17,849 research outputs found
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution
concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems
such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty
regarding the model about the opponent. This paper is, to our knowledge, the
first to investigate Stackelberg equilibria under uncertainty in extensive-form
games, one of the broadest classes of game. We introduce robust Stackelberg
equilibria, where the uncertainty is about the opponent's payoffs, as well as
ones where the opponent has limited lookahead and the uncertainty is about the
opponent's node evaluation function. We develop a new mixed-integer program for
the deterministic limited-lookahead setting. We then extend the program to the
robust setting for Stackelberg equilibrium under unlimited and under limited
lookahead by the opponent. We show that for the specific case of interval
uncertainty about the opponent's payoffs (or about the opponent's node
evaluations in the case of limited lookahead), robust Stackelberg equilibria
can be computed with a mixed-integer program that is of the same asymptotic
size as that for the deterministic setting.Comment: Published at AAAI1
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution
concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems
such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty
regarding the model about the opponent. This paper is, to our knowledge, the
first to investigate Stackelberg equilibria under uncertainty in extensive-form
games, one of the broadest classes of game. We introduce robust Stackelberg
equilibria, where the uncertainty is about the opponent's payoffs, as well as
ones where the opponent has limited lookahead and the uncertainty is about the
opponent's node evaluation function. We develop a new mixed-integer program for
the deterministic limited-lookahead setting. We then extend the program to the
robust setting for Stackelberg equilibrium under unlimited and under limited
lookahead by the opponent. We show that for the specific case of interval
uncertainty about the opponent's payoffs (or about the opponent's node
evaluations in the case of limited lookahead), robust Stackelberg equilibria
can be computed with a mixed-integer program that is of the same asymptotic
size as that for the deterministic setting.Comment: Published at AAAI1
Approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games
The -well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of
approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater
than to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in
her mixed strategy. The smallest constant currently known for
which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an
-well-supported Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is slightly
below . In this paper we study this problem for symmetric bimatrix games
and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a
-well-supported Nash equilibrium, for an arbitrarily small
positive constant
Symmetry Breaking for Answer Set Programming
In the context of answer set programming, this work investigates symmetry
detection and symmetry breaking to eliminate symmetric parts of the search
space and, thereby, simplify the solution process. We contribute a reduction of
symmetry detection to a graph automorphism problem which allows to extract
symmetries of a logic program from the symmetries of the constructed coloured
graph. We also propose an encoding of symmetry-breaking constraints in terms of
permutation cycles and use only generators in this process which implicitly
represent symmetries and always with exponential compression. These ideas are
formulated as preprocessing and implemented in a completely automated flow that
first detects symmetries from a given answer set program, adds
symmetry-breaking constraints, and can be applied to any existing answer set
solver. We demonstrate computational impact on benchmarks versus direct
application of the solver.
Furthermore, we explore symmetry breaking for answer set programming in two
domains: first, constraint answer set programming as a novel approach to
represent and solve constraint satisfaction problems, and second, distributed
nonmonotonic multi-context systems. In particular, we formulate a
translation-based approach to constraint answer set solving which allows for
the application of our symmetry detection and symmetry breaking methods. To
compare their performance with a-priori symmetry breaking techniques, we also
contribute a decomposition of the global value precedence constraint that
enforces domain consistency on the original constraint via the unit-propagation
of an answer set solver. We evaluate both options in an empirical analysis. In
the context of distributed nonmonotonic multi-context system, we develop an
algorithm for distributed symmetry detection and also carry over
symmetry-breaking constraints for distributed answer set programming.Comment: Diploma thesis. Vienna University of Technology, August 201
Separable and Low-Rank Continuous Games
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous
games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are
all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of
equilibria in separable games. We show that these games admit finitely
supported Nash equilibria. Motivated by the bounds on the supports of mixed
equilibria in two-player finite games in terms of the ranks of the payoff
matrices, we define the notion of the rank of an n-player continuous game and
use this to provide bounds on the cardinality of the support of equilibrium
strategies. We present a general characterization theorem that states that a
continuous game has finite rank if and only if it is separable. Using our rank
results, we present an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria
of two-player separable games with fixed strategy spaces in time polynomial in
the rank of the game
Computing Equilibria of Semi-algebraic Economies Using Triangular Decomposition and Real Solution Classification
In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of determining the existence
of multiple equilibria in economic models. We propose a general and complete
approach for identifying multiplicities of equilibria in semi-algebraic
economies, which may be expressed as semi-algebraic systems. The approach is
based on triangular decomposition and real solution classification, two
powerful tools of algebraic computation. Its effectiveness is illustrated by
two examples of application.Comment: 24 pages, 5 figure
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