Finitely inseparable first-order axiomatized mereotopological theories

This paper will first introduce first-order mereotopological axioms and axiomatized theories which can be found in some recent literature and it will also give a survey of decidability, undecidability as well as other relevant notions. Then the main result to be given in this paper will be the finite inseparability of any mereotopological theory up to atomic general mereotopology (AGEMT) or strong atomic general mereotopology (SAGEMT). Besides, a more comprehensive summary will also be given via making observations about other properties stronger than undecidability

Notes on models of first-order mereological theories

This paper will consider some interesting mereological models and, by looking into them carefully, will clarify some important metalogical issues, such as definability, atomicity and decidability. More precisely, this paper will inquire into what kind of subsets can be defined in certain mereological models, what kind of axioms can guarantee that any member is composed of atoms and what kind of axioms are crucial, by regulating the models in a certain way, for an axiomatized mereological theory to be decidable

Mereology then and now

This paper offers a critical reconstruction of the motivations that led to the development of mereology as we know it today, along with a brief description of some questions that define current research in the field

A modal approach to dynamic ontology: modal mereotopology

In this paper we show how modal logic can be applied in the axiomatizations of some dynamic ontologies. As an example we consider the case of mereotopology, which is an extension of mereology with some relations of topological nature like contact relation. We show that in the modal extension of mereotopology we may define some new mereological and mereotopological relations with dynamic nature like stable part-of and stable contact. In some sense such “stable” relations can be considered as approximations of the “essential relations” in the domain of mereotopology

Decidability of mereological theories

Mereological theories are theories based on a binary predicate ‘being a part of’. It is believed that such a predicate must at least define a partial ordering. A mereological theory can be obtained by adding on top of the basic axioms of partial orderings some of the other axioms posited based on pertinent philosophical insights. Though mereological theories have aroused quite a few philosophers’ interest recently, not much has been said about their meta-logical properties. In this paper, I will look into whether those theories are decidable or not. Besides, since theories of Boolean algebras are in some sense upper bounds of mereological theories which can be found in the literature, I shall also make some observations about the possibility of getting mereological theories beyond Boolean algebras

Formal Theories of Parthood

A compact overview of the main formal theories of parthood and of their mutual relationships, up to Classical Extensional Mereology. Written as an Appendix to the other essays included in the volume

A Monadic Second-Order Version of Tarski’s Geometry of Solids

In this paper, we are concerned with the development of a general set theory using the single axiom version of Leśniewski’s mereology. The specification of mereology, and further of Tarski’s geometry of solids will rely on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC). In the first part, we provide a specification of Leśniewski’s mereology as a model for an atomless Boolean algebra using Clay’s ideas. In the second part, we interpret Leśniewski’s mereology in monadic second-order logic using names and develop a full version of mereology referred to as CIC-based Monadic Mereology (λ-MM) allowing an expressive theory while involving only two axioms. In the third part, we propose a modeling of Tarski’s solid geometry relying on λ-MM. It is intended to serve as a basis for spatial reasoning. All parts have been proved using a translation in type theory

Classical mereology is not elementarily axiomatizable

By the classical mereology I mean a theory of mereological structures in the sense of [10]. In [7] I proved that the class of these structures is not elementarily axiomatizable. In this paper a new version of this result is presented, which according to my knowledge is the first such presentation in English. A relation of this result to a certain Hsing-chien Tsai’s theorem from [13] is emphasized