97 research outputs found
Programación binivel y equilibrios conjeturados: resultados teóricos y algoritmos numéricos.
This thesis presents the fruit of 3 years of research. During this time 3 works were developed,
each one with its own mathematical formulations and results. These works are, of
course, related to each other and will be further developed in the near future.
The first work of this thesis is presented in chapter 1 and addresses the problem
of defining an optimality criterion for a semi-public company in a semi-mixed duopoly
model. Here, we have two agents competing, the semi-public company and a private firm,
both producing a homogeneous good to satisfy the demand in the market. The private
firm, as usual, seeks to maximize its net profit, while the semi-public company has a
commitment to watch over the economy of the population, but at the same time, does
not neglect its own profit. The compromise between these two objectives for the semipublic
company is described by a parameter β ∈ (0, 1], where β → 0 represents that the
semi-public company thinks only for its own net profit, and β = 1 represents that the
semi-public company cares solely for the economy of the population without seeking its
own benefit
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Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods
This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words)
Global Dynamics in Repeated Games with Additively Separable Payoffs
This paper studies the global dynamics of a class of infinitely repeated two-player games in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in their actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium such that each player's action is a stationary function of the opponent's last action. We completely characterize IREs and their dynamics in terms of certain indifference curves. Our results are used to show that in a prisoners' dilemma game with observable mixed strategies, gradual cooperation occurs when the players are sufficiently patient, and that in a certain duopoly game, kinked demand curves emerge naturally.Immediately reactive equilibria, Additively separable payoffs, Kinked demand, Gradual cooperation, Prisoners' dilemma
Game theory and industrial organization
In this article, we consider how important developments in game theory have contributed to the theory of industrial organization. Our goal is not to survey the theory of industrial organization; rather, we consider the contribution of game theory through a careful discussion of a small number of topics within the industrial organization field. We also identify some points in which developments in the theory of industrial organization have contributed to game theory. The topics that we consider are: commitment in two-stage games and the associated theories of strategic-trade policy and entry deterrence; asymmetric-information games and the associated theories of limit pricing and predation; repeated games with public moves and the associated theory of collusion in markets with public demand fluctuations; mixed-strategy equilibria and purification theory and the associated theory of sales; and repeated games with imperfect monitoring and the associated theory of collusion and price wars. We conclude with a general assessment concerning the contribution of game theory to industrial organization
Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs
This paper studies a class of infinitely repeated games with two players in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in their actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium such that the action of each player is a stationary function of the last action of the other player. We show that the set of IREs in the simultaneous move game is identical to that in the alternating move game. In both games, IREs are completely characterized in terms of indifference curves associated with what we call effective payoffs. A folk-type theorem using only IREs is established in a special case. Our results are applied to a prisoner's dilemma game with observable mixed strategies and a duopoly game. In the latter game, kinked demand curves with a globally stable steady state are derived.
Channel Management and differentiation strategies: A case study from the market for fresh produce
The paper analyses the current differentiation strategies in the market for fresh produce. First a short review of the literature on channel structure and product differentiation is presented, in order to identify, on a theoretical grounding the incentives for differentiation strategies. Second, a case study is drawn of a UK channel intermediary organisation carrying out differentiation policies in the fresh produce category (on behalf of UK multiple retailer customers) supplied by a dedicated Italian grower. Results show that in the fresh produce industry there is room for product differentiation, but with contradictory welfare effects.fresh produce, product differentiation, channel structure and management, Agribusiness, Marketing,
Equilibrium in Generalized Cournot and Stackelberg Models
A model of an oligopolistic market with a homogeneous product is examined. Each subject of the model uses a conjecture about the market response to variations of its production volume. The conjecture value depends upon both the current total volume of production at the market and the subject's contribution into it. Under general enough assumptions, the equilibrium existence and uniqueness theorems are proven. Furthermore, a particular assumption { namely, constant elasticity, { is considered, and the generalized Stackelberg model comprising several leaders is investigated.oligopolistic market;conjectural variations;equilibrium;leaders and followers
Equilibrium in Generalized Cournot and Stackelberg Models
A model of an oligopolistic market with a homogeneous product is examined. Each subject of the model uses a conjecture about the market response to variations of its production volume. The conjecture value depends upon both the current total volume of production at the market and the subject's contribution into it. Under general enough assumptions, the equilibrium existence and uniqueness theorems are proven. Furthermore, a particular assumption { namely, constant elasticity, { is considered, and the generalized Stackelberg model comprising several leaders is investigated.
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