A Tale of Two Networks: Terrorism, Transnational Law, and Network Theory

Talk of networks and network theory has become almost ubiquitous in the field of counterterrorism. Terrorist organizations are networks. Terrorists have been empowered by the Internet, ethnic diasporas, and cell phones—networks all. Many of the putative targets of terrorists—electrical grids, oil pipelines, and transportation systems, to name a few—are themselves networks. And, perhaps less often mentioned, terrorists are increasingly hampered by national and international laws that foster cooperation and coordination among states—a network of laws. From smart mobs to net wars, from narco-trafficking to the Internet, network theory has provided insights into decentralized social organizations and their coordinated action. Both sides in the War on Terror are networked and are themselves networks. This essay is the tale of two networks: what happens when the network of terror and the network of law collide. Part II will briefly introduce the network theory and use it to describe the mechanisms of al Qaeda\u27s terror network. Part III will turn to how network theory has affected counterterrorism strategy, particularly emphasizing intelligence analysis and the use of legal regimes to leverage strengths. Part IV will return to network theory more broadly and ask how the network of law can be adjusted to be more effective in disrupting the terrorists\u27 network. This essay concludes that, despite the hostility of the Bush Administration to international law and that Administrations\u27 efforts to circumvent existing domestic legal regimes, the network of domestic and international laws, including the protection of civil liberties, is a crucial component to a successful counterterrorism strategy

Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle: A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Model for Combatting New Terrorism

Terrorism in the new millennium has morphed drastically since the 1970s. The terrorist organizations of today are a hybrid between the insurgent group models of the 1960s and modern terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. This hybrid model has created what has become a transnational insurgency recruited, trained, and led by major terrorist networks such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Even smaller regional groups such as Boko Haram have surpassed merely conducting terrorist attacks. These smaller groups are also focused on controlling territory. Tan (2008) refers to this change as “New Terrorism”. To combat New Terrorism, a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and counterterrorism tactics must be employed. This study will examine the need to define roles and responsibilities for various organization and various echelons through the introduction of a new Special Operations Forces model; Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle. The acronym to be used for this model is D3. This model recommends different tactics, techniques, and procedures for forces not specifically assigned the counterterrorism mission. As new terrorism continues to change, only counterterrorism forces should be tasked with the Find Fix Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) model of targeting (Counterterrorism 2014). All other military and law enforcement elements should disrupt and deny the enemy in support of the counterterrorism effort. This study is based on extensive research and the author’s 23 years of experience serving in U.S. Army Special Forces. Throughout his career, the author interacted with people from various social, economic, and professional backgrounds throughout the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans

Europe: reinforcing existing trends

The main impact of 9/11 on European societies has been to crystallize the pre-existing debate on immigration around the culturalist paradigm. In mainstream thinking the culture of the immigrants came to be seen as the major obstacle to their integration. Issues as discrimination, disadvantaged socioeconomic position, and unemployment in the immigrant communities and their impact upon radicalization receded in the publics’ mind. Whilst the febrile debate on the compatibility of Islam with western values that had ensued has abated, a decade long Islam-centered security obsession has left its mark. Anti-Muslim prejudice has gained traction in mainstream thinking – even if its most extremist expression has again become the hallmark of a new generation of radical right groups, who claim the anti-Islam and anti-immigration themes as their unique selling proposition. But as was the case before 9/11, the situation differs among countries, with some countries displaying a more serene debate about the place of Muslims and Islam in society than others. One could argue that as apprehension among the public about Islam fluctuates, polity and media shoulder a crucial responsibility as to the way this issue is framed and discussed.Immigration and integration will indeed undoubtedly continue to be matters of intense policy discussion, sometimes (but not always) linked to Islam. Since Europe too has become an immigration continent, it experiences the same fluctuating apprehensions about the newcomers’ impact on society as the United States did with the nativist movement from the 19th century onwards. Nativist anti-immigration sentiments indeed remain present in European countries as well as grievances resulting from the fragile socio-economical position of immigration communities. This mix remains a potent cocktail for polarization and a major challenge for society in general. But they are now by and large devoid of the national security concerns they were associated with in the years following 9/11

U.S. Surveillance of Citizens: The Prevention of Domestic Terrorism

The United States drastically increased the powers given to the federal government following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as the sheer number of casualties and shock that struck the nation called for an immediate response. The fear of another mass attack is still within the minds of the American people, and the U.S. government has taken measures to attempt to prevent such a tragedy. This thesis will analyze the topic of domestic surveillance, as well as ethical concerns for the criminal justice field, and will explore the future of homeland security and anti-terrorism for this country if this trend of surveillance continues

EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?

Europe did not wake up to terrorism on 9/11; terrorism is solidly entrenched in Europe's past. The historical characteristics of Europe's counterterrorism approach have been first, to treat terrorism as a crime to be tackled through criminal law, and second, to emphasize the need for understanding the 'root causes' of terrorism in order to be able to prevent terrorist acts. The 9/11 attacks undoubtedly brought the EU into uncharted territory, boosting existing cooperation and furthering political integration-in particular in the field of justice and home affairs, where most of Europe's counterterrorism endeavours are situated-to a degree few would have imagined some years earlier. This development towards European counterterrorism arrangements was undoubtedly event-driven and periods of inertia and confusion alternated with moments of significant organizational breakthroughs. The 2005 London attacks contributed to a major shift of emphasis in European counterterrorism thinking. Instead of an external threat, terrorism now became a home-grown phenomenon. The London bombings firmly anchored deradicalization at the heart of EU counterterrorism endeavours

The internet and terrorism: pathways towards terrorism & counter-terrorism

The internet and terrorism: pathways towards terrorism & counter-terroris

Conceptualizing al-Qaeda and US Grand Strategy

The US debate about the nature of al-Qaeda and the associated threat does not occur in a political or ideological vacuum. In fact, given its on-going political salience, questions such as what al-Qaeda is, how it can be conceptualized and defeated provide a large number of access points for those trying to shape broader US policies and underlying discourses. In the context of Middle East politics, for example, the perception of an on-going terrorist threat allowed some to argue for US policies that take into account Palestinian demands, whilst others stressed the need to uphold a close relationship with the Israeli government and to vigorously pursue the ‘national interest’.1 More recently, the answer to the question of whether al-Qaeda can still be thought of as having a coherent core or whether it simply serves as a brand for essentially local, bottom-up radicalization processes has direct implications for the question of whether the US-led military presence in Afghanistan and the aggressive pursuit of the Taliban should be at the heart of US counterterrorism efforts. Ultimately, the US debate about al-Qaeda is inextricably linked to specific ontologies of international politics and long-held convictions about the global role which the United States should and can play. That is why the present analysis follows in the footsteps of those who have called for closer attention to be paid to individual perceptions and convictions as the intervening variable between international incentives and policy outcomes