DR.SGX: Hardening SGX Enclaves against Cache Attacks with Data Location Randomization

Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to various software-based side-channel attacks. In particular, attacks that monitor CPU caches shared between the victim enclave and untrusted software enable accurate leakage of secret enclave data. Known defenses assume developer assistance, require hardware changes, impose high overhead, or prevent only some of the known attacks. In this paper we propose data location randomization as a novel defensive approach to address the threat of side-channel attacks. Our main goal is to break the link between the cache observations by the privileged adversary and the actual data accesses by the victim. We design and implement a compiler-based tool called DR.SGX that instruments enclave code such that data locations are permuted at the granularity of cache lines. We realize the permutation with the CPU's cryptographic hardware-acceleration units providing secure randomization. To prevent correlation of repeated memory accesses we continuously re-randomize all enclave data during execution. Our solution effectively protects many (but not all) enclaves from cache attacks and provides a complementary enclave hardening technique that is especially useful against unpredictable information leakage

Análise de malware com suporte de hardware

Orientadores: Paulo Lício de Geus, André Ricardo Abed GrégioDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de ComputaçãoResumo: O mundo atual é impulsionado pelo uso de sistemas computacionais, estando estes pre- sentes em todos aspectos da vida cotidiana. Portanto, o correto funcionamento destes é essencial para se assegurar a manutenção das possibilidades trazidas pelos desenvolvi- mentos tecnológicos. Contudo, garantir o correto funcionamento destes não é uma tarefa fácil, dado que indivíduos mal-intencionados tentam constantemente subvertê-los visando benefíciar a si próprios ou a terceiros. Os tipos mais comuns de subversão são os ataques por códigos maliciosos (malware), capazes de dar a um atacante controle total sobre uma máquina. O combate à ameaça trazida por malware baseia-se na análise dos artefatos coletados de forma a permitir resposta aos incidentes ocorridos e o desenvolvimento de contramedidas futuras. No entanto, atacantes têm se especializado em burlar sistemas de análise e assim manter suas operações ativas. Para este propósito, faz-se uso de uma série de técnicas denominadas de "anti-análise", capazes de impedir a inspeção direta dos códigos maliciosos. Dentre essas técnicas, destaca-se a evasão do processo de análise, na qual são empregadas exemplares capazes de detectar a presença de um sistema de análise para então esconder seu comportamento malicioso. Exemplares evasivos têm sido cada vez mais utilizados em ataques e seu impacto sobre a segurança de sistemas é considerá- vel, dado que análises antes feitas de forma automática passaram a exigir a supervisão de analistas humanos em busca de sinais de evasão, aumentando assim o custo de se manter um sistema protegido. As formas mais comuns de detecção de um ambiente de análise se dão através da detecção de: (i) código injetado, usado pelo analista para inspecionar a aplicação; (ii) máquinas virtuais, usadas em ambientes de análise por questões de escala; (iii) efeitos colaterais de execução, geralmente causados por emuladores, também usados por analistas. Para lidar com malware evasivo, analistas tem se valido de técnicas ditas transparentes, isto é, que não requerem injeção de código nem causam efeitos colaterais de execução. Um modo de se obter transparência em um processo de análise é contar com suporte do hardware. Desta forma, este trabalho versa sobre a aplicação do suporte de hardware para fins de análise de ameaças evasivas. No decorrer deste texto, apresenta-se uma avaliação das tecnologias existentes de suporte de hardware, dentre as quais máqui- nas virtuais de hardware, suporte de BIOS e monitores de performance. A avaliação crítica de tais tecnologias oferece uma base de comparação entre diferentes casos de uso. Além disso, são enumeradas lacunas de desenvolvimento existentes atualmente. Mais que isso, uma destas lacunas é preenchida neste trabalho pela proposição da expansão do uso dos monitores de performance para fins de monitoração de malware. Mais especificamente, é proposto o uso do monitor BTS para fins de construção de um tracer e um debugger. O framework proposto e desenvolvido neste trabalho é capaz, ainda, de lidar com ataques do tipo ROP, um dos mais utilizados atualmente para exploração de vulnerabilidades. A avaliação da solução demonstra que não há a introdução de efeitos colaterais, o que per- mite análises de forma transparente. Beneficiando-se desta característica, demonstramos a análise de aplicações protegidas e a identificação de técnicas de evasãoAbstract: Today¿s world is driven by the usage of computer systems, which are present in all aspects of everyday life. Therefore, the correct working of these systems is essential to ensure the maintenance of the possibilities brought about by technological developments. However, ensuring the correct working of such systems is not an easy task, as many people attempt to subvert systems working for their own benefit. The most common kind of subversion against computer systems are malware attacks, which can make an attacker to gain com- plete machine control. The fight against this kind of threat is based on analysis procedures of the collected malicious artifacts, allowing the incident response and the development of future countermeasures. However, attackers have specialized in circumventing analysis systems and thus keeping their operations active. For this purpose, they employ a series of techniques called anti-analysis, able to prevent the inspection of their malicious codes. Among these techniques, I highlight the analysis procedure evasion, that is, the usage of samples able to detect the presence of an analysis solution and then hide their malicious behavior. Evasive examples have become popular, and their impact on systems security is considerable, since automatic analysis now requires human supervision in order to find evasion signs, which significantly raises the cost of maintaining a protected system. The most common ways for detecting an analysis environment are: i) Injected code detec- tion, since injection is used by analysts to inspect applications on their way; ii) Virtual machine detection, since they are used in analysis environments due to scalability issues; iii) Execution side effects detection, usually caused by emulators, also used by analysts. To handle evasive malware, analysts have relied on the so-called transparent techniques, that is, those which do not require code injection nor cause execution side effects. A way to achieve transparency in an analysis process is to rely on hardware support. In this way, this work covers the application of the hardware support for the evasive threats analysis purpose. In the course of this text, I present an assessment of existing hardware support technologies, including hardware virtual machines, BIOS support, performance monitors and PCI cards. My critical evaluation of such technologies provides basis for comparing different usage cases. In addition, I pinpoint development gaps that currently exists. More than that, I fill one of these gaps by proposing to expand the usage of performance monitors for malware monitoring purposes. More specifically, I propose the usage of the BTS monitor for the purpose of developing a tracer and a debugger. The proposed framework is also able of dealing with ROP attacks, one of the most common used technique for remote vulnerability exploitation. The framework evaluation shows no side-effect is introduced, thus allowing transparent analysis. Making use of this capability, I demonstrate how protected applications can be inspected and how evasion techniques can be identifiedMestradoCiência da ComputaçãoMestre em Ciência da ComputaçãoCAPE

Selective Dynamic Analysis of Virtualized Whole-System Guest Environments

Dynamic binary analysis is a prevalent and indispensable technique in program analysis. While several dynamic binary analysis tools and frameworks have been proposed, all suffer from one or more of: prohibitive performance degradation, a semantic gap between the analysis code and the execution under analysis, architecture/OS specificity, being user-mode only, and lacking flexibility and extendability. This dissertation describes the design of the Dynamic Executable Code Analysis Framework (DECAF), a virtual machine-based, multi-target, whole-system dynamic binary analysis framework. In short, DECAF seeks to address the shortcomings of existing whole-system dynamic analysis tools and extend the state of the art by utilizing a combination of novel techniques to provide rich analysis functionality without crippling amounts of execution overhead. DECAF extends the mature QEMU whole-system emulator, a type-2 hypervisor capable of emulating every instruction that executes within a complete guest system environment. DECAF provides a novel, hardware event-based method of just-in-time virtual machine introspection (VMI) to address the semantic gap problem. It also implements a novel instruction-level taint tracking engine at bitwise level of granularity, ensuring that taint propagation is sound and highly precise throughout the guest environment. A formal analysis of the taint propagation rules is provided to verify that most instructions introduce neither false positives nor false negatives. DECAF’s design also provides a plugin architecture with a simple-to-use, event-driven programming interface that makes it both flexible and extendable for a variety of analysis tasks. The implementation of DECAF consists of 9550 lines of C++ code and 10270 lines of C code. Its performance is evaluated using CPU2006 SPEC benchmarks, which show an average overhead of 605% for system wide tainting and 12% for VMI. Three platformneutral DECAF plugins - Instruction Tracer, Keylogger Detector, and API Tracer - are described and evaluated in this dissertation to demonstrate the ease of use and effectiveness of DECAF in writing cross-platform and system-wide analysis tools. This dissertation also presents the Virtual Device Fuzzer (VDF), a scalable fuzz testing framework for discovering bugs within the virtual devices implemented as part of QEMU. Such bugs could be used by malicious software executing within a guest under analysis by DECAF, so the discovery, reproduction, and diagnosis of such bugs helps to protect DECAF against attack while improving QEMU and any analysis platforms built upon QEMU. VDF uses selective instrumentation to perform targeted fuzz testing, which explores only the branches of execution belonging to virtual devices under analysis. By leveraging record and replay of memory-mapped I/O activity, VDF quickly cycles virtual devices through an arbitrarily large number of states without requiring a guest OS to be booted or present. Once a test case is discovered that triggers a bug, VDF reduces the test case to the minimum number of reads/writes required to trigger the bug and generates source code suitable for reproducing the bug during debugging and analysis. VDF is evaluated by fuzz testing eighteen QEMU virtual devices, generating 1014 crash or hang test cases that reveal bugs in six of the tested devices. Over 80% of the crashes and hangs were discovered within the first day of testing. VDF covered an average of 62.32% of virtual device branches during testing, and the average test case was minimized to a reproduction test case only 18.57% of its original size

ReSim, a Trace-Driven, Reconfigurable ILP Processor Simulator

Modern processors are becoming more complex and as features and application size increase, their evaluation is becoming more time-consuming. To date, design space exploration relies on extensive use of software simulation that when highly accurate is slow. In this paper we propose ReSim, a parameterizable ILP processor simulation acceleration engine based on reconfigurable hardware. We describe ReSim’s trace-driven microarchitecture that allows us to simulate the operation of a complex ILP processor in a cycle serial fashion, aiming to simplify implementation complexity and to boost operating frequency. Being trace driven, ReSim can simulate timing in an almost ISA independent fashion, and supports all SimpleScalar ISAs, i.e. PISA, Alpha, etc. We implemented ReSim for the latest Xilinx devices. In our experiments with a 4-way superscalar processor ReSim achieves a simulation throughput of up to 28MIPS, and offers more than a factor of 5x improvement over the best reported ILP processor hardware simulators

Ubiquitous Memory Introspection (Preliminary Manuscript)

Modern memory systems play a critical role in the performance ofapplications, but a detailed understanding of the application behaviorin the memory system is not trivial to attain. It requires timeconsuming simulations of the memory hierarchy using long traces, andoften using detailed modeling. It is increasingly possible to accesshardware performance counters to measure events in the memory system,but the measurements remain coarse grained, better suited forperformance summaries than providing instruction level feedback. Theavailability of a low cost, online, and accurate methodology forderiving fine-grained memory behavior profiles can prove extremelyuseful for runtime analysis and optimization of programs.This paper presents a new methodology for Ubiquitous MemoryIntrospection (UMI). It is an online and lightweight mini-simulationmethodology that focuses on simulating short memory access tracesrecorded from frequently executed code regions. The simulations arefast and can provide profiling results at varying granularities, downto that of a single instruction or address. UMI naturally complementsruntime optimizations techniques and enables new opportunities formemory specific optimizations.In this paper, we present a prototype implementation of a runtimesystem implementing UMI. The prototype is readily deployed oncommodity processors, requires no user intervention, and can operatewith stripped binaries and legacy software. The prototype operateswith an average runtime overhead of 20% but this slowdown is only 6%slower than a state of the art binary instrumentation tool. We used32 benchmarks, including the full suite of SPEC2000 benchmarks, forour evaluation. We show that the mini-simulation results accuratelyreflect the cache performance of two existing memory systems, anIntel Pentium~4 and an AMD Athlon MP (K7) processor. We alsodemonstrate that low level profiling information from the onlinesimulation can serve to identify high-miss rate load instructions with a77% rate of accuracy compared to full offline simulations thatrequired days to complete. The online profiling results are used atruntime to implement a simple software prefetching strategy thatachieves a speedup greater than 60% in the best case

Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationA modern software system is a composition of parts that are themselves highly complex: operating systems, middleware, libraries, servers, and so on. In principle, compositionality of interfaces means that we can understand any given module independently of the internal workings of other parts. In practice, however, abstractions are leaky, and with every generation, modern software systems grow in complexity. Traditional ways of understanding failures, explaining anomalous executions, and analyzing performance are reaching their limits in the face of emergent behavior, unrepeatability, cross-component execution, software aging, and adversarial changes to the system at run time. Deterministic systems analysis has a potential to change the way we analyze and debug software systems. Recorded once, the execution of the system becomes an independent artifact, which can be analyzed offline. The availability of the complete system state, the guaranteed behavior of re-execution, and the absence of limitations on the run-time complexity of analysis collectively enable the deep, iterative, and automatic exploration of the dynamic properties of the system. This work creates a foundation for making deterministic replay a ubiquitous system analysis tool. It defines design and engineering principles for building fast and practical replay machines capable of capturing complete execution of the entire operating system with an overhead of several percents, on a realistic workload, and with minimal installation costs. To enable an intuitive interface of constructing replay analysis tools, this work implements a powerful virtual machine introspection layer that enables an analysis algorithm to be programmed against the state of the recorded system through familiar terms of source-level variable and type names. To support performance analysis, the replay engine provides a faithful performance model of the original execution during replay

Automatic generation of synthetic workloads for multicore systems

textWhen designing a computer system, benchmark programs are used with cycle accurate performance/power simulators and HDL level simulators to evaluate novel architectural enhancements, perform design space exploration, understand the worst-case power characteristics of various designs and find performance bottlenecks. This research effort is directed towards automatically generating synthetic benchmarks to tackle three design challenges: 1) For most of the simulation related purposes, full runs of modern real world parallel applications like the PARSEC, SPLASH suites cannot be used as they take machine weeks of time on cycle accurate and HDL level simulators incurring a prohibitively large time cost 2) The second design challenge is that, some of these real world applications are intellectual property and cannot be shared with processor vendors for design studies 3) The most significant problem in the design stage is the complexity involved in fixing the maximum power consumption of a multicore design, called the Thermal Design Power (TDP). In an effort towards fixing this maximum power consumption of a system at the most optimal point, designers are used to hand-crafting possible code snippets called power viruses. But, this process of trying to manually write such maximum power consuming code snippets is very tedious. All of these aforementioned challenges has lead to the resurrection of synthetic benchmarks in the recent past, serving as a promising solution to all the challenges. During the design stage of a multicore system, availability of a framework to automatically generate system-level synthetic benchmarks for multicore systems will greatly simplify the design process and result in more confident design decisions. The key idea behind such an adaptable benchmark synthesis framework is to identify the key characteristics of real world parallel applications that affect the performance and power consumption of a real program and create synthetic executable programs by varying the values for these characteristics. Firstly, with such a framework, one can generate miniaturized synthetic clones for large target (current and futuristic) parallel applications enabling an architect to use them with slow low-level simulation models (e.g., RTL models in VHDL/Verilog) and helps in tailoring designs to the targeted applications. These synthetic benchmark clones can be distributed to architects and designers even if the original applications are intellectual property, when they are not publicly available. Lastly, such a framework can be used to automatically create maximum power consuming code snippets to be able to help in fixing the TDP, heat sinks, cooling system and other power related features of the system. The workload cloning framework built using the proposed synthetic benchmark generation methodology is evaluated to show its superiority over the existing cloning methodologies for single-core systems by generating miniaturized clones for CPU2006 and ImplantBench workloads with only an average error of 2.9% in performance for up to five orders of magnitude of simulation speedup. The correlation coefficient predicting the sensitivity to design changes is 0.95 and 0.98 for performance and power consumption. The proposed framework is evaluated by cloning parallel applications implemented based on p-threads and OpenMP in the PARSEC benchmark suite. The average error in predicting performance is 4.87% and that of power consumption is 2.73%. The correlation coefficient predicting the sensitivity to design changes is 0.92 for performance. The efficacy of the proposed synthetic benchmark generation framework for power virus generation is evaluation on SPARC, Alpha and x86 ISAs using full system simulators and also using real hardware. The results show that the power viruses generated for single-core systems consume 14-41% more power compared to MPrime on SPARC ISA. Similarly, the power viruses generated for multicore systems consume 45-98%, 40-89% and 41-56% more power than PARSEC workloads, running multiple copies of MPrime and multithreaded SPECjbb respectively.Electrical and Computer Engineerin