Multi-Layer Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience for Smart Grid

The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that integrates communication technologies with the physical layer operation of the energy systems. Security and resilience mechanisms by design are important to provide guarantee operations for the system. This chapter provides a layered perspective of the smart grid security and discusses game and decision theory as a tool to model the interactions among system components and the interaction between attackers and the system. We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the design of cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing protocol at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges of the information security at the management layer of the grid. The chapter will discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in addressing multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.Comment: 16 page

Game Theory Relaunched

The game is on. Do you know how to play? Game theory sets out to explore what can be said about making decisions which go beyond accepting the rules of a game. Since 1942, a well elaborated mathematical apparatus has been developed to do so; but there is more. During the last three decades game theoretic reasoning has popped up in many other fields as well - from engineering to biology and psychology. New simulation tools and network analysis have made game theory omnipresent these days. This book collects recent research papers in game theory, which come from diverse scientific communities all across the world; they combine many different fields like economics, politics, history, engineering, mathematics, physics, and psychology. All of them have as a common denominator some method of game theory. Enjoy

Incentive Engineering for Concurrent Games

We consider the problem of incentivising desirable behaviours in multi-agent systems by way of taxation schemes. Our study employs the concurrent games model: in this model, each agent is primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of a goal, expressed as a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula; secondarily, agents seek to minimise costs, where costs are imposed based on the actions taken by agents in different states of the game. In this setting, we consider an external principal who can influence agents' preferences by imposing taxes (additional costs) on the actions chosen by agents in different states. The principal imposes taxation schemes to motivate agents to choose a course of action that will lead to the satisfaction of their goal, also expressed as an LTL formula. However, taxation schemes are limited in their ability to influence agents' preferences: an agent will always prefer to satisfy its goal rather than otherwise, no matter what the costs. The fundamental question that we study is whether the principal can impose a taxation scheme such that, in the resulting game, the principal's goal is satisfied in at least one or all runs of the game that could arise by agents choosing to follow game-theoretic equilibrium strategies. We consider two different types of taxation schemes: in a static scheme, the same tax is imposed on a state-action profile pair in all circumstances, while in a dynamic scheme, the principal can choose to vary taxes depending on the circumstances. We investigate the main game-theoretic properties of this model as well as the computational complexity of the relevant decision problems.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2023, arXiv:2307.0400

Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery

Studies investigating the relationship between lobbying and bribery are limited and contradictory. Some studies regard lobbying and bribery as substitutes while others consider them complementary strategies. Using congestion games this study attempts to clarify the externalities present in these rent-seeking strategies which generate complementarities between them. Lobbying cost-sharing and cooperation through business associations and congestion in benefits from competitive bribery are important sources of externalities. The theoretical model is then investigated empirically. The results indicate that lobbying and bribery are complementary strategies. However, as countries grow, lobbying will be used more intensely. The results also show that there is a positive externality in collective lobbying so that firms that cooperate can save on lobbying costs. There are also externalities in competitive bribery. The results show that the effects of social and legal punishments of bribery are considerable but become less severe as corruption becomes more widespread

Proceedings, MSVSCC 2013

Proceedings of the 7th Annual Modeling, Simulation & Visualization Student Capstone Conference held on April 11, 2013 at VMASC in Suffolk, Virginia

Report on DIMACS Working Group Meeting: Mathematical Sciences Methods for the Study of Deliberate Releases of Biological Agents and their Consequences

55 pages, 1 article*Report on DIMACS Working Group Meeting: Mathematical Sciences Methods for the Study of Deliberate Releases of Biological Agents and their Consequences* (Castillo-Chavez, Carlos; Roberts, Fred S.) 55 page

Approaches to the Security Analysis of Power Systems: Defence Strategies Against Malicious Threats

This report is intended to provide a conceptual framework for assessing the security risk to power systems assets and operations related to malicious attacks. The problem is analysed with reference to all the actors involved and the possible targets. The specific nature of the malicious attacks is discussed and representations in terms of strategic interaction are proposed. Models based on Game Theory and Multi Agent Systems techniques specifically developed for the representation of malicious attacks against power systems are presented and illustrated with reference to applications to small-scale test systems.JRC.G.6-Sensors, radar technologies and cybersecurit

Prevention of terrorism : an assessment of prior POM work and future potentials

© 2020 Production and Operations Management Society In this study, we review POM-based research related to prevention of terrorism. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) terrorist attacks have the potential to be prevented. Consequently, the focus of this study is on security enhancement and improving the resiliency of a nation to prevent terrorist attacks. Accordingly, we review articles from the 25 top journals, [following procedures developed by Gupta et al. (2016)], in the fields of Production and Operations Management, Operations Research, Management Science, and Supply Chain Management. In addition, we searched some selected journals in the fields of Information Sciences, Political Science, and Economics. This literature is organized and reviewed under the following seven core capabilities defined by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): (1) Intelligence and Information Sharing, (2) Planning, (3) Interdiction and Disruption, (4) Screening, Search, and Detection, (5) Forensics and Attribution, (6) Public Information and Warning, and (7) Operational Coordination. We found that POM research on terrorism is primarily driven by the type of information that a defending country and a terrorist have about each other. Game theory is the main technique that is used in most research papers. Possible directions for future research are discussed