98 research outputs found
Avoiding Braess' Paradox through Collective Intelligence
In an Ideal Shortest Path Algorithm (ISPA), at each moment each router in a
network sends all of its traffic down the path that will incur the lowest cost
to that traffic. In the limit of an infinitesimally small amount of traffic for
a particular router, its routing that traffic via an ISPA is optimal, as far as
cost incurred by that traffic is concerned. We demonstrate though that in many
cases, due to the side-effects of one router's actions on another routers
performance, having routers use ISPA's is suboptimal as far as global aggregate
cost is concerned, even when only used to route infinitesimally small amounts
of traffic. As a particular example of this we present an instance of Braess'
paradox for ISPA's, in which adding new links to a network decreases overall
throughput. We also demonstrate that load-balancing, in which the routing
decisions are made to optimize the global cost incurred by all traffic
currently being routed, is suboptimal as far as global cost averaged across
time is concerned. This is also due to "side-effects", in this case of current
routing decision on future traffic.
The theory of COllective INtelligence (COIN) is concerned precisely with the
issue of avoiding such deleterious side-effects. We present key concepts from
that theory and use them to derive an idealized algorithm whose performance is
better than that of the ISPA, even in the infinitesimal limit. We present
experiments verifying this, and also showing that a machine-learning-based
version of this COIN algorithm in which costs are only imprecisely estimated (a
version potentially applicable in the real world) also outperforms the ISPA,
despite having access to less information than does the ISPA. In particular,
this COIN algorithm avoids Braess' paradox.Comment: 28 page
Game Theory Models for the Verification of the Collective Behaviour of Autonomous Cars
The collective of autonomous cars is expected to generate almost optimal
traffic. In this position paper we discuss the multi-agent models and the
verification results of the collective behaviour of autonomous cars. We argue
that non-cooperative autonomous adaptation cannot guarantee optimal behaviour.
The conjecture is that intention aware adaptation with a constraint on
simultaneous decision making has the potential to avoid unwanted behaviour. The
online routing game model is expected to be the basis to formally prove this
conjecture.Comment: In Proceedings FVAV 2017, arXiv:1709.0212
When Accidents Become Design Choices: Navigation Systems, Rat-Running, and AI Safety
Machine learning algorithms work particularly well if we want to find the best solution to a given problem from the set of all possible solutions. However, such an unprecedented ability to solve optimisation problems only stresses the need to carefully pick out the right goal to be optimised. In this regard, and taking route-planning services as a guiding example, I claim that the current problem definition for route-planning algorithms prompts disruptive driving practices such as intelligent rat-running which create, in turn, global problems by intending to optimise local ones. In order to avoid this, I defend that the design approach to such algorithms should aim for hybrid search strategies that constrain the local benefit to the global costs of a given solution, in order to set the grounds for a safer AI in the future
Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games
We consider repeated multiplayer games in which players repeatedly and simultaneously choose strategies from a finite set of available strategies according to some strategy adjustment process. We focus on the specific class of weakly acyclic games, which is particularly relevant for multiagent cooperative control problems. A strategy adjustment process determines how players select their strategies at any stage as a function of the information gathered over previous stages. Of particular interest are âpayoff-basedâ processes in which, at any stage, players know only their own actions and (noise corrupted) payoffs from previous stages. In particular, players do not know the actions taken by other players and do not know the structural form of payoff functions. We introduce three different payoff-based processes for increasingly general scenarios and prove that, after a sufficiently large number of stages, player actions constitute a Nash equilibrium at any stage with arbitrarily high probability. We also show how to modify player utility functions through tolls and incentives in so-called congestion games, a special class of weakly acyclic games, to guarantee that a centralized objective can be realized as a Nash equilibrium. We illustrate the methods with a simulation of distributed routing over a network
Routing choices in intelligent transport systems
Road congestion is a phenomenon that can often be avoided; roads become popular, travel times increase, which could be mitigated with better coordination mechanisms. The choice of route, mode of transport, and departure time all play a crucial part in controlling congestion levels. Technology, such as navigation applications, have the ability to influence these decisions and play an essential role in congestion reduction. To predict vehicles' routing behaviours, we model the system as a game with rational players. Players choose a path between origin and destination nodes in a network. Each player seeks to minimise their own journey time, often leading to inefficient equilibria with poor social welfare. Traffic congestion motivates the results in this thesis. However, the results also hold true for many other applications where congestion occurs, e.g. power grid demand. Coordinating route selection to reduce congestion constitutes a social dilemma for vehicles. In sequential social dilemmas, players' strategies need to balance their vulnerability to exploitation from their opponents and to learn to cooperate to achieve maximal payouts. We address this trade-off between mathematical safety and cooperation of strategies in social dilemmas to motivate our proposed algorithm, a safe method of achieving cooperation in social dilemmas, including route choice games. Many vehicles use navigation applications to help plan their journeys, but these provide only partial information about the routes available to them. We find a class of networks for which route information distribution cannot harm the receiver's expected travel times. Additionally, we consider a game where players always follow the route chosen by an application or where vehicle route selection is controlled by a route planner, such as autonomous vehicles. We show that having multiple route planners controlling vehicle routing leads to inefficient equilibria. We calculate the Price of Anarchy (PoA) for polynomial function travel times and show that multiagent reinforcement learning algorithms suffer from the predicted Price of Anarchy when controlling vehicle routing. Finally, we equip congestion games with waiting times at junctions to model the properties of traffic lights at intersections. Here, we show that Braess' paradox can be avoided by implementing traffic light cycles and establish the PoA for realistic waiting times. By employing intelligent traffic lights that use myopic learning, such as multi-agent reinforcement learning, we prove a natural reward function guarantees convergence to equilibrium. Moreover, we highlight the impact of multi-agent reinforcement learning traffic lights on the fairness of journey times to vehicles
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