3,367 research outputs found
-anonymous Signaling Scheme
We incorporate signaling scheme into Ad Auction setting, to achieve better
welfare and revenue while protect users' privacy. We propose a new
\emph{-anonymous signaling scheme setting}, prove the hardness of the
corresponding welfare/revenue maximization problem, and finally propose the
algorithms to approximate the optimal revenue or welfare
Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
We study the asymmetric binary matrix partition problem that was recently
introduced by Alon et al. (WINE 2013) to model the impact of asymmetric
information on the revenue of the seller in take-it-or-leave-it sales.
Instances of the problem consist of an binary matrix and a
probability distribution over its columns. A partition scheme
consists of a partition for each row of . The partition acts
as a smoothing operator on row that distributes the expected value of each
partition subset proportionally to all its entries. Given a scheme that
induces a smooth matrix , the partition value is the expected maximum
column entry of . The objective is to find a partition scheme such that
the resulting partition value is maximized. We present a -approximation
algorithm for the case where the probability distribution is uniform and a
-approximation algorithm for non-uniform distributions, significantly
improving results of Alon et al. Although our first algorithm is combinatorial
(and very simple), the analysis is based on linear programming and duality
arguments. In our second result we exploit a nice relation of the problem to
submodular welfare maximization.Comment: 17 page
Online Learning and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences
We consider the problem of learning from revealed preferences in an online
setting. In our framework, each period a consumer buys an optimal bundle of
goods from a merchant according to her (linear) utility function and current
prices, subject to a budget constraint. The merchant observes only the
purchased goods, and seeks to adapt prices to optimize his profits. We give an
efficient algorithm for the merchant's problem that consists of a learning
phase in which the consumer's utility function is (perhaps partially) inferred,
followed by a price optimization step. We also consider an alternative online
learning algorithm for the setting where prices are set exogenously, but the
merchant would still like to predict the bundle that will be bought by the
consumer for purposes of inventory or supply chain management. In contrast with
most prior work on the revealed preferences problem, we demonstrate that by
making stronger assumptions on the form of utility functions, efficient
algorithms for both learning and profit maximization are possible, even in
adaptive, online settings
What Makes them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising
We study users' response to sponsored-search advertising using data from Microsoft's Live AdCenter distributed in the "Beyond Search" initiative. We estimate a structural model of utility maximizing users, which quantifies "user experience" based on their "revealed preferences," and predicts user responses to counterfactual ad placements. In the model, each user chooses clicks sequentially to maximize his expected utility under incomplete information about the relevance of ads. We estimate the substitutability of ads in users' utility function, the fixed effects of different ads and positions, user uncertainty about ads' relevance, and user heterogeneity. We find substantial substitutability of ads, which generates large negative externalities: 40% more clicks would occur in a hypothetical world in which each ad faces no competition. As for counterfactual ad placements, our simulations indicate that CTR-optimal matching increases CTR by 10.1% while user-optimal matching increases user welfare by 13.3%. Moreover, targeting ad placement to specific users could raise user welfare by 59%. Here, we find a significant suboptimality (up to 16% of total welfare) in case the search engine tries to implement a sophisticated matching policy using a misspecified model that does not account for externalities. Finally, user welfare could be raised by 14% if they had full information about the relevance of ads to them.
On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that
have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer wants a
specific number of items; a bundle of size less than has no value,
while a bundle of size greater than is worth no more than the most valued
items (valuations being additive). We consider the objective of setting
prices and allocations in order to maximize the total revenue of the market
maker. The pricing problem with sharp multi-unit demand buyers has a number of
properties that the unit-demand model does not possess, and is an important
question in algorithmic pricing. We consider the problem of computing a revenue
maximizing solution for two solution concepts: competitive equilibrium and
envy-free pricing.
For unrestricted valuations, these problems are NP-complete; we focus on a
realistic special case of "correlated values" where each buyer has a
valuation v_i\qual_j for item , where and \qual_j are positive
quantities associated with buyer and item respectively. We present a
polynomial time algorithm to solve the revenue-maximizing competitive
equilibrium problem. For envy-free pricing, if the demand of each buyer is
bounded by a constant, a revenue maximizing solution can be found efficiently;
the general demand case is shown to be NP-hard.Comment: page2
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