FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence, 30 January 1998

This manual defines and describes the technical intelligence mission. It names the key technical intelligence organizations involved at the national level and their interrelationships and responsibilities. The manual describes in detail the technical intelligence organizations and operations in a US command in the field. It discusses at length the responsibilities on the key staff sections in the command. It has extensive appendices explaining forms and procedures used by forces in the field. It has an excellent list of acronyms and glossary. Comment by the depositor A clear understanding of the evolution of technical intelligence may not be needed by the intended audience of this manual, and as far as I know, no comprehensive history exists. However, supposed historical facts included in an official manual ought to be true. This manual fails in that respect. For example, this paragraph on Page 1-5 is utter nonsense: Following the Korean War, the United States did not disband its TECHINT capability completely, as had been done at the conclusion of all previous hostilities. But neither did we maintain it at its wartime level. Three small TECHINT detachments remained in place at the Army\u27s research and development centers. By 1962 two of the detachments merged to form the Army\u27s Foreign Science and Technology Center. The third detachment established the Missile Intelligence Agency at Redstone Arsenal. The Surgeon General also operated a Medical Intelligence Center at Fort Detrick, MD. At the end of World War II, technical intelligence staffs remained in the offices of the heads of the seven Army Technical Services. Between then and the creation of the Army Foreign Science and Technical Center, many of those staffs were converted into special purpose intelligence agencies as is documented by DA General Orders. The first such agency, the Signal Corps Intelligence Agency was established at Washington, DC, according to Sec. IV, DA GO 39, 18 Aug 49, before the beginning of the Korean War. Paragraph VIII of DA GO 57, 1962, established the Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and transferred the functions, personnel, records, and equipment of the Chemical Corps, Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps, Transportation Corps, and Quartermaster intelligence agencies to it. In addition Corps of Engineer technical intelligence activities which had been housed in the Army Map Service were transferred to it. The intelligence section in the office of the commanding general of the Army Missile Command was not recognized as an official intelligence production agency until much later in the 1960s. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency, which was not at Ft Detrick, was not affected by the reorganization of the Army intelligence activities outlined in Department of the Army Reorganization Planning Directive 381-2, 18 May 1962, which is available in the UNL Digital Commons at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usarmyresearch/169/ In fact, the intelligence organization which was formed in the Office of the Surgeon General went through a complicated series of reorganizations before it became the National Center for Medical Intelligence at Ft Detrick. Robert L Bolin, Associate Professor Emeritus, UNL Librarie

Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–April 2020

We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 66 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through April 2020. It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016)

FM 34-54, Battlefield Technical Intelligence, April 1990

This manual contains a theoretical description of technical intelligence within US forces in the field. It contains a brief historical sketch of the evolution of technical intelligence and a description of national intelligence organizations and an explanation of the relationships between them. It explains technical intelligence organization, operations, and responsibilities within a US command in the field. It contains extensive examples of documents and forms used in technical intelligence operations, a detailed foreign language recognition guide, an extensive list of abbreviations, and a detailed glossary

In Harm\u27s Way: The Continued Relevance of the U.S. Navy\u27s Forward Presence Mission in the Post-Cold War World

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States Navy has seen the fleet shrink from nearly 600 ships in 1988 to 320 ships in 1999, with a planned reduction to 305 ships by 2004. While the fleet has been reduced by nearly 50 percent over the last decade, the deployment of U.S. naval forces has continued at near-Cold War levels. The result is a mismatch between the national security requirements that naval forces are called on to support, and the forces available to meet those requirements. Some have suggested that the traditional forward presence mission of the Navy-Marine Corps team is no longer relevant in the post-Cold War environment. Others suggest that virtual presence through space surveillance and global air power can replace the physical presence of naval forces. Still others have advocated a return to an isolationist policy, forgoing military presence altogether. Although U.S. naval forces are no longer required to counter the threat of Soviet aggression, possible peer or near-peer competitors, such as Russia and China, combined with emerging regional powers, require that the United States maintain forces in areas near U.S. interests. This thesis will examine the continued importance of maintaining a strong naval presence in the three principal areas of U.S. interest--the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia--and the inability to meet U.S. national security requirements with proposed alternatives to forward presence. Also covered will be new systems and operational concepts of the Navy-Marine Corps team, and their importance to the forward presence mission

U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) impacts on combat aviation tactics from Gulf War I through 2007 Iraq

Unmanned, aerial vehicles (UAVs) are an increasingly important element of many modern militaries. Their success on battlefields in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the globe has driven demand for a variety of types of unmanned vehicles. Their proven value consists in low risk and low cost, and their capabilities include persistent surveillance, tactical and combat reconnaissance, resilience, and dynamic re-tasking. This research evaluates past, current, and possible future operating environments for several UAV platforms to survey the changing dynamics of combat-aviation tactics and make recommendations regarding UAV employment scenarios to the Turkish military. While UAVs have already established their importance in military operations, ongoing evaluations of UAV operating environments, capabilities, technologies, concepts, and organizational issues inform the development of future systems. To what extent will UAV capabilities increasingly define tomorrow's missions, requirements, and results in surveillance and combat tactics? Integrating UAVs and concepts of operations (CONOPS) on future battlefields is an emergent science. Managing a transition from manned- to unmanned and remotely piloted aviation platforms involves new technological complexity and new aviation personnel roles, especially for combat pilots. Managing a UAV military transformation involves cultural change, which can be measured in decades.http://archive.org/details/usunmannedaerial109454211Turkish Air Force authors.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide for Practitioners

The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that can occur in vertical mergers and the types of economic and factual analysis of competitive effects that can be applied to those mergers during the HSR review process. The analysis in the article also identifies several legal and policy issues that the agencies would consider when they undertake the process of revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines. The Appendix contains a listing and summary of the vertical merger cases challenged by the DOJ and FTC since 1994

The impact of the financial crisis on European defence: annex

The financial crisis may pose a risk as well as offer an opportunity for the European defence sector: on the one hand, it sounds plausible that shrinking budgets increase the pressure on member states to cooperate and thus overcome the EU’s problems related to capability development and restructuring of the defence industries and markets. On the other hand, national prerogatives still dominate despite a decade of rhetoric and initiatives for more cooperation and less state in EU defence. If this national focus continues to dominate under current financial circumstances, EU member states run the risk to implement cuts in their Armed Forces in an uncoordinated way. As a result, member states might end up with potentially even bigger capability gaps than they have today and hence even less opportunities to implement the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This study provides a comprehensive and detailed overview on the ongoing impact of the financial crisis on EU Member States defence spending. In addition, it examines the potential of overcoming the need to cut defence spending by greater cooperation in the framework of the European Union and by drawing upon the innovations in the Lisbon Treaty. The study highlights the need to address the challenges of the economic crisis, a growing number of initiatives by various EU countries as well as the opportunities the Lisbon Treaty offers for pursuing an effective defence sector strategy that goes beyond the current incremental approach. The study has been requested to provide Members of the European Parliament, broader defence policy community and European public a first comprehensive overview of the impact of the financial crisis on European defence and at the EU level, as well as its wider impact on the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It includes recommendations to be developed by the European Parliament and decision makers at the national and EU level in order to address the economic crisis whilst ensuring Europe retains defence capabilities to respond to future security challenges

Motivation for Air-Launch: Past, Present, and Future

Air-launch is defined as two or more air-vehicles joined and working together, that eventually separate in flight, and that have a combined performance greater than the sum of the individual parts. The use of the air-launch concept has taken many forms across civil, commercial, and military contexts throughout the history of aviation. Air-launch techniques have been applied for entertainment, movement of materiel and personnel, efficient execution of aeronautical research, increasing aircraft range, and enabling flexible and efficient launch of space vehicles. For each air-launch application identified in the paper, the motivation for that application is discussed