Sortal concepts and modality

What is the modal significance of sortal concepts? It is generally accepted that sortal concepts provide persistence conditions with modal implications that are de re, and not merely de dicto. I do not think that this important assumption has received the scrutiny that it deserves. In this paper, I examine the contrast between a ‘pure de dicto’ theory of the persistence conditions associated with sortal concepts and a variety of de re theories, both essentialist and non-essentialist. I conclude that although there is a defensible argument against the pure de dicto theory, it has two interesting implications. First, the argument lends no support to an essentialist version of the de re theory. Secondly, it appears to support the rejection of the pure de dicto theory only by a theorist who is also a pluralist about coincidence. Hence it appears to provide no justification for the rejection of the pure de dicto theory on the part of a contingent identity theorist

The non-identity problem: accounting for future people and animals

In this thesis I have argued for adopting the de dicto meaning of future individuals in non-identity cases. Although many philosophers adopt de re meaning in the non-identity cases, there is no de re reading available before making an identity-fixing decision, we can only start taking de re individuals into account after conception. Adopting the de dicto meaning is the only way to take the future individuals – people and animals – into account before their identity is fixed while making decisions that will concern them. I have proposed that in situations where there is only the de dicto meaning available and where decision maker has special responsibilities toward de dicto, the de dicto harm might be significant enough to make the decision or action at least morally problematic. To better account for the animal examples introduced by Clare Palmer, I suggested to bring another layer to the non-identity cases and consider harms on the population level where appropriate. While considering harms to population (species or breed) might appear to consider harms to a third party, in procreative context, the individual cannot be viewed as totally separate from the populations they belong to.https://www.ester.ee/record=b517914

Условия истинности модальных предложений в логике У. Оккама

The article reconstructs W. Ockham’s approach to the analysis of veracity conditions of modal propositions. General features of the semantics of modal propositions are explicated.  The author argues that they are semantically similar to the propositions about the past and the future and that the contingence of the propositions cum dicto and sine dicto is incorrect. Key words: Medieval modal logic, sine dicto and cum dicto, de re and de dicto, supposition, nominalism.Статья посвящена реконструкции подхода средневекового схоласта У. Оккама к анализу условий истинности модальных предложений. В ней эксплицированы общие черты семантики модальных предложений в логике Оккама и выявлена их семантическая близость к высказываниям о будущем и прошлом, а также обоснован вывод о том, что сближение предложений sine dicto с de re нельзя считать корректным.Ключевые слова: средневековая модальная логика, sine dicto и cum dicto, de re и de dicto, суппозиция, номинализ

De re interpretation in belief reports: An experimental investigation

Determiner phrases (DPs) under intensional operators give rise to multiple interpretations, known as the de re/de dicto ambiguity. Formal theoretical approaches to modeling this ambiguity must rely on nuanced semantic judgments, but inconsistent judgments in the literature suggest that informal judgment collection may be insufficient. In addition, little is known about how these ambiguities are resolved in context and how preferences between these readings vary by context and across individuals, etc. We reported three controlled experiments to systemize the truth-value judgment collection of de re/de dicto readings. While the de dicto readings were robustly accepted by nearly all English speakers, de re readings exhibited strongly bimodal judgments, suggesting an inherent disagreement among speakers. In addition, the acceptability of de re judgments was affected by the DP's internal structure as well as idiosyncratic scenarios. More broadly, our experimental results lend support to the practice of including quantitative data collection within semantics

De Re and De Dicto

Statements involving knowledge, intent, and the like may often be interpreted either de re (about a thing) or de dicto (about a statement). For instance, A knowingly took B\u27s car can mean either A knowingly took a car that turned out to be B\u27s, the de re interpretation, or A knowingly caused it to be the case that he took B\u27s car, the de dicto interpretation. This paper takes up twelve cases whose outcome depends on which interpretation one gives to a governing principle. It suggests that since the two alternative interpretations are equally supported by the applicable language policy considerations must be brought in to resolve the cases

The role of time in considering collections

The paper concerns the understanding of plurals in the framework of Artificial Intelligence and emphasizes the role of time. The construction of collection(s) and their evolution across time is often crucial and has to be accounted for. The paper contrasts a "de dicto" collection where the collection can be considered as persisting over these situations even if its members change with a "de re" collection whose composition does not vary through time. It expresses different criteria of choice between the two interpretations (de re and de dicto) depending on the context of enunciation

De Re and De Dicto

Statements involving knowledge, intent, and the like may often be interpreted either de re (about a thing) or de dicto (about a statement). For instance, A knowingly took B\u27s car can mean either A knowingly took a car that turned out to be B\u27s, the de re interpretation, or A knowingly caused it to be the case that he took B\u27s car, the de dicto interpretation. This paper takes up twelve cases whose outcome depends on which interpretation one gives to a governing principle. It suggests that since the two alternative interpretations are equally supported by the applicable language policy considerations must be brought in to resolve the cases

At least you tried: the value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing

I argue that there are some situations in which it is praiseworthy to be motivated only by moral rightness de dicto, even if this results in wrongdoing. I consider a set of cases that are challenging for views that dispute this, prioritising concern for what is morally important (de re, and not de dicto) in moral evaluation (for example, Arpaly, 2003; Arpaly & Schroeder, 2013; Harman 2015; Weatherson, 2019). In these cases, the agent is not concerned about what is morally important (de re), does the wrong thing, but nevertheless seems praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I argue that the views under discussion cannot accommodate this, and should be amended to recognise that it is often praiseworthy to be motivated to do what is right (de dicto)