The mind's eye in blindfold chess

Visual imagery plays an important role in problem solving, and research into blindfold chess has provided a wealth of empirical data on this question. We show how a recent theory of expert memory (the template theory, Gobet & Simon, 1996, 2000) accounts for most of these data. However, how the mind’s eye filters out relevant from irrelevant information is still underspecified in the theory. We describe two experiments addressing this question, in which chess games are presented visually, move by move, on a board that contains irrelevant information (static positions, semi-static positions, and positions changing every move). The results show that irrelevant information affects chess masters only when it changes during the presentation of the target game. This suggests that novelty information is used by the mind’s eye to select incoming visual information and separate “figure” and “ground.” Mechanisms already present in the template theory can be used to account for this novelty effect

Automation of play:theorizing self-playing games and post-human ludic agents

This article offers a critical reflection on automation of play and its significance for the theoretical inquiries into digital games and play. Automation has become an ever more noticeable phenomenon in the domain of video games, expressed by self-playing game worlds, self-acting characters, and non-human agents traversing multiplayer spaces. On the following pages, the author explores various instances of automated non-human play and proposes a post-human theoretical lens, which may help to create a new framework for the understanding of videogames, renegotiate the current theories of interaction prevalent in game studies, and rethink the relationship between human players and digital games

The emergence of choice: Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies

Consider the chess game: When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) \ud how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario \ud may evolve

Modelling Clock Synchronization in the Chess gMAC WSN Protocol

We present a detailled timed automata model of the clock synchronization algorithm that is currently being used in a wireless sensor network (WSN) that has been developed by the Dutch company Chess. Using the Uppaal model checker, we establish that in certain cases a static, fully synchronized network may eventually become unsynchronized if the current algorithm is used, even in a setting with infinitesimal clock drifts

Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies

When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? Consider the chess game: how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) \ud how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario \ud may evolve

Contextual emergence of intentionality

By means of an intriguing physical example, magnetic surface swimmers, that can be described in terms of Dennett's intentional stance, I reconstruct a hierarchy of necessary and sufficient conditions for the applicability of the intentional strategy. It turns out that the different levels of the intentional hierarchy are contextually emergent from their respective subjacent levels by imposing stability constraints upon them. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, phenomenal physical laws emerge for the coarse-grained description of open, nonlinear, and dissipative nonequilibrium systems in critical states. One level higher, dynamic patterns, such as, e.g., magnetic surface swimmers, are contextually emergent as they are invariant under certain symmetry operations. Again one level up, these patterns behave apparently rational by selecting optimal pathways for the dissipation of energy that is delivered by external gradients. This is in accordance with the restated Second Law of thermodynamics as a stability criterion. At the highest level, true believers are intentional systems that are stable under exchanging their observation conditions.Comment: 27 pages; 4 figures (Fig 1. Copyright by American Physical Society); submitted to Journal of Consciousness Studie

Expertise and intuition: A tale of three theories

Several authors have hailed intuition as one of the defining features of expertise. In particular, while disagreeing on almost anything that touches on human cognition and artificial intelligence, Hubert Dreyfus and Herbert Simon agreed on this point. However, the highly influential theories of intuition they proposed differed in major ways, especially with respect to the role given to search and as to whether intuition is holistic or analytic. Both theories suffer from empirical weaknesses. In this paper, we show how, with some additions, a recent theory of expert memory (the template theory) offers a coherent and wide-ranging explanation of intuition in expert behaviour. It is shown that the theory accounts for the key features of intuition: it explains the rapid onset of intuition and its perceptual nature, provides mechanisms for learning, incorporates processes showing how perception is linked to action and emotion, and how experts capture the entirety of a situation. In doing so, the new theory addresses the issues problematic for Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories. Implications for research and practice are discussed

Inflexibility of experts – Reality or myth? Quantifying the Einstellung effect in chess masters

How does the knowledge of experts affect their behaviour in situations that require unusual methods of dealing? One possibility, loosely originating in research on creativity and skill acquisition, is that an increase in expertise can lead to inflexibility of thought due to automation of procedures. Yet another possibility, based on expertise research, is that experts’ knowledge leads to flexibility of thought. We tested these two possibilities in a series of experiments using the Einstellung (set) effect paradigm. Chess players tried to solve problems that had both a familiar but non-optimal solution and a better but less familiar one. The more familiar solution induced the Einstellung (set) effect even in experts, preventing them from finding the optimal solution. The presence of the non-optimal solution reduced experts' problem solving ability was reduced to about that of players three standard deviations lower in skill level by the presence of the non-optimal solution. Inflexibility of thought induced by prior knowledge (i.e., the blocking effect of the familiar solution) was shown by experts but the more expert they were, the less prone they were to the effect. Inflexibility of experts is both reality and myth. But the greater the level of expertise, the more of a myth it becomes