Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science

A theory of the firm based on the idea that firms are problem solvers is developed. A network of firms and hierarchical structure of an individual firm are analyzed in terms of distributed and parallel computing. This framework, based on notions of computer science, allows us a simple answer to why a network of firms exists instead of a network of individuals

Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science

A theory of the firm based on the idea that firms are problem solvers is developed. A network of firms and hierarchical structure of an individual firm are analyzed in terms of distributed and parallel computing. This framework, based on notions of computer science, allows us a simple answer to why a network of firms exists instead of a network of individuals

Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash Implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome is always implemented in a Nash equilibrium, and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism (AC) and other asymmetric variations, are the only rules that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under Strong Nash Implementation. The second property, Weakly Pareto Nash Implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominate any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG), a variation of AC that meets individual rationality, and other asymmetric mechanisms are the only rules that meet WPNI and Individual Rationality. PNI and WPNI provide the first economic justification of the Price of Stability (PoS), a seemingly natural measure in the computer science literature but not easily embraced in economics. EG minimizes the PoS across all individually rational mechanisms.Cost-sharing, Implementation, Average Cost, Egalitarian Mechanism.

Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first prop- erty, Pareto Nash Implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient out- come is always implemented in a Nash equilibrium, and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism (AC) and other assymetric variations, are the only rules that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under Strong Nash Implementation. The second property, Weakly Pareto Nash Implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominate any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG), a variation of AC that meets individual rationality, and other assymetric mechanisms are the only rules that meet WPNI and Individual Rationality. PNI and WPNI provide the first economic justification of the Price of Stability (PoS), a seemingly natural measure in the computer science literature but not easily embraced in economics. EG minimizes the PoS across all individually rational mechanisms.ntable SCFs in our environment if we add a few desirable axioms.

The Phillips Machine (MONIAC)

The Phillips Machine, or Monetary National Income Analogue Computer (MONIAC), is a hydraulic representation of cash flow within the UK economy in the early 20th century. It represents the circular flow of income (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, 2015), shown by the economic equation Aggregate Demand = Consumer Expenditure + Investment + Government Spending + (Exports – Imports), or Y = C + I + G + (X – M), which is an important equation in determining the national output of an economy (Pettinger, 2008). Though no longer in use, of the 14 that were built, the majority were originally restricted to military and government use owing to their effectiveness in determining economic policy. This paper describes an implementation of an emulation of this machine that satisfies, or mostly satisfies, almost all of the requirements specified in the ISO/IEC 25010 software quality assurance standard and would be suitable for deployment to support A-Level Economics teaching. With further work it would also become suitable as part of a museum display of a Phillips Machine

Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS

The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory

Spartan Daily, April 9, 1957

Volume 44, Issue 108https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/12464/thumbnail.jp

Architecture and Design of Medical Processor Units for Medical Networks

This paper introduces analogical and deductive methodologies for the design medical processor units (MPUs). From the study of evolution of numerous earlier processors, we derive the basis for the architecture of MPUs. These specialized processors perform unique medical functions encoded as medical operational codes (mopcs). From a pragmatic perspective, MPUs function very close to CPUs. Both processors have unique operation codes that command the hardware to perform a distinct chain of subprocesses upon operands and generate a specific result unique to the opcode and the operand(s). In medical environments, MPU decodes the mopcs and executes a series of medical sub-processes and sends out secondary commands to the medical machine. Whereas operands in a typical computer system are numerical and logical entities, the operands in medical machine are objects such as such as patients, blood samples, tissues, operating rooms, medical staff, medical bills, patient payments, etc. We follow the functional overlap between the two processes and evolve the design of medical computer systems and networks.Comment: 17 page

Econometrics meets sentiment : an overview of methodology and applications

The advent of massive amounts of textual, audio, and visual data has spurred the development of econometric methodology to transform qualitative sentiment data into quantitative sentiment variables, and to use those variables in an econometric analysis of the relationships between sentiment and other variables. We survey this emerging research field and refer to it as sentometrics, which is a portmanteau of sentiment and econometrics. We provide a synthesis of the relevant methodological approaches, illustrate with empirical results, and discuss useful software