Coevolution of trustful buyers and cooperative sellers in the trust game

Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation system. Under the reputation system, a buyer can avoid transacting with a seller with a bad reputation. A transaction in online marketplaces is better modeled by the trust game than other social dilemma games, including the donation game and the prisoner's dilemma. In addition, most individuals participate mostly as buyers or sellers; each individual does not play the two roles with equal probability. Although the reputation mechanism is known to be able to remove the moral hazard in games with asymmetric roles, competition between different strategies and population dynamics of such a game are not sufficiently understood. On the other hand, existing models of reputation-based cooperation, also known as indirect reciprocity, are based on the symmetric donation game. We analyze the trust game with two fixed roles, where trustees (i.e., sellers) but not investors (i.e., buyers) possess reputation scores. We study the equilibria and the replicator dynamics of the game. We show that the reputation mechanism enables cooperation between unacquainted buyers and sellers under fairly generous conditions, even when such a cooperative equilibrium coexists with an asocial equilibrium in which buyers do not buy and sellers cheat. In addition, we show that not many buyers may care about the seller's reputation under cooperative equilibrium. Buyers' trusting behavior and sellers' reputation-driven cooperative behavior coevolve to alleviate the social dilemma.Comment: 5 figure

The Impact of Third-Party Information on Trust: Valence, Source, and Reliability

Economic exchange between strangers happens extremely frequently due to the growing number of internet transactions. In trust situations like online transactions, a trustor usually does not know whether she encounters a trustworthy trustee. However, the trustor might form beliefs about the trustee's trustworthiness by relying on third-party information. Different kinds of third-party information can vary dramatically in their importance to the trustor. We ran a factorial design to study how the different characteristics of third-party information affect the trustor's decision to trust. We systematically varied unregulated third-party information regarding the source (friend or a stranger), the reliability (gossip or experiences), and the valence (positive or negative) of the information. The results show that negative information is more salient for withholding trust than positive information is for placing trust. If third-party information is positive, experience of a friend has the strongest effect on trusting followed by friend's gossip. Positive information from a stranger does not matter to the trustor. With respect to negative information, the data show that even the slightest hint of an untrustworthy trustee leads to significantly less placed trust irrespective of the source or the reliability of the information

Evolutionary Psychology and Artificial Intelligence:The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Human Behaviour

Artificial Intelligence (AI) presents a new landscape for humanity. Both what we can do, and the impact of our ordinary actions is changed by the innovation of digital and intelligent technology. In this chapter we postulate how AI impacts contemporary societies on an individual and collective level. We begin by teasing apart the current actual impact of AI on society from the impact that our cultural narratives surrounding AI has. We then consider the evolutionary mechanisms that maintain a stable society such as heterogeneity, flexibility and cooperation. Taking AI as a prosthetic intelligence, we discuss how—for better and worse—it enhances our connectivity, coordination, equality, distribution of control and our ability to make predictions. We further give examples of how transparency of thoughts and behaviours influence call-out culture and behavioural manipulation with consideration of group dynamics and tribalism. We next consider the efficacy and vulnerability of human trust, including the contexts in which blind trust in information is either adaptive or maladaptive in an age where the cost of information is decreasing. We then discuss trust in AI, and how we can calibrate trust as to avoid over-trust and mistrust adaptively, using transparency as a mechanism. We then explore the barriers for AI increasing accuracy in our perception by focusing on fake news. Finally, we look at the impact of information accuracy, and the battles of individuals against false beliefs. Where available, we use models drawn from scientific simulations to justify and clarify our predictions and analysis

Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas.

Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Previous studies explored indirect reciprocity in the so-called donation game, a special class of Prisoner\u27s Dilemma (PD) with unilateral decision making. A more general class of social dilemmas includes Snowdrift (SG), Stag Hunt (SH), and PD games, where two players perform actions simultaneously. In these simultaneous-move games, moral assessments need to be more complex; for example, how should we evaluate defection against an ill-reputed, but now cooperative, player? We examined indirect reciprocity in the three social dilemmas and identified twelve successful social norms for moral assessments. These successful norms have different principles in different dilemmas for suppressing cheaters. To suppress defectors, any defection against good players is prohibited in SG and PD, whereas defection against good players may be allowed in SH. To suppress unconditional cooperators, who help anyone and thereby indirectly contribute to jeopardizing indirect reciprocity, we found two mechanisms: indiscrimination between actions toward bad players (feasible in SG and PD) or punishment for cooperation with bad players (effective in any social dilemma). Moreover, we discovered that social norms that unfairly favor reciprocators enhance robustness of cooperation in SH, whereby reciprocators never lose their good reputation

Trust and exchange : the production of trust in illicit online drug markets

Au cours de la dernière décennie, les marchés illicites en ligne sont passés de niches de marchés à plateformes économiques à part entière. L’un des aspects de cette expansion semble reposer dans l’abandon de l’articulation traditionnelle de la relation de confiance entre vendeurs et acheteurs pour l’adoption de transactions régies par les principes d’atomisation sociale et d’anonymat. Se situant au cœur d’une sociologie économique des marchés illicites encore émergente, cette thèse cherche donc à étudier l’élaboration de la confiance au sein des marchés de drogues illicites en ligne. En m’appuyant sur la notion d’institutions en tant que constructions sociales, j'avance la thèse selon laquelle ces marchés illicites modernisent les modalités de transaction des marchés licites traditionnels : des contrats sont proposés ; des tribunaux sont érigés; la sanction est formalisée ; et la gouvernance est transformée. Cette approche permet de révéler un schisme fondamental de la littérature et de ses postulats à l’égard de l'ordre social régnant au sein des marchés illicites en ligne -- rupture qui s’exprime notamment par l’opposition entre 1) une conception de ces marchés comme socialement atomisés et régis uniquement par la réputation ; et 2) l’idée selon laquelle les serveurs restent sous le contrôle des administrateurs. Afin de pallier cette discordance, je propose un modèle d’élaboration de la confiance notamment issu des approches cognitives et comportementales. Premièrement, je soutiens qu'un ensemble de mécanismes actifs de renforcement remplace fonctionnellement les principes sociaux traditionnels de la confiance. Deuxièmement, je soutiens que la confiance, aussi bien interpersonnelle qu’abstraite (à savoir, la confiance accordée aux institutions), est principalement produite selon un processus bayésien d'accumulation d'expériences. Dans cette perspective, l'article « Uncertainty and Risk » examine l'ensemble des mécanismes actifs de renforcement de la confiance -- première composante de ce modèle -- et révèle que les vendeurs ajustent les prix non seulement en fonction de la réputation, mais également des contrats et du statut. Dans les articles suivants, le processus bayésien d'accumulation d'expériences -- deuxième partie du modèle -- est abordé. L’étude menée dans l‘article « Building a case for trust » met ainsi en lumière une association entre les échanges répétés avec le vendeur et une tendance à effectuer des transactions de plus en plus importantes. Le troisième article (« A change of expectations? »), quant à lui, met en exergue le fait qu’un faible nombre d’expériences satisfaisantes suffit à augmenter la certitude de l’acheteur quant à la qualité du produit illicite. Dans leur ensemble, ces deux articles soutiennent l’idée selon laquelle le processus d'accumulation d'expériences favorise la coopération et les attentes. Enfin, ce travail s’achève par l’articulation des deux composantes de ce modèle et, de manière plus générale, par l’articulation de la thèse de la modernisation et d’une conception de la confiance dont l’élaboration repose sur un processus d’accumulation d’expériences sociales. L’apport unique d'une sociologie économique dans l’étude criminologique des marchés illicites est notamment souligné et des pistes de recherches futures sont discutées.During the last decade illicit online drug markets have grown from niche markets into full-fledged platform economies. It seems that over the course of a few years, sellers and buyers have left the social bases of trust behind preferring to exchange under conditions of social atomization and anonymity. Situated in an emerging economic sociological approach to illicit markets, this work examines the production of trust in illicit online drug markets. Drawing on economic sociology, namely, the notion of institutions as social constructions, I advance the thesis that these markets modernize the premodern exchange modes of traditional illicit markets: Contracts are implemented; courts are erected; sanctions are formalized; and governance transforms. This analysis reveals a fundamental schism in the literature and its assumptions about the social order of illicit online markets. Specifically, a conception of these markets as socially atomized and governed only by reputation, versus the recognition that servers remain under the control of administrators. Building off the modernization thesis and the schism, I propose a model for the production of trust that is sensitive to both cognitive and behavioral approaches to trust. First, I propose that a set of active trust producing mechanisms functionally replace the bases of trust that have eroded as illicit markets move online. Second, I argue that trust is primarily produced through a Bayesian process of accumulating experience, which produces both interpersonal and abstract trust. In the article Uncertainty and Risk I examine the first component, the active production of trust. I revisit a key debate in the literature, the pricing of illicit goods. We find that sellers set prices adjust prices not only with respect to reputation, but also contracts and status. In the following two articles, I examine the second part of the model, the bayesian process of experience accumulation. In the article Building a Case for Trust, I find that repeated exchanges with a seller are associated with a propensity towards larger transactions. In the third article, A Change of Expectations?, I find that even a few experiences increases expectations in the performance of the market institution. Thus, the two articles provide evidence that the process of experience accumulation promotes cooperation and expectation. I conclude the work by reconciling a tension between the two components of the model, the proposition that markets are modernized, but that trust is produced primarily through a process of experience accumulation. On this basis, I continue to highlight the contributions and analytical advantages of the economic sociological approach to illicit markets

Trust from a trait perspective: a theoretical framework and empirical test

Corresponding to the pivotal role of trust for all kinds of social interactions and inter-personal relationships, trust has been the target of abundant research across scientific disci-plines. However, an integration of the huge literature is currently missing – thus hampering a common understanding of trust and a synthesis between the fields. Furthermore, from a psy-chological perspective, there is an insufficient understanding of the (basic) personality traits accounting for individual variation in trust. Therefore, the overall objective of this thesis is to bridge the gap between different lines of trust research and to uncover the dispositional de-terminants of trust. To that end, a behavioral view on trust is adopted, defining trust in terms of a risky choice to depend on another. Based on a broad review of the literature, a theoretical framework is distilled, identifying the situational features and personality characteristics un-derlying trust. Specifically, trust is considered to be a function of (1) attitudes toward risky prospects (risk and loss aversion), (2) trustworthiness expectations, and (3) betrayal sensitivity. These determinants are, in turn, rooted in different traits (i.e., anxiety/fear, trustworthiness, and forgiveness) which can be localized in the space defined by basic personality models. Here, the HEXACO model provides particularly clear-cut hypotheses on the basic traits driv-ing trust, including a unique factor for each of the proposed (specific) trait determinants. Building on this reasoning, the empirical part of this thesis presents first evidence on the link between the HEXACO dimensions and trust. As a starting point, the focus was on the Honesty-Humility factor, representing the unique feature of the HEXACO model compared to more established models of personality (e.g., the Five-Factor Model). In line with the pro-posed theoretical framework, two sets of studies provided support for a social projection path from trait trustworthiness to trustworthiness expectations. Specifically, high levels of Hones-ty-Humility predicted more optimistic trustworthiness expectations and – as necessitated by social projection – were also positively linked to trustworthy behavior. As such, the findings not only identify a trait source of trust, but also clarify the dispositional determinants of trust-worthiness. Overall, the theoretical framework and empirical evidence presented in this thesis suggests the fruitfulness to take a closer look at trust – from a trait perspective

Ecosystem synergies, change and orchestration

This thesis investigates ecosystem synergies, change, and orchestration. The research topics are motivated by my curiosity, a fragmented research landscape, theoretical gaps, and new phenomena that challenge extant theories. To address these motivators, I conduct literature reviews to organise existing studies and identify their limited assumptions in light of new phenomena. Empirically, I adopt a case study method with abductive reasoning for a longitudinal analysis of the Alibaba ecosystem from 1999 to 2020. My findings provide an integrated and updated conceptualisation of ecosystem synergies that comprises three distinctive but interrelated components: 1) stack and integrate generic resources for efficiency and optimisation, 2) empower generative changes for variety and evolvability, and 3) govern tensions for sustainable growth. Theoretically grounded and empirically refined, this new conceptualisation helps us better understand the unique synergies of ecosystems that differ from those of alternative collective organisations and explain the forces that drive voluntary participation for value co-creation. Regarding ecosystem change, I find a duality relationship between intentionality and emergence and develop a phasic model of ecosystem sustainable growth with internal and external drivers. This new understanding challenges and extends prior discussions on their dominant dualism view, focus on partial drivers, and taken-for-granted lifecycle model. I propose that ecosystem orchestration involves systematic coordination of technological, adoption, internal, and institutional activities and is driven by long-term visions and adjusted by re-visioning. My analysis reveals internal orchestration's important role (re-envisioning, piloting, and organisation architectural reconfiguring), the synergy and system principles in designing adoption activities, and the expanding arena of institutional activities. Finally, building on the above findings, I reconceptualise ecosystems and ecosystem sustainable growth to highlight multi-stakeholder value creation, inclusivity, long-term orientation and interpretative approach. The thesis ends with discussing the implications for practice, policy, and future research.Open Acces