Cascading Failures in Bi-partite Graphs: Model for Systemic Risk Propagation

As economic entities become increasingly interconnected, a shock in a financial network can provoke significant cascading failures throughout the system. To study the systemic risk of financial systems, we create a bi-partite banking network model composed of banks and bank assets and propose a cascading failure model to describe the risk propagation process during crises. We empirically test the model with 2007 US commercial banks balance sheet data and compare the model prediction of the failed banks with the real failed banks after 2007. We find that our model efficiently identifies a significant portion of the actual failed banks reported by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The results suggest that this model could be useful for systemic risk stress testing for financial systems. The model also identifies that commercial rather than residential real estate assets are major culprits for the failure of over 350 US commercial banks during 2008-2011.Comment: 13 pages, 7 figure

Approaching Economic Issues through Epidemiology–An Introduction to Business Epidemiology

In the tradition of transferring models and concepts from one science to another, our research explores the possibility of importing some concepts, definitions and approaches from human epidemiology to economic research, based on the extensive usage of medical terms and concepts in economy. The article explores some basic epidemiology concepts and their possible relevance to economic research, with the final goal to provide a new viewpoint over the economic phenomena, usable in economic crisis. The article introduces the concept of “business epidemiology” as a possible scientific approach to the economic crisis.epidemiology; business disease; company health; research methodology; financial contagion

DebtRank-transparency: Controlling systemic risk in financial networks

Banks in the interbank network can not assess the true risks associated with lending to other banks in the network, unless they have full information on the riskiness of all the other banks. These risks can be estimated by using network metrics (for example DebtRank) of the interbank liability network which is available to Central Banks. With a simple agent based model we show that by increasing transparency by making the DebtRank of individual nodes (banks) visible to all nodes, and by imposing a simple incentive scheme, that reduces interbank borrowing from systemically risky nodes, the systemic risk in the financial network can be drastically reduced. This incentive scheme is an effective regulation mechanism, that does not reduce the efficiency of the financial network, but fosters a more homogeneous distribution of risk within the system in a self-organized critical way. We show that the reduction of systemic risk is to a large extent due to the massive reduction of cascading failures in the transparent system. An implementation of this minimal regulation scheme in real financial networks should be feasible from a technical point of view.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figure

Transient fluctuation of the prosperity of firms in a network economy

The transient fluctuation of the prosperity of firms in a network economy is investigated with an abstract stochastic model. The model describes the profit which firms make when they sell materials to a firm which produces a product and the fixed cost expense to the firms to produce those materials and product. The formulae for this model are parallel to those for population dynamics. The swinging changes in the fluctuation in the transient state from the initial growth to the final steady state are the consequence of a topology-dependent time trial competition between the profitable interactions and expense. The firm in a sparse random network economy is more likely to go bankrupt than expected from the value of the limit of the fluctuation in the steady state, and there is a risk of failing to reach by far the less fluctuating steady state

Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax

Financial markets are exposed to systemic risk (SR), the risk that a major fraction of the system ceases to function, and collapses. It has recently become possible to quantify SR in terms of underlying financial networks where nodes represent financial institutions, and links capture the size and maturity of assets (loans), liabilities, and other obligations, such as derivatives. We demonstrate that it is possible to quantify the share of SR that individual liabilities within a financial network contribute to the overall SR. We use empirical data of nationwide interbank liabilities to show that the marginal contribution to overall SR of liabilities for a given size varies by a factor of a thousand. We propose a tax on individual transactions that is proportional to their marginal contribution to overall SR. If a transaction does not increase SR it is tax-free. With an agent-based model (CRISIS macro-financial model) we demonstrate that the proposed "Systemic Risk Tax" (SRT) leads to a self-organised restructuring of financial networks that are practically free of SR. The SRT can be seen as an insurance for the public against costs arising from cascading failure. ABM predictions are shown to be in remarkable agreement with the empirical data and can be used to understand the relation of credit risk and SR.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figure

Financial asset bubbles in banking networks

We consider a banking network represented by a system of stochastic differential equations coupled by their drift. We assume a core-periphery structure, and that the banks in the core hold a bubbly asset. The banks in the periphery have not direct access to the bubble, but can take initially advantage from its increase by investing on the banks in the core. Investments are modeled by the weight of the links, which is a function of the robustness of the banks. In this way, a preferential attachment mechanism towards the core takes place during the growth of the bubble. We then investigate how the bubble distort the shape of the network, both for finite and infinitely large systems, assuming a non vanishing impact of the core on the periphery. Due to the influence of the bubble, the banks are no longer independent, and the law of large numbers cannot be directly applied at the limit. This results in a term in the drift of the diffusions which does not average out, and that increases systemic risk at the moment of the burst. We test this feature of the model by numerical simulations.Comment: 33 pages, 6 table