96,548 research outputs found
Civil Procedure as a Critical Discussion
This Article develops a model for analyzing legal dispute resolution systems as systems for argumentation. Our model meshes two theories of argument conceived centuries apart: contemporary argumentation theory and classical stasis theory. In this Article, we apply the model to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a proof of concept. Specifically, the model analyzes how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure function as a staged argumentative critical discussion designed to permit judge and jury to rationally resolve litigantsâ differences in a reasonable manner. At a high level, this critical discussion has three phases: a confrontation, an (extended) opening, and a concluding phase. Those phases are the umbrella under which discrete argumentation phases occur at points we call stases. Whenever litigants seek a ruling or judgment, they reach a stasisâa stopping or standing point for arguing procedural points of disagreement. During these stases, the parties make arguments that fall into predictable âcommonplaceâ argument types. Taken together, these stock argument types form a taxonomy of arguments for all civil cases. Our claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure function as a system for argumentation is novel, as is our claim that civil cases breed a taxonomy of argument types. These claims also mark the beginning of a broader project. Starting here with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we embark on a journey that we expect to follow for several years (and which we hope other scholars will join), exploring our modelâs application across dispute resolution systems and using it to make normative claims about those systems. From a birds-eye view, this Article also represents a short modern trek in a much longer journey begun by advocates in city states in and near Greece nearly 2500 years ago
Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a ministerial exception to the ordinary rules of employer liability. The Court also concluded that the exception operates as an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar. This conclusion raises quite significant questions about how courts should address the exception in the course of litigation. This Article posits that courts should approach these procedural questions in light of the underlying justification for the ministerial exception. The exception reflects a longstanding constitutional limitation on the competence of courts to resolve âstrictly and purely ecclesiasticalâ questions. To conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense does not alter this fundamental limitation on the authority of secular courts. As a practical matter, this means that in litigation between religious institutions and their employees, courts may be required to manage discovery to resolve threshold questions about the application of the ministerial exception before permitting broader discovery. Similarly, courts should consider permitting interlocutory appeals of trial court decisions that deny motions for summary judgment based on the exception. And courts not only should conclude that religious institutions do not waive the defense by failing to raise it but also ought to raise it sua sponte when the facts indicate that the exception may apply. These departures from the ordinary treatment of affirmative defenses are necessary to respect the constitutional principles that the Court articulated in Hosanna-Tabor
Civil Procedure
Contains:
California Wrongful Death Statute: Correcting an Unintended Mistake ........ 453
Clearing Up Civil Procedure Section 425.16-Delivering The FinalKnockout Punch to SLAPP Suits ..................................... 45
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