Essays in the theory of organizational structure.

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Multiagent systems: games and learning from structures

Multiple agents have become increasingly utilized in various fields for both physical robots and software agents, such as search and rescue robots, automated driving, auctions and electronic commerce agents, and so on. In multiagent domains, agents interact and coadapt with other agents. Each agent's choice of policy depends on the others' joint policy to achieve the best available performance. During this process, the environment evolves and is no longer stationary, where each agent adapts to proceed towards its target. Each micro-level step in time may present a different learning problem which needs to be addressed. However, in this non-stationary environment, a holistic phenomenon forms along with the rational strategies of all players; we define this phenomenon as structural properties. In our research, we present the importance of analyzing the structural properties, and how to extract the structural properties in multiagent environments. According to the agents' objectives, a multiagent environment can be classified as self-interested, cooperative, or competitive. We examine the structure from these three general multiagent environments: self-interested random graphical game playing, distributed cooperative team playing, and competitive group survival. In each scenario, we analyze the structure in each environmental setting, and demonstrate the structure learned as a comprehensive representation: structure of players' action influence, structure of constraints in teamwork communication, and structure of inter-connections among strategies. This structure represents macro-level knowledge arising in a multiagent system, and provides critical, holistic information for each problem domain. Last, we present some open issues and point toward future research

A Mechanism Design Approach to Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

The defense sector is undergoing a phase of rapid technological advancement, in the pursuit of its goal of information superiority. This goal depends on a large network of complex interconnected systems - sensors, weapons, soldiers - linked through a maze of heterogeneous networks. The sheer scale and size of these networks prompt behaviors that go beyond conglomerations of systems or `system-of-systems\u27. The lack of a central locus and disjointed, competing interests among large clusters of systems makes this characteristic of an Ultra Large Scale (ULS) system. These traits of ULS systems challenge and undermine the fundamental assumptions of today\u27s software and system engineering approaches. In the absence of a centralized controller it is likely that system users may behave opportunistically to meet their local mission requirements, rather than the objectives of the system as a whole. In these settings, methods and tools based on economics and game theory (like Mechanism Design) are likely to play an important role in achieving globally optimal behavior, when the participants behave selfishly. Against this background, this thesis explores the potential of using computational mechanisms to govern the behavior of ultra-large-scale systems and achieve an optimal allocation of constrained computational resources Our research focusses on improving the quality and accuracy of the common operating picture through the efficient allocation of bandwidth in tactical data networks among self-interested actors, who may resort to strategic behavior dictated by self-interest. This research problem presents the kind of challenges we anticipate when we have to deal with ULS systems and, by addressing this problem, we hope to develop a methodology which will be applicable for ULS system of the future. We build upon the previous works which investigate the application of auction-based mechanism design to dynamic, performance-critical and resource-constrained systems of interest to the defense community. In this thesis, we consider a scenario where a number of military platforms have been tasked with the goal of detecting and tracking targets. The sensors onboard a military platform have a partial and inaccurate view of the operating picture and need to make use of data transmitted from neighboring sensors in order to improve the accuracy of their own measurements. The communication takes place over tactical data networks with scarce bandwidth. The problem is compounded by the possibility that the local goals of military platforms might not be aligned with the global system goal. Such a scenario might occur in multi-flag, multi-platform military exercises, where the military commanders of each platform are more concerned with the well-being of their own platform over others. Therefore there is a need to design a mechanism that efficiently allocates the flow of data within the network to ensure that the resulting global performance maximizes the information gain of the entire system, despite the self-interested actions of the individual actors. We propose a two-stage mechanism based on modified strictly-proper scoring rules, with unknown costs, whereby multiple sensor platforms can provide estimates of limited precisions and the center does not have to rely on knowledge of the actual outcome when calculating payments. In particular, our work emphasizes the importance of applying robust optimization techniques to deal with the uncertainty in the operating environment. We apply our robust optimization - based scoring rules algorithm to an agent-based model framework of the combat tactical data network, and analyze the results obtained. Through the work we hope to demonstrate how mechanism design, perched at the intersection of game theory and microeconomics, is aptly suited to address one set of challenges of the ULS system paradigm - challenges not amenable to traditional system engineering approaches

Inefficient private renegotiation of sovereign debt

The negotiation of sovereign debt repayments and of new loans after default may yield inefficient outcomes that justify intervention by creditor country governments and international financial institutions. The author analyzes possible distortions arising in renegotiations between private creditors and sovereign borrowers. He argues that legal privileges accorded to existing creditors in their home jurisdictions can distort the flow of resources for capital formation abroad. Seniority privileges for old lenders convey to them some of the social returns from new lending, reducing the potential rewards for those who might provide the new funds. Hence the author urges investigation of official alienation of these privileges, regulatory reform, and introduction of alternative financial instruments that embody opportunities for creditor commitment.Strategic Debt Management,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation

The theory of the firm

January 1987, first draft, May 1987, latest revisio

Essays on financial institutions, inflation and inequality

The first essay takes a political economy perspective to explain differences in inflationary performance in the post communist economies. It is argued that these differences largely result from political choices rather than structural differences. Based on empirical evidence we describe some institutional mechanisms that can prevent reversal of stabilisation policies after a change of government. The second essay uses an overlapping generations model of money to analyse what the consequences are, for the distribution of real assets and inflation, of having more than one agent extracting seigniorage. As described in the first essay uncoordinated monetary policy caused continued high inflation in some transitional economies. Here it is shown how Russia's inflationary performance after liberalisation can be explained by our model. The third essay uses a moral hazard framework to derive a testable hypothesis linking the degree of inequality and the volume of financial intermediation. This link is part of the transmission mechanism running from inequality via the financial sector to real growth in some recent models of economic development. We test the hypothesis using a new World Bank data set on inequality and find only partial support for the moral hazard model in the data. The fourth essay uses a random matching framework to model a financial market without intermediation. The economic consequences of this are analysed and it is shown that in the search economy the dispersion of project returns can affect the growth rate. This is not the case in the intermediated economy where only the mean of the project return distribution matters for growth

Essays on the political economy of state government saving and the role of budget stabilization funds

This dissertation explores the saving behavior of state governments in the context of the ability of states to weather recessionary periods. The first chapter of the dissertation discusses the role of savings as a policy option for state decision-makers in light of the fiscal constraints facing state governments, reviews the previous literature that has examined the savings behavior of state governments, and outlines the research agenda for the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides statistics on the post-World War II savings of states to explore recent trends in their savings behavior and discusses the data employed in the dissertation. The third chapter examines an implication of the common pool problem associated with public sector savings by investigating how anticipated future changes in the controlling parties of states\u27 legislatures affect the current level of saving. The results provide evidence that state saving is adversely impacted by future changes in controlling political parties, suggesting that politically unstable states may be ill-prepared to deal with recessions relative to politically stable states. Chapter 4 of the dissertation examines the role that political stability and other factors have had on states\u27 choices to adopt budget stabilization funds. The results provide evidence that states which have experienced more long-term political instability, have been severely hit by recessions, and have expenditure and/or tax limitation laws in place, are more likely to adopt a budget stabilization fund as an additional vehicle for saving. The final research chapter of the dissertation investigates the effectiveness of budget stabilization funds by examining how states\u27 savings behavior has changed as a result of utilizing budget stabilization funds. The results from this chapter provide evidence that budget stabilization funds governed by explicit deposit and withdrawal rules can assist state decision-makers in saving and thus enhance a state\u27s ability to mitigate recessions in the future. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the dissertation and discusses areas of future research investigating state saving and budget stabilization funds

If you build it, they wille come : applying the lessons of collective action theory to the 1991 Persian Gulf War

La théorie de l'action collective a été appliquée aux problèmes de la répartition du fardeau entre les alliés et le financement des biens publics internationaux. Bien que la littérature concernant la théorie économique de l'action collective ait évolué, sa mise en application dans le domaine des relations internationales a stagné. Plusieurs questions de sécurité internationale se situent au niveau régional et mettent en jeu des biens collectifs rivaux et exclusifs. Ces questions de sécurité collective peuvent être reformulées en terme théorique comme "biens d'association". Les biens d'association ont tendance à être fourni efficacement. Une étude de cas portant sur la Guerre du Golfe de 1991 semble démontrer la pertinence de l'action collective et la théorie de club dans le cadre de coalitions militaires internationales. La théorie de l'action collective explique certaines relations causales déterminant le succès de la création de coalitions. Le leadership d'un acteur dominant peut forcer ses alliés à révéler leurs préférences et à payer en fonction de celles-ci. La technologie de l'agrégation de forces militaires pour mener une guerre offensive permet le remboursement si l'agrégation nécessaire n'est pas achevée, changeant ainsi le calcul des coûts-bénéfices. Cette technologie diminue le risque associé au leadership dans l'action collective et augmente ainsi la possibilité de coopération