary mechanisms to remunerate capacity – need to be analysed in the light of the local regulatory and institutional environment. If there is a lack of investment, the priority should be to identify the roots of the problem. The lack of demand side response, short-term reliability management procedures and uncompetitive ancillary services procurement often undermine market reflective scarcity pricing and distort long-term investment incentives. The introduction of a capacity mechanism should come as an optional supplement to wholesale and ancillary markets improvements. Priority reforms should focus on encouraging demand side responsiveness and reducing scarcity price distortions introduced by balancing and congestion management through better dialog between network engineers and market operators. electricity market, generation adequacy, market design, capacity mechanis

Meter Scoping Study

This report presents a summary of metering technology and cost information from past studies in an attempt to identify key barriers to more widespread implementation

Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets

This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort.Experimental economics; market design; design economics; electricity auction;

The Electricity Market Game

This paper examines the effects of imperfect competition in unregulated electricity markets from a general equilibrium perspective, and demonstrates that horizontal market power can explain both the large peak-period price spikes observed recently in California and elsewhere, and the marked reduction in additions to capacity that have also occurred during the transition to competitive markets.

Dynamic Pricing, Advanced Metering, and Demand Response in Electricity Markets

Presents an overview and analysis of the possible approaches to bringing an active demand side into electricity markets. Part of a series of research reports that examines energy issues facing California