Correlated Anarchy in Overlapping Wireless Networks

We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users start out completely uneducated and naive but, by using a fixed set of strategies to process a broadcasted training signal, they quickly evolve and converge to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Then, in order to measure efficiency in this steady state, we adapt the notion of the price of anarchy to our setting and we obtain an explicit analytic estimate for it by using methods from statistical physics (namely the theory of replicas). Surprisingly, we find that the price of anarchy does not depend on the specifics of the wireless nodes (e.g. spectral efficiency) but only on the number of strategies per user and a particular combination of the number of nodes, the number of users and the size of the training signal. Finally, we map this game to the well-studied minority game, generalizing its analysis to an arbitrary number of choices.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures; to appear in the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication, Special Issue on Game Theory in Communication Systems, 200

On the Two-user Multi-carrier Joint Channel Selection and Power Control Game

In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the energy efficiency maximization problem where transmitters individually choose their channel assignment and power control. We conduct a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Interestingly, we formally show that a spectrum orthogonalization naturally occurs when users decide sequentially about their transmitting carriers and powers, delivering a binary channel assignment. Both analytical and simulation results are provided for assessing and improving the performances in terms of energy efficiency and spectrum utilization between the simultaneous-move game (with synchronous decision makers), the social welfare (in a centralized manner) and the proposed Stackelberg (hierarchical) game. For the first time, we provide tight closed-form bounds on the spectral efficiency of such a model, including correlation across carriers and users. We show that the spectrum orthogonalization capability induced by the proposed hierarchical game model enables the wireless network to achieve the spectral efficiency improvement while still enjoying a high energy efficiency.Comment: 31 pages, 13 figures, accepted in IEEE Transactions on Communication

Automated Dynamic Offset Applied to Cell Association

In this paper, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian game framework for automated dynamic offset selection. Users compete to maximize their throughput by picking the best locally serving radio access network (RAN) with respect to their own measurement, their demand and a partial statistical channel state information (CSI) of other users. In particular, we investigate the properties of a Stackelberg game, in which the base station is a player on its own. We derive analytically the utilities related to the channel quality perceived by users to obtain the equilibria. We study the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of such system, where the PoA is the ratio of the social welfare attained when a network planner chooses policies to maximize social welfare versus the social welfare attained in Nash/Stackeleberg equilibrium when users choose their policies strategically. We show by means of a Stackelberg formulation, how the operator, by sending appropriate information about the state of the channel, can configure a dynamic offset that optimizes its global utility while users maximize their individual utilities. The proposed hierarchical decision approach for wireless networks can reach a good trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. Typically, it is shown that when the network goal is orthogonal to user's goal, this can lead the users to a misleading association problem.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures, technical report. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1002.3931, arXiv:0903.2966 by other author

Convergent learning algorithms for potential games with unknown noisy rewards

In this paper, we address the problem of convergence to Nash equilibria in games with rewards that are initially unknown and which must be estimated over time from noisy observations. These games arise in many real-world applications, whenever rewards for actions cannot be prespecified and must be learned on-line. Standard results in game theory, however, do not consider such settings. Specifically, using results from stochastic approximation and differential inclusions, we prove the convergence of variants of fictitious play and adaptive play to Nash equilibria in potential games and weakly acyclic games, respectively. These variants all use a multi-agent version of Q-learning to estimate the reward functions and a novel form of the e-greedy decision rule to select an action. Furthermore, we derive e-greedy decision rules that exploit the sparse interaction structure encoded in two compact graphical representations of games, known as graphical and hypergraphical normal form, to improve the convergence rate of the learning algorithms. The structure captured in these representations naturally occurs in many distributed optimisation and control applications. Finally, we demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithms in a simulated ad hoc wireless sensor network management problem

Bandwidth and Power Management in Broadband Wireless Networks

Bandwidth and power are considered as two important resources in wireless networks. Therefore, how to management these resources becomes a critical issue. In this thesis, we investigate this issue majorally in IEEE 802.16 networks. We first perform performance analysis on two bandwidth request mechanisms defined in IEEE 802.16 networks. We also propose two practical performance objectives. Based on the analysis, we design two scheduling algorithm to achieve the objectives. Due to the characteristics of popular variable bit rate (VBR) traffic, it is very difficult for subscriber stations (SSs) to make appropriate bandwidth reservation. Therefore, the bandwidth may not be utilized all the time. We propose a new protocol, named bandwidth recycling, to utilized unused bandwidth. Our simulation shows that the proposed scheme can improve system utilization averagely by 40\%. We also propose a more aggressive solution to reduce the gap between bandwidth reservation and real usage. We first design a centralized approach by linear programming to obtain the optimal solution. Further, we design a fully distributed scheme based on game theory, named bandwidth reservation (BR) game. Due to different quality of service (QoS) requirements, we customize the utility function for each scheduling class. Our numerical and simulation show that the gap between BR game and optimal solution is limited. Due to the advantage of dynamical fractional frequency reuse (DFFR), the base station (BS) can dynamically adjust transmission power on each frequency partition. We emphasis on power allocation issue in DFFR to achieve most ecomicical data transmission. We first formulate the problem by integer linear programming (ILP). Due to high computation complexity, we further design a greedy algorithm. Our simulation shows that the results of the greedy algorithm is very close to the ILP results

Selfishness, altruism and message spreading in mobile social networks

Many kinds of communication networks, in particular social and opportunistic networks, rely at least partly on on humans to help move data across the network. Human altruistic behavior is an important factor determining the feasibility of such a system. In this paper, we study the impact of different distributions of altruism on the throughput and delay of mobile social communication system. We evaluate the system performance using four experimental human mobility traces with uniform and community-biased traffic patterns. We found that mobile social networks are very robust to the distributions of altruism due to the nature of multiple paths. We further confirm the results by simulations on two popular social network models. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first complete study of the impact of altruism on mobile social networks, including the impact of topologies and traffic patterns.published_or_final_versio

Content Sharing in Mobile Networks with Infrastructure: Planning and Management

This thesis focuses on mobile ad-hoc networks (with pedestrian or vehicular mobility) having infrastructure support. We deal with the problems of design, deployment and management of such networks. A first issue to address concerns infrastructure itself: how pervasive should it be in order for the network to operate at the same time efficiently and in a cost-effective manner? How should the units composing it (e.g., access points) be placed? There are several approaches to such questions in literature, and this thesis studies and compares them. Furthermore, in order to effectively design the infrastructure, we need to understand how and how much it will be used. As an example, what is the relationship between infrastructure-to-node and node-to-node communication? How far away, in time and space, do data travel before its destination is reached? A common assumption made when dealing with such problems is that perfect knowledge about the current and future node mobility is available. In this thesis, we also deal with the problem of assessing the impact that an imperfect, limited knowledge has on network performance. As far as the management of the network is concerned, this thesis presents a variant of the paradigm known as publish-and-subscribe. With respect to the original paradigm, our goal was to ensure a high probability of finding the requested content, even in presence of selfish, uncooperative nodes, or even nodes whose precise goal is harming the system. Each node is allowed to get from the network an amount of content which corresponds to the amount of content provided to other nodes. Nodes with caching capabilities are assisted in using their cache in order to improve the amount of offered conten