A Rational Approach to Cryptographic Protocols

This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties. Concretely, several concepts of two-person games and of two-party cryptographic protocols are here combined in order to model the latters as the formers. One of the main advantages of analysing a cryptographic protocol in the game-theory setting is the possibility of describing improved and stronger cryptographic solutions because possible adversarial behaviours may be taken into account directly. With those tools, protocols can be studied in a malicious model in order to find equilibrium conditions that make possible to protect honest parties against all possible strategies of adversaries

The Existence and Persistence of a Winner’s Curse: New Evidence from the (Baseball) Field

This study takes advantage of recent developments in the measurement and valuation of individual output in the baseball labor market to (i) reassess prior evidence that this market is afflicted by the winner’s curse phenomenon and (ii) test whether bidders learn to avoid this curse over time. Though we find no evidence of negative average returns on player contracts for the earliest cohort of baseball free agents, we conclude that teams in that era failed to efficiently discount their bids in accord with available information, especially about risk. What is more, evidence from a larger sample of players signed in the late 1990s shows that teams have continued to overvalue inconsistent free agents and failed to limit their bids to conform to players’ lower values in small markets. This is consistent with experimental evidence that finds bounded-rational behavior when bidders are faced with complex valuation problems involving multiple elements.market efficiency, bounded rationality, overbidding

The Impact of China’s Labor Contract Law on Workers

ILRF\u27s report examines the impact of the Labor Contract Law on workplaces in China’s export manufacturing hubs. ILRF argues for various strategies, from a greater emphasis on collective bargaining to community-based legal education, to ensure full implementation of the Labor Contract Law

Balancing Fairness and Predictability: An Analysis of Proposed Modifications to Standards Regarding the Enforcement of Prenuptial Agreements

Article published in the Michigan State University School of Law Student Scholarship Collection

Organizing and Representing Clerical Workers: The Harvard Model

[Excerpt] The private sector clerical work force is largely nonunion, simultaneously offering the labor movement a major source of potential membership growth and an extremely difficult challenge. Based on December 1990 data, there are eighteen million workers employed in office clerical, administrative support, and related occupations. Eighty percent of these employees are women, accounting for 30 percent of all women in the labor force. Among private sector office workers, 57 percent work in the low-union-density industry groups of services (only 5.7 percent union) and finance, insurance, and real estate (only 2.5 percent union). With barely over ten million total private sector union members, the labor movement can ill afford to overlook the thirteen million nonunion women who work in private sector clerical occupations. Concerned trade unionists are now searching for appropriate models for organizing and representing these workers. Two schools of thought have emerged. Some believe that clericals are like other workers and can be organized when job-related concerns predispose them to action. According to this view, private sector clerical organizing can proceed if and when unions devote sufficient attention and resources to the endeavor using conventional organizing techniques. Other unionists argue that clericals are different. Not only are they primarily women, but they also tend to be traditionally feminine and turned off by macho blue-collar unionism. According to this interpretation, a special approach is required regarding style, tactics, and/or issues to be addressed. I will focus on one highly visible private sector clerical organizing victory: the 1988 union win among Harvard University clerical and technical employees. The Harvard case is, in many ways, representative of the success unions have experienced among university-based clerical workers in recent years using rank-and-file grassroots oriented campaigns. And, as a private sector campaign that confronted intense management opposition, it also offers tactical lessons that are relevant beyond the confines of academia. Perhaps most important, the Harvard case presents us with a distinct organizing and bargaining model whose relevance to other organizing efforts deserves careful evaluation: the Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers (HUCTW) not only employed a grassroots organizingapproach, but also devised a unique bargaining strategy that succeeded in institutionalizing and preserving rank-and-file involvement

Questions About the Efficiency of Employment Arbitration Agreements

The growing popularity of arbitration agreements is well-documented. The academic literature on these agreements has been largely critical, arguing that they jeopardize important rights and enable employers to take unfair advantage of employees and consumers. However, standard economic analysis suggests that since these agreements are freely negotiated, they presumably increase the utility of both parties and are therefore efficient. This Article raises questions about the efficiency of such agreements in the employment context. It begins by modeling the decision-making process by which a rational employee would judge the desirability of an agreement, both after and before a dispute has arisen. The model demonstrates that no employee can, in reality, have the information necessary to make a rational economic judgment about a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. In the absence of information, systematic behavioral heuristics will lead employees to overlook or misjudge the costs and benefits of such agreements. Given that employees are not signing these agreements on the basis of rational economic analysis, the Article considers possible arguments that the agreements might still increase societal efficiency. Ultimately, it concludes that proponents of pre-dispute agreements need to provide stronger evidence of such efficiencies. In the meantime, courts, legislators, and commentators should focus more on the decision-making imperfections that can lead to inefficient arbitration agreements

Vermont\u27s Dairy Sector: Is There a Sustainable Future for the 800 lb. Gorilla?

Key Questions Will the organic sector resume its previous prolific growth or will it stagnate? The growth in artisan cheese presents an opportunity for a few farmers, but will it continue? How does the interest in local foods affect Vermont’s dairy sector? Will the interest in raw milk present a future option for dairy farmers