Markets for information : of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A complete characterization of the equilibria of the game is provided. We find that information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. Also, the market for information tends to be a monopoly, and there is typically inefficiency given by underinvestment in information acquisition. Regulatory interventions in the form of firewalls, limiting the access to the sale of information to third parties, uninterested in trading the underlying object, only make the inefficiency worse. On the other hand, efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked. The above findings hold when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component. When that is not the case, and the vertical differentiation element is more important, firewalls can in fact be beneficial.Information sale, Cheap talk, Conflicts of interest, Information acquisition, Chinese walls, Market efficiency

Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies

In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A complete characterization of the equilibria of the game is provided. We find that information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. Also, the market for information tends to be a monopoly, and there is typically inefficiency given by underinvestment in information acquisition. Regulatory interventions in the form of firewalls, limiting the access to the sale of information to third parties, uninterested in trading the underlying object, only make the inefficiency worse. On the other hand, efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked. The above findings hold when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component. When that is not the case, and the vertical differentiation element is more important, firewalls can in fact be beneficial.information acquisition, cheap talk, sale of information

Markets for information : of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A complete characterization of the equilibria of the game is provided. We find that information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. Also, the market for information tends to be a monopoly, and there is typically inefficiency given by underinvestment in information acquisition. Regulatory interventions in the form of firewalls, limiting the access to the sale of information to third parties, uninterested in trading the underlying object, only make the inefficiency worse. On the other hand, efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked. The above findings hold when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component. When that is not the case, and the vertical differentiation element is more important, firewalls can in fact be beneficial

Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies

In this paper we study, within a formal model, market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. Agents may then sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose the trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable - cheap talk messages - hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders. We find that, in equilibrium, information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. Also, the market for information tends to be a monopoly, and there is inefficiency given by underinvestment in information acquisition. Regulatory interventions in the form of firewalls, limiting the access to the sale of information to agents uninterested in trading the underlying object, only make the inefficiency worse. Efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked. The above findings hold when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component. When the vertical differentiation element is more important firewalls can in fact be beneficial.Information sale, Cheap talk, Conflicts of interest, Information Acquisition, Firewalls, Market efficiency

The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: A Suggested Revision (March 26, 2020)

The FTC and DOJ requested comments on their draft Vertical Merger Guidelines in January 2020. This article is a complete alternative set of suggested Vertical Merger Guidelines that reflects and supplements the approach explained in the comments submitted by the author along with Jonathan. Baker, Nancy Rose and Fiona Scott Morton, as well as their other comments, and might be read in conjunction with those comments. This suggested revision of the Agencies’ draft expands the list of potential competition harms and provides illustrative examples. It expands and unifies the discussion and treatment of potential competitive benefits. It deletes the quasi-safe harbor and suggests the circumstances under which competitive harms raise lessened concerns on the one hand and heightened concerns on the other

Методы оценки налогооблагаемой прибыли в Германии

Оценка налогооблагаемой прибыли имеет важнейшее значение для налоговой нагрузки в сфере бизнеса и поэтому является предметом политических дискуссий и претерпевает постоянные изменения. С учетом актуальности проблемы, сформулирована цель исследования: анализ законодательно установленных методов оценки налогооблагаемой прибыли в Германии, их достоинств и недостатков, а также особенностей их практического применения. Данный анализ может быть использован для изучения перспектив совершенствования налоговой системы и развития бизнеса в России. В статье рассматриваются сферы применения различных методов оценки прибыли. Выявлено, что важнейшими из них являются метод полного сравнения операционных активов компании (налоговый баланс) и метод основанный на оценке чистой прибыли. Главное отличие этих методов в том, что первый построен на основе сопоставления балансов на начало и конец года, что и позволяет сравнивать операционные активы, а второй базируется на принципе денежного потока (поступления и расходования денежных средств). В работе подробно описывается применение указанных методов. Проведенный анализ показал, что сравнение операционных активов компании является более точным методом, хотя и гораздо более дорогостоящим, чем отчетность, основанная на методе чистой прибыли. Анализ подтверждается практическими примерами.The assessment of taxable earnings is of fundamental importance for the corporate tax burden. Therefore it is often subject of political discussions and is either witnessing a constant process of change. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to analyse the structure of the assessment of taxable earnings in Germany. This can be used to obtain information on the possibilities for future national developments in Russia. We start with an overview of the areas of application of the different methods for the assessment of earnings. It shows that the complete comparison of a company’s operating assets (so-called tax balance sheet) and the statement based on the net income method are the most important methods. The fundamental difference between this two methods: the statement based on the net income method is controlled by the inflow and outflow principle (flow value statement), the stock value statement, which makes it necessary to draw up two balance sheets (one at the start of the year and one at the end of the year, underlies the comparison of the company’s operating assets. Therefore the analysis focuses on these two methods. It shows, that the complete comparison of a company’s operating assets is more accurate but although much more costly than the statement based on the net income method. The analysis is supported by practical examples, which are also used to illustrate the differences between the two main methods

Externality-correcting taxes and regulation

Much of the literature on externalities has considered taxes and direct regulation as alternative policy instruments. Both instruments may in practice be imperfect, reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider cases where taxes are either imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases we characterise the optimal instrument mix, and show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax

Traceability in the U.S. Food Supply: An Application of Transaction Cost Analysis

Suboptimal supply of food and agricultural traceability is framed in a transaction cost analysis. We propose a model that considers the variables of opportunism potential, agency costs, uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency, and transaction costs. The model is then applied to the development of a typology of feasible governance modes – market, hybrid, firm, or public bureau, considering levels of transaction costs and competencies of private firms. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed and future research opportunities are suggested.traceability supply, transaction cost economics, agency theory, Agribusiness,

Evolution and Culture

The goal of cross-cultural psychology to identify and explain similarities and differences in the behavior of individuals in different cultures requires linking human behavior to its context (Cole, Meshcheryakov & Ponomariov, 2011). In order to specify this relation, the focus is usually on the sociocultural environment and how it interacts with behavior. Since cross-cultural psychology also deals with the evolutionary and biological bases of behavior, this focus on culture has regularly led to an unbalanced view (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis & Sam, 2011). Too often, biology and culture are seen as opposites: what is labeled as cultural is not biological and what is labeled as biological is not cultural (Chasiotis, 2010, 2011a). This article will first introduce the central concepts of natural and sexual selection, adaptation, and the epigenetic (open) genetic processes in evolutionary biology, and indicate their psychological implications. It will then argue that biology and culture are intricately related. Finally, empirical evidence from diverse psychological research areas will be presented to illustrate why the study of the evolutionary basis is as essential as the analysis of the sociocultural context for the understanding of behavior. Due to space restrictions, cultural transmission will be the only research area which is addressed in more detail (more examples of evolutionary approaches in intelligence, personality, and behavior genetics and their implications for cross-cultural research can be found on the website accompanying Berry et al., 2011; see also further readings section)

Externality-correcting taxes and regulation

Much of the literature on externalities has considered taxes and direct regulation as alternative policy instruments. Both instruments may in practice be imperfect, reflecting informational deficiencies and other limitations. We analyse the use of taxes and regulation in combination, to control externalities arising from individual consumption behaviour. We consider cases where taxes are either imperfectly differentiated to reflect individual differences in externalities, or where some consumption escapes taxation. In both cases we characterise the optimal instrument mix, and show how changing the level of direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax.externalities, Pigouvian taxes, regulations