7,155 research outputs found
If Donald Trump were Mexican, would he still be Donald Trump? The problem of identity in counterfactuals and a dispositionalist solution
The study of counterfactuals has produced some well-known problems concerning identity. I focus on two of them. I suggest that a dispositionalist account of counterfactuals, not involving possible worlds but dispositions and potentiality, could solve both. First is the problem of identity across possible worlds, concerning the identification of individuals in various possible worlds. Dispositionalism can solve it: its aim is to explain counterfactuals in the actual world, without appealing to possible worlds. This would eliminate the problem because the individuals involved in counterfactuals would be in the actual world, without needing identification in other worlds. Second is the problem of what I call ‘property alteration’. In ‘if Donald Trump were Mexican, he wouldn’t be President of the USA’, denying Trump’s property of ‘being a US citizen’ could lead us to deny the identity between the Donald Trump we know and the Donald Trump of the counterfactual. Barbara Vetter’s version of dispositionalism can solve also this problem, introducing the concept of ‘potentiality’
Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds? A Difficulty for Fine’s Exact Semantics for Counterfactuals
In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The difficulty undermines Fine's reasons for preferring exact semantics to possible worlds semantics
Some Aspects of Modality in Analytical Mechanics
This paper discusses some of the modal involvements of analytical mechanics.
I first review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and
Hamilton-Jacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involvements; both are
related to David Lewis' work on modality, especially on counterfactuals.
The first is the way Hamilton-Jacobi theory uses ensembles, i.e. sets of
possible initial conditions. The structure of this set of ensembles remains to
be explored by philosophers.
The second is the way the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches' variational
principles state the law of motion by mentioning contralegal dynamical
evolutions. This threatens to contravene the principle that any actual truth,
in particular an actual law, is made true by actual facts. Though this threat
can be avoided, at least for simple mechanical systems, it repays scrutiny; not
least because it leads to some open questions.Comment: 36 pages, no figures. Delivered at a Philosophy of Science
Association Symposium in memory of the distinguished philosopher David Lewis,
Milwaukee, November 2002. This version includes significant additions to
Section 5.1. This version is forthcoming in `Formal Teleology and Causality',
ed. M. Stoeltzner, P. Weingartner, Paderborn, Germany: Mentis. A precis of
the first half of the paper is forthcoming in the journal Philosophy of
Scienc
Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics
It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’
Counterfactuals of Ontological Dependence
A great deal has been written about 'would' counterfactuals of causal dependence. Comparatively little has been said regarding 'would' counterfactuals of ontological dependence. The standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics is inadequate for handling such counterfactuals. That's because some of these counterfactuals are counterpossibles, and the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics trivializes for counterpossibles. Fortunately, there is a straightforward extension of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics available that handles counterpossibles: simply take Lewis's closeness relation that orders possible worlds and unleash it across impossible worlds. To apply the extended semantics, an account of the closeness relation for counterpossibles is needed. In this paper I offer a strategy for evaluating 'would' counterfactuals of ontological dependence that understands closeness between worlds in terms of the metaphysical concept of grounding
Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles
Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails
Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism
Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1Introduction2Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems3Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together4Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism4.1High-grade necessity4.2Unity in diversity5Conclusio
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