An Incongruent Amalgamation: John Stuart Mill\u27s Utilitarianism on Naturalism

John Stuart Mill\u27s utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, often surfaces in cultural debates in the contemporary West over the extent and foundations of moral duties. Given the drift from its historical Judeo-Christian moorings, naturalism now provides much of the epistemic grounding in Western culture in relation to moral duties. The amalgamation of Mill’s utilitarianism and naturalism has resulted in a cultural and epistemic disconnect. Naturalism is hard-pressed to provide consistent epistemic support for Mill’s utilitarian principle. This essay provides a number of suggestions as to why Mill’s utilitarianism may be inconsistent on naturalism

Cultural Naturalism

Peer reviewe

Naturalism, Evolution and Culture

In my essay, I will argue that evolution does not undermine naturalism. This is because Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism rests on a false and unmotivated premise and is thus invalid. My argument consists of two parts: In the expository part, I outline Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism in considerable detail (section 2). In the argumentative part, I firstly pose William Ramsey’s challenge to Plantinga’s probabilistic claim that the reliability of human cognitive faculties is low and critically examine Plantinga’s response in order to reinforce it (section 3). Secondly, I attack Plantinga’s understanding of human evolution, which motivates his cognitive skepticism, as being unduly narrow (section 4)

Ethics in the Context of Evolutionary Naturalism

The author explores the contributions of three biologists—Ernst Mayr, E. O. Wilson, and Lynn Margulis—to evolutionary theories of ethics. In particular, how does each relate his or her view of ethics to naturalistic and humanistic philosophies? A humanistic ethic could lead to appeals to some sort of \"transcendence\" that is scientifically suspect. Naturalistic ethics, on the other hand, could lead to a sterile view of human culture. Can these two be brought together into some kind of naturalistic humanism? This essay presents some initial steps in this direction, based on a survey of the thought of these scientists

Cultural Naturalism and the Market God

This work employs John Dewey\u27s cultural naturalism to explore how and why the orthodox economic tradition functions as a religious faith.Scholars such as the theologian Harvey Cox and others now view orthodox economic practice as a religion. Other scholars such as Max Weber, Alasdair MacIntyre, and numerous others view modern economic practice as exemplifying a particular ethic. The focus in this work is placed upon the destructive consequences of practicing the Market faith. This work argues that much of contemporary economic practice maintains a view of science that is incompatible with the kind of naturalism found in Classical American Pragmatism. The history of the development of economics as a religious faith is explored beginning in the seventeenth-century up to the present day. The philosophical assumptions that have composed this relatively new faith are analyzed in detail. The conclusion provides an account of what we may hope for in the future

Habemus habermas: o universalismo ético entre o naturalismo e a religião

The article revisits Habermas’s recasting of moral universalism, so as to avoid the aporias of naturalism and cultural relativism, according to a pragmatic-formal perspective that does justice to the complex phenomenon of religion in a postsecular, pluralist world, where believers, atheists, and agnostics can coexist together and actively participate in the construction of a more tolerant, just society.The article revisits Habermas’s recasting of moral universalism, so as to avoid the aporias of naturalism and cultural relativism, according to a pragmatic-formal perspective that does justice to the complex phenomenon of religion in a postsecular, pluralist world, where believers, atheists, and agnostics can coexist together and actively participate in the construction of a more tolerant, just society

Naturalizing ethics

In this essay we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies—Hume’s and Moore’s—that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not an especially worrisome for ethical naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes the essence of Duke Naturalism. (NOTE: This is a slightly modified reprint of Flangan et al 2007 of the same title.

Naturalizing ethics

In this essay we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies—Hume’s and Moore’s—that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not an especially worrisome for ethical naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes the essence of Duke Naturalism