Coordinating a multi-retailer decentralized distribution system with random demand based on buyback and compensation contracts

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to set up the coordinating mechanism for a decentralized distribution system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers by means of contracts. It is in the two-stage supply chain system that all retailers sell an identical product made by the manufacturer and determine their order quantities which directly affect the expected profit of the supply chain with random demand. Design/methodology/approach: First comparison of the optimal order quantities in the centralized and decentralized system shows that the supply chain needs coordination. Then the coordination model is given based on buyback cost and compensation benefit. Finally the coordination mechanism is set up in which the manufacturer as the leader uses a buyback policy to incentive these retailers and the retailers pay profit returns to compensate the manufacturer. Findings: The results of a numerical example show that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved in the multi-retailer supply chain by the buyback and compensation contracts. Research limitations: The results based on assumptions might not completely hold in practice and the paper only focuses on studying a single product in two-stage supply chain Practical implications: The coordination mechanism is applicable to a realistic supply chain under a private information setting and the research results is the foundation of further developing the coordination mechanism for a realistic multi-stage supply chain system with more products. Originality/value: This paper focused on studying the coordination mechanism for a decentralized multi-retailer supply chain by the joint application of the buyback and compensation contracts. Furthermore the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit are achieved.Peer Reviewe

Coordinating a multi-retailer decentralized distribution system with random demand based on buyback and compensation contracts

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to set up the coordinating mechanism for a decentralized distribution system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers by means of contracts. It is in the two-stage supply chain system that all retailers sell an identical product made by the manufacturer and determine their order quantities which directly affect the expected profit of the supply chain with random demand. Design/methodology/approach: First comparison of the optimal order quantities in the centralized and decentralized system shows that the supply chain needs coordination. Then the coordination model is given based on buyback cost and compensation benefit. Finally the coordination mechanism is set up in which the manufacturer as the leader uses a buyback policy to incentive these retailers and the retailers pay profit returns to compensate the manufacturer. Findings: The results of a numerical example show that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved in the multi-retailer supply chain by the buyback and compensation contracts. Research limitations: The results based on assumptions might not completely hold in practice and the paper only focuses on studying a single product in two-stage supply chain Practical implications: The coordination mechanism is applicable to a realistic supply chain under a private information setting and the research results is the foundation of further developing the coordination mechanism for a realistic multi-stage supply chain system with more products. Originality/value: This paper focused on studying the coordination mechanism for a decentralized multi-retailer supply chain by the joint application of the buyback and compensation contracts. Furthermore the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit are achieved.Peer Reviewe

Coordinating a Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Agents under Demand and Consumer Returns Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal order decision in a supply chain when it faces uncertain demand and uncertain consumer returns. We build consumer returns model with decision-makers’ risk preference under mean-variance objective framework and discuss supply chain coordination problem under wholesale-price-only policy and the manufacturer’s buyback policy, respectively. We find that, with wholesale price policy, the supply chain cannot be coordinated whether the supply chain agents are risk-neutral or risk-averse. However, with buyback policy, the supply chain can be coordinated and the profit of the supply chain can be arbitrarily allocated between the manufacturer and the retailer. Through numerical examples, we illustrate the impact of stochastic consumer returns and the supply chain agents’ risk attitude on the optimal order decision

Game-theoretic analysis of supply chain coordination under advertising and price dependent demand

Supply chain members cannot act independently and they need to act as a part of a unified system and coordinated with other members. Therefore, a coordination mechanism may be necessary to motivate members to achieve coordination. In this paper, the coordination problem is studied in a two-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where demand is a function of price and advertising expenditures in two scenarios. The first scenario is “No coordination”, and the other scenario is “coordination with Revenue sharing contract”. The models are solved using game theory, Cooperative and Nash equilibrium. Finally, numerical examples are presented indicating that the average expected profit in the second scenario, coordination with revenue sharing, is higher than the first scenario. In addition numerical examples indicate that as price and advertising elasticity to demand increase, profitability of supply chain decreases

Supply chain contracting coordination for fresh products with fresh-keeping effort

Purpose – Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. This paper aims to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived. Design/methodology/approach – To address this issue, we consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e., wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision-making. We start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at end. Findings – The results show that (a) the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; (b) a fresh product supply chain can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; (c) the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; (d) the profit of a fresh product supply chain is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price. Originality/value – Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem

Three-Level Supply Chain Coordination under Disruptions Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract with Price Dependent Demand

Considering the market demand is stochastic and dependent on price, this paper shows that the revenue-sharing contract could coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer under normal environment. However, the original revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain under disruptions in circumstances of certain incidents leading to significant changes in market demand and causing additional deviation costs. To solve the problem, this essay introduces two improved forms of revenue-sharing contract: a mixed contract form based on a quantity discount policy and a pure form, which are characterized by antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form or in the multiplicative form with price dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples

Decentralized and centralized supply chains with trade credit option

The notion of a trade credit period is a common business practice, where a supplier allows a buyer a specified period to make a payment in full for a purchase made. The objective of this thesis is to explore the role of such a credit payment option in supply chain management. Towards this end, a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a single supplier (e.g. manufacturer) and the cases of both a single and multiple buyers (e.g. retailers) is examined under decentralized (independent) and centralized (coordinated) decision making scenarios. The major emphasis of this research is limited to the case of a single product with price-sensitive deterministic, as well as stochastic market demand.The conditions under which a trade credit period should be offered and its appropriate length are determined from the supplier’s perspective under the decentralized case. Under the centralized decision scenario, the efficacy of a trade credit policy as a supply chain coordination mechanism is thoroughly analyzed and guidelines for pricing, production and delivery decisions are developed. The concepts developed in this study are illustrated via a number of numerical examples, in conjunction with thorough sensitivity analyses involving some selected problem parameters.The major contribution of this thesis is that we incorporate the pricing and inventory issues in supply chains with an endogenous credit payment period. This is the first study that examines the efficacy of trade credit option as a coordination mechanism. We propose a coordination mechanism that coordinates the supply chain, when a trade credit by itself is not sufficient to serve such a purpose, while preserving the benefits of a trade credit option. Also, this study is the first to examine the issues concerning trade credit under price sensitive stochastic demand. Another first for this work is the exploration of the implications of a trade credit policy in supply chains consisting of multiple competing retailers. The effects of the extent of competition and the market size on trade credit policy are evaluated. Our analyses lead to some important practical implications, to serve as managerial guidelines.Ph.D., Decision Sciences -- Drexel University, 201