6,144 research outputs found
Computer-aided HAZOP of batch processes
The modern batch chemical processing plants have a tendency of increasing
technological complexity and flexibility which make it difficult to control the
occurrence of accidents. Social and legal pressures have increased the demands
for verifying the safety of chemical plants during their design and operation.
Complete identification and accurate assessment of the hazard potential in the
early design stages is therefore very important so that preventative or protective
measures can be integrated into future design without adversely affecting
processing and control complexity or capital and operational costs. Hazard and
Operability Study (HAZOP) is a method of systematically identifying every
conceivable process deviation, its abnormal causes and adverse hazardous
consequences in the chemical plants. [Continues.
Evaluation of an intensified continuous heat-exchanger reactor for inherently safer characteristics
The present paper deals with the establishment of a new methodology in order to evaluate the inherently safer characteristics of a continuous intensified reactor in the case of an exothermic reaction. The transposition of the propionic anhydride esterification by 2-butanol into a new prototype of ‘‘heatexchanger/ reactor’’, called open plate reactor (OPR), designed by Alfa Laval Vicarb has been chosen as a case study. Previous studies have shown that this exothermic reaction is relatively simple to carry out in a homogeneous liquid phase, and a kinetic model is available. A dedicated software model is then used not only to assess the feasibility of the reaction in the ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ but also to estimate the temperature and concentration profiles during synthesis and to determine optimal operating conditions for safe control. Afterwards the reaction was performed in the reactor. Good agreement between experimental results and the simulation validates the model to describe the behavior of the process during standard runs. A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) was then applied to the intensified process in order to identify the potential hazards and to provide a number of runaway scenarios. Three of them are highlighted as the most dangerous: no utility flow, no reactant flows, both stop at the same time. The behavior of the process is simulated following the stoppage of both the process and utility fluid. The consequence on the evolution of temperature profiles is then estimated for a different hypothesis taking into account the thermal inertia of the OPR. This approach reveals an intrinsically safer behavior of the OPR
Computer-aided applications in process plant safety
Process plants that produce chemical products through pre-designed processes are
fundamental in the Chemical Engineering industry. The safety of hazardous processing plants
is of paramount importance as an accident could cause major damage to property and/or
injury to people. HAZID is a computer system that helps designers and operators of process
plants to identify potential design and operation problems given a process plant design.
However, there are issues that need to be addressed before such a system will be accepted for
common use.
This research project considers how to improve the usability and acceptability of such a
system by developing tools to test the developed models in order for the users to gain
confidence in HAZID s output as HAZID is a model based system with a library of
equipment models. The research also investigates the development of computer-aided safety
applications and how they can be integrated together to extend HAZID to support different
kinds of safety-related reasoning tasks.
Three computer-aided tools and one reasoning system have been developed from this project.
The first is called Model Test Bed, which is to test the correctness of models that have been built. The second is called Safe Isolation Tool, which is to define isolation boundary and identify potential hazards for isolation work. The third is an Instrument Checker, which lists all the instruments and their connections with process items in a process plant for the engineers to consider whether the instrument and its loop provide safeguards to the equipment during the hazard identification procedure. The fourth is a cause-effect analysis system that can automatically generate cause-effect tables for the control engineers to consider the safety design of the control of a plant as the table shows process events and corresponding process responses designed by the control engineer.
The thesis provides a full description of the above four tools and how they are integrated into the HAZID system to perform control safety analysis and hazard identification in process
plants
State-based modelling in hazard identification
The signed directed graph (SDG) is the most commonly used type of model for automated
hazard identification in chemical plants. Although SDG models are efficient in
simulating the plant, they have some weaknesses, which are discussed here in relation to typical process industry examples. Ways to tackle these problems are suggested, and the view is taken that a state-based formalism is needed, to take account of the discrete components in the system, their connection together, and their behaviour over time. A strong representation for operations and actions is also needed, to make the models appropriate for modelling batch processes. A research prototype for HAZOP studies on batch plants (CHECKOP) is also presented, as an illustration of the suggested approach to modelling
An automated system for batch hazard and operability studies
A widely used hazard identification technique within the process industry is HAZOP (hazard and
operability study). To overcome the repetitive and time-consuming nature of the technique automated
systems are being developed. This work considers batch processes, in which material undergoes
processing in distinct stages within the plant equipment items according to a set of operating
procedures, rather than each equipment item remaining in a “steady state”, as is normal for continuous
plants. In batch plants deviations which can lead to hazards can arise both from deviations from
operating procedures and process variable deviations. Therefore, the effect of operator actions needs to
be considered. CHECKOP is an automated batch HAZOP identification system being developed as a
joint project between HAZID Technologies Ltd and Loughborough University. CHECKOP uses a
state-based approach to HAZOP analysis. CHECKOP takes a plant description and a set of operating
instructions as input and produces a HAZOP report automatically. The overall system architecture and
the details of the major components of the systems will be described. Examples of incorrect plant
operation along with the resulting output generated by CHECKOP will be shown. The advantages and
limitations of CHECKOP will be discussed
HAZOP: Our Primary Guide in the Land of Process Risks: How can we improve it and do more with its results?
PresentationAll risk management starts in determining what can happen. Reliable predictive analysis is key. So, we perform process hazard analysis, which should result in scenario identification and definition. Apart from material/substance properties, thereby, process conditions and possible deviations and mishaps form inputs. Over the years HAZOP has been the most important tool to identify potential process risks by systematically considering deviations in observables, by determining possible causes and consequences, and, if necessary, suggesting improvements. Drawbacks of HAZOP are known; it is effort-intensive while the results are used only once. The exercise must be repeated at several stages of process build-up, and when the process is operational, it must be re-conducted periodically. There have been many past attempts to semi- automate the HazOp procedure to ease the effort of conducting it, but lately new promising developments have been realized enabling also the use of the results for facilitating operational fault diagnosis. This paper will review the directions in which improved automation of HazOp is progressing and how the results, besides for risk analysis and design of preventive and protective measures, also can be used during operations for early warning of upcoming abnormal process situations
A system-theoretic, control-inspired view and approach to process safety
Accidents in the process industry continue to occur, and we do not seem to be making much progress in reducing them (Venkatasubramanian, 2011). Postmortem analysis has indicated that they were preventable and had similar systemic causes (Kletz, 2003). Why do we fail to learn from the past and make adequate changes to prevent their reappearance? A variety of explanations have been offered; operators' faults, component failures, lax supervision of operations, poor maintenance, etc. All of these explanations, and many others, have been exhaustively studied, analyzed, “systematized” into causal groups, and a variety of approaches have been developed to address them. Even so, they still occur with significant numbers of fatalities and injured people, with significant disruption of productive operations and frequently extensive destruction of the surrounding environment, both physical and social
- …