Optimal Strategies for Decision Theoretic Online Learning

We extend the drifting games analysis to continuous time and show that the optimal adversary, if the value function has strictly positive derivative up to fourth order is bronian motion

Boating Against the Current: Cases, Concepts, Models and Development Power

Generalizing from many of actual problems, this paper puts forward the game: boating against the current, discusses the related assumptions and analyzes the related characters of it. Further more, the author gives the dispersed and continuous models for boating against the current Based on the Partial Distribution[14]-[17]. It is worth to say that the game of boating against the current is a representative example of Development Power problems [18]-[21]. So we should see that the theories of Development Power is proved to have a wide realistic background, and studying Development Power is important for human to interpret and to analyze the macro-laws and macro-characters of economy and society developing.boating against the current, Development Power (DP), Partial Distribution, society and economy, analytic model

On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-valued Auctions

Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects. In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprisesPublicad

Punishment in Public Goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the population. Evolutionary game theory has shown that under certain conditions, cooperation nonetheless evolves stably, for example if players have the opportunity to punish cheaters that benefit from a public good yet refuse to pay into the common pool. However, punishment has remained enigmatic because it is costly, and difficult to maintain. On the other hand, cooperation emerges naturally in the Public Goods game if the synergy of the public good (the factor multiplying the public good investment) is sufficiently high. In terms of this synergy parameter, the transition from defection to cooperation can be viewed as a phase transition with the synergy as the critical parameter. We show here that punishment reduces the critical value at which cooperation occurs, but also creates the possibility of meta-stable phase transitions, where populations can "tunnel" into the cooperating phase below the critical value. At the same time, cooperating populations are unstable even above the critical value, because a group of defectors that are large enough can "nucleate" such a transition. We study the mean-field theoretical predictions via agent-based simulations of finite populations using an evolutionary approach where the decisions to cooperate or to punish are encoded genetically in terms of evolvable probabilities. We recover the theoretical predictions and demonstrate that the population shows hysteresis, as expected in systems that exhibit super-heating and super-cooling. We conclude that punishment can stabilize populations of cooperators below the critical point, but it is a two-edged sword: it can also stabilize defectors above the critical point.Comment: 22 pages, 9 figures. Slight title change, version that appears in Physical Biolog