Interception of electronic communications in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

The book is concerned with a legal regulation of interception of electronic communications in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. There are analysed legal instruments embodied within the framework of enforceable law which can be used by police for the sake of criminal investigation and other specialised tasks arising from the Act No. 273/2008 Sb., on Police of the Czech Republic, or by intelligence agencies during fulfilling of their duties. Consequently, in seven chapters, there is described and analysed a structure of legal regulation of interception of electronic communications, constitutional safeguards, access authorization of relevant public agencies, and possibilities of use of the interceptions in court proceedings. Analysis of Slovak legal regulation is present in the form of the eighth comparative chapter. The book is also concerned with collection and retention of operational and localisation data, access to them and their use in court proceedings.Monografie se zabývá právní úpravou odposlechů elektronických komunikací v České republice a na Slovensku. Analyzuje účinnou právní úpravu možnosti provádění odposlechů elektronických komunikací orgány činnými v trestním řízení při odhalování a vyšetřování trestné činnosti policií za účelem plnění zvláštních úkolů vyplývajících ze zákona č. 273/2008 Sb., o Policii České republiky a zpravodajskými službami při plnění jejich úkolů. V sedmi kapitolách je postupně popsána struktura právní úpravy odposlechů elektronických komunikací, jsou analyzována ústavněprávní východiska, oprávnění dotčených orgánů veřejné moci na přístup k odposlechům a možnost užití odposlechů během soudního řízení. Slovenská právní úprava je obsažena formou osmé komparativní kapitoly. Monografie se dotýká rovněž tzv. data retention, tedy uchovávání provozních a lokalizačních údajů ze sítí elektronických komunikací a přístupu k nim

Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of Surveillance

It is no longer reasonable to assume that electronic communications can be kept private from governments or private-sector actors. In theory, encryption can protect the content of such communications, and anonymity can protect the communicator\u27s identity. But online anonymity-one of the two most important tools that protect online communicative freedom-is under practical and legal attack all over the world. Choke-point regulation, online identification requirements, and data-retention regulations combine to make anonymity very difficult as a practical matter and, in many countries, illegal. Moreover, key internet intermediaries further stifle anonymity by requiring users to disclose their real names. This Article traces the global development of technologies and regulations hostile to online anonymity, beginning with the early days of the Internet. Offering normative and pragmatic arguments for why communicative anonymity is important, this Article argues that anonymity is the bedrock of online freedom, and it must be preserved. U.S. anti-anonymity policies not only enable repressive policies abroad but also place at risk the safety of anonymous communications that Americans may someday need. This Article, in addition to providing suggestions on how to save electronic anonymity, calls for proponents of anti-anonymity policies to provide stronger justifications for such policies and to consider alternatives less likely to destroy individual liberties. In a time where surveillance technology and laws demanding identification abound, protecting the right to speak freely without fear of official retribution is critical to protecting these liberties

THE EAR OF DIONYSUS: RETHINKING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE

As the 110th Congress begins to flex its atrophied oversight muscle, it bears remembering that, in the ongoing debate over who should have the authority to authorize and oversee foreign intelligence surveillance programs, someone must, and the existing mechanisms, in particular, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ( FISA\u27) and its related procedures, are no longer adequate and must be updated. The FISA simply did not anticipate the nature of the current threat to national security from transnational terrorism, nor did it anticipate the development of global communication networks or advanced technical methods for intelligence gathering

The Un-Territoriality of Data

Territoriality looms large in our jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to the government’s authority to search and seize. Fourth Amendment rights turn on whether the search or seizure takes place territorially or extraterritorially; the government’s surveillance authorities depend on whether the target is located within the United States or without; and courts’ warrant jurisdiction extends, with limited exceptions, only to the borders’ edge. Yet the rise of electronic data challenges territoriality at its core. Territoriality, after all, depends on the ability to define the relevant “here” and “there,” and it presumes that the “here” and “there” have normative significance. The ease and speed with which data travels across borders, the seemingly arbitrary paths it takes, and the physical disconnect between where data is stored and where it is accessed critically test these foundational premises. Why should either privacy rights or government access to sought-after evidence depend on where a document is stored at any given moment? Conversely, why should State A be permitted to unilaterally access data located in State B, simply because technology allows it to do so, without regard to State B’s rules governing law enforcement access to data held within its borders? This Article addresses these challenges. It explores the unique features of data and highlights the ways in which data undermines longstanding assumptions about the link between data location and the rights and obligations that should apply. Specifically, it argues that a territorial-based Fourth Amendment fails to adequately protect “the people” it is intended to cover. Conversely, the Article warns against the kind of unilateral, extraterritorial law enforcement that electronic data encourages — in which nations compel the production of data located anywhere around the globe, without regard to the sovereign interests of other nations

Strengthening e-crime legislation in the UAE: learning lessons from the UK and the EU

The electronic revolution brought with it technological innovations that are now integral to communication, business, commerce and the workings of governments all over the world. It also significantly changed the criminal landscape. Globally it has been estimated that crime conducted via the internet (e-crime) costs more than €290 billion annually. Formulating a robust response to cybercrime in law is a top priority for many countries that presents ongoing challenges. New cybercrime trends and behaviours are constantly emerging, and debates surrounding legal provisions to deal with them by increasing online tracking and surveillance are frequently accompanied by concerns of the rights of citizens to freedom, privacy and confidentiality. This research compares the ways that three different legislative frameworks have been navigating these challenges. Specifically, it examines the legal strategies of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU). The UAE is comparatively inexperienced in this area, its first law to address e-crime was adopted in 2006, sixteen years after the UK, and so the express purpose of this study is to investigate how e-crime legislation in the UAE can be strengthened. Drawing on a range of theoretical resources supplemented with empirical data, this research seeks to provide a comprehensive account of how key e-crime legislation has evolved in the UAE, the UK and the EU, and to evaluate how effective it has been in tackling cybercrime. Integral to this project is an analysis of some of the past and present controversies related to surveillance, data retention, data protection, privacy, non-disclosure and the public interest. An important corollary of this research is how e-crime legislation is not only aligned with political and economic aims, but when looking at the UAE, the discrete ways that legislation can be circumscribed by cultural, social and religious norms comes into focus

Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution: Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic Abroad

This Article reveals interdependent legal and technical loopholes that the US intelligence community could use to circumvent constitutional and statutory safeguards for Americans. These loopholes involve the collection of Internet traffic on foreign territory, and leave Americans as unprotected as foreigners by current United States (US) surveillance laws. This Article will also describe how modern Internet protocols can be manipulated to deliberately divert American’s traffic abroad, where traffic can then be collected under a more permissive legal regime (Executive Order 12333) that is overseen solely by the executive branch of the US government. Although the media has reported on some of the techniques we describe, we cannot establish the extent to which these loopholes are exploited in practice. An actionable short-term remedy to these loopholes involves updating the antiquated legal definition of “electronic surveillance” in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), that has remained largely intact since 1978. In the long term, however, a fundamental reconsideration of established principles in US surveillance law is required, since these loopholes cannot be closed by technology alone. Legal issues that require reconsideration include the determination of applicable law by the geographical point of collection of network traffic, the lack of general constitutional or statutory protection for network-traffic collection before users are “intentionally targeted,” and the fact that constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment is limited to “US persons” only. The combination of these three principles results in high vulnerability for Americans when the US intelligence community collects Americans’ network traffic abroad

Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a Technology Fix - Doctrine to Follow

While the Jones Court held unanimously that the Government’s use of a GPS device to track Antoine Jones’s vehicle for twenty-eight days was a Fourth Amendment search, the Justices disagreed on the facts and rationale supporting the holding. Beyond the very narrow trespass-based search theory regulating the Government’s attachment of a GPS device to Jones’s vehicle with the intent to gather information, the majority opinion does nothing to constrain government use of other tracking technologies, including cell phones, which merely involve the transmission of electronic signals without physical trespass. While the concurring opinions endorse application of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to instances of government use of tracking technologies that do not depend on physical trespass, they offer little in the way of clear, concrete guidance to lower courts that would seek to apply Katz in such cases. Taken as a whole, then, the Jones opinions leave us still “Jonesing” for a privacy mandate

A democratic licence to operate

Preface Britain is an open, democratic and increasingly digital society. Technological innovation and the growth in global communication networks have enabled commerce, trade and the transfer of knowledge. British citizens, companies and the government have embraced the benefits of these ever-expanding national and international networks. The availability of digital technology is having a profound effect on society. Computers guide our everyday activities and regulate our communications. Big data is reshaping the way we live, work and think. Digital information is helping us to identify social trends, tackle crime and prevent disease. More information and data is being shared: between citizens themselves; between citizens and government; consumers and companies; and exchanged by the public and private sectors. Often this information is shared across national borders. Protecting privacy and ensuring data security is necessary but is thus becoming more difficult as information volumes increase and are moved and stored around the world. The strain of technological evolution on society is particularly acute in the realms of crime, national security and public safety. Technological developments have enhanced the capacity of governments, companies and citizens to know more about individuals and to undertake surveillance, interception and data collection. The Internet has become the front line in contemporary debates about privacy and security. Privacy is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of individual freedom, and its erosion weakens the constitutional foundations on which democracy and good governance have traditionally been based in this country. Successive governments have faced a perpetual dilemma: democratic societies demand openness about what is being done in their name but key aspects of the way that police, security and intelligence agencies operate must remain secret in order for their work to be effective. These agencies are dependent on the public’s consent, and in an open society there is therefore an important understanding between citizens and the state that the agencies must operate within a strict legal framework, that their intrusions into private life must be necessary and proportionate, and that they must be overseen and scrutinised by independent bodies. In Britain how these principles apply in practice in the digital age has been the subject of considerable controversy, with recent reviews concluding that the state of the law has not matched the pace of technological change

Assemblages of Surveillance, Security & State Power: The Politics of Data Collection in the Anglosphere

Digital networks have transformed relations within and between states, markets, corporations, and populations, easing the flow of people, capital, goods, and information across borders. This connectivity is often perceived as undermining the state's legitimacy as an effective sovereign entity. Against this, some prominent International Relations scholars have sought to understand how states have not only been transformed by connectivity, but have been central to its governance. There is a growing focus on ‘transgovernmental' cohorts of states that use networked strategies to offset the challenges encountered in the digital era (e.g. Slaughter, 2009 & 2017; Bach & Newman, 2014; Keohane & Nye, 1974). Providing useful conceptual tools, this scholarship does not satisfactorily engage with the dynamics of these networks and how they operate as responses to, and governing influence upon, the spaces and vectors created by global connectivity. In response, this thesis focuses on three advanced liberal democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Referred to as the Five Eyes"# and the Anglosphere", this thesis argues that, building on deep historical, cultural, linguistic, and political ties, these once discrete states have become deeply networked. Beyond military cooperation, these states collaborate in often unseen ways to acquire the legislative and technical capacity to maintain their reputations as sovereign in a connected world. The actions of these states diverge from the wider West, breaking with democratic norms. This thesis argues that moves to secure access to the data generated by and about individuals for the purposes of surveillance, policing, and national security, signals a renegotiation of the limits of the state power in the Anglosphere. This thesis explores (i) the how Anglosphere states have rationalised their response to the 'challenges' posed by digital communications and encryption technologies; (ii) what that response reveals about the shifting limits of state power, and (iii) how these connected insights transforms theorising of contemporary sovereignty. The thesis finds that, drawing on notions of ungoverned space, the US, UK, and Australia have rationalised a range of regulatory measures that aim to equip them with the resources deemed necessary to collectively assert sovereignty over networked spaces, digitally empowered individuals, and economically, socially, politically, and technologically connected populations.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Social Sciences, 202

An analysis of the relationship between individuals’ perceptions of privacy and mobile phone location data - a grounded theory study

The mobile phone is a ubiquitous tool in today’s society, a daily companion for the majority of British citizens. The ability to trace a mobile phone’s geographic position at all times via mobile phone networks generates potentially sensitive data that can be stored and shared for significant lengths of time, particularly for the purpose of crime and terrorism investigations. This thesis examines the implications of the storage and use of mobile phone location data on individuals’ perceptions of privacy. The grounded theory methodology has been used to illustrate patterns and themes that are useful in understanding the broader discourses concerning location data relating to privacy, technology and policy-setting. The main contribution of this thesis is the development of a substantive theory grounded in empirical data from interviews, mobile phone location tracking and a survey. This theory is specific to a particular area, as it maps the relationship between mobile phone location data and perceptions of privacy within the UK. The theory confirms some arguments in the literature that argue that the concept of privacy is changing with individuals' increased dependence on electronic communications technologies in day-to-day life. However, whilst individuals tend to hold a rather traditional picture of privacy, not influenced by technology and solely related to their own personal lives, scholars paint a picture of privacy that is affected by technology and relates to society as a whole. Digital mass data collections, such as communications data retention, are not perceived as privacy invasive by individuals. Mobile phone location data is not seen as related to a citizen's daily life but instead primarily as a crime investigation tool. A recognition and understanding of the divergence between the perceptions and definitions of privacy between individuals and the academic literature in relation to mobile phone location data is of relevance, as it should impact on future policies regulating the gathering, storage and analysis of personal data