Robotomorphy: Becoming our creations

Humans and gods alike have since the dawn of time created objects in their own image. From clay fgures and wooden toys—some granted life in myths and movies but also dead representations of their creators—to modern-day robots that mimic their creators in more than appearance. These objects tell the story of how we perceive ourselves, and in this article, I examine how they also change us. Robotomorphy describes what occurs when we project the characteristics and capabilities of robots onto ourselves, to make sense of the complicated and mysterious beings that we are. Machines are, after all, relatively comprehensible and help dispel the discomfort associated with complex human concepts such as consciousness, free will, the soul, etc. I then argue that using robots as the mirror image by which we understand ourselves entails an unfortunate reductionism. When robots become the blueprint for humanity, they simultaneously become benchmarks and ideals to live up to, and suddenly the things we make are no longer representations of ourselves, but we of them. This gives rise to a recursive process in which the mirror mirrors itself and infuences both the trajectory for machine development and human self-perception.publishedVersio

Minds, Brains and Programs

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4

The Language Labyrinth: Constructive Critique on the Terminology Used in the AI Discourse

In the interdisciplinary field of artificial intelligence (AI) the problem of clear terminology is especially momentous. This paper claims, that AI debates are still characterised by a lack of critical distance to metaphors like 'training', 'learning' or 'deciding'. As consequence, reflections regarding responsibility or potential use-cases are greatly distorted. Yet, if relevant decision-makers are convinced that AI can develop an 'understanding' or properly 'interpret' issues, its regular use for sensitive tasks like deciding about social benefits or judging court cases looms. The chapter argues its claim by analysing central notions of the AI debate and tries to contribute by proposing more fitting terminology and hereby enabling more fruitful debates. It is a conceptual work at the intersection of critical computer science and philosophy of language.Comment: 16 page

What Was Artificial Intelligence?

When it was originally published in 2002, Sue Curry Jansen’s “What Was Artificial Intelligence?” attracted little notice. The long essay was published as a chapter in Jansen’s Critical Communication Theory, a book whose wisdom and erudition failed to register across the many fields it addressed. One explanation for the neglect, ironic and telling, is that Jansen’s sheer scope as an intellectual had few competent readers in the communication studies discipline into which she published the book. “What Was Artificial Intelligence?” was buried treasure. In this mediastudies.press edition, Jansen’s prescient autopsy of AI self-selling—the rhetoric of the masculinist sublime—is reprinted with a new introduction. Now an open access book, “What Was Artificial Intelligence?” is a message in a bottle, addressed to Musk, Bezos, and the latest generation of AI myth-makers

Artificial Intelligence in the Context of Human Consciousness

Artificial intelligence (AI) can be defined as the ability of a machine to learn and make decisions based on acquired information. AI’s development has incited rampant public speculation regarding the singularity theory: a futuristic phase in which intelligent machines are capable of creating increasingly intelligent systems. Its implications, combined with the close relationship between humanity and their machines, make achieving understanding both natural and artificial intelligence imperative. Researchers are continuing to discover natural processes responsible for essential human skills like decision-making, understanding language, and performing multiple processes simultaneously. Artificial intelligence attempts to simulate these functions through techniques like artificial neural networks, Markov Decision Processes, Human Language Technology, and Multi-Agent Systems, which rely upon a combination of mathematical models and hardware

What Was Artificial Intelligence?

When it was originally published in 2002, Sue Curry Jansen’s “What Was Artificial Intelligence?” attracted little notice. The long essay was published as a chapter in Jansen’s Critical Communication Theory, a book whose wisdom and erudition failed to register across the many fields it addressed. One explanation for the neglect, ironic and telling, is that Jansen’s sheer scope as an intellectual had few competent readers in the communication studies discipline into which she published the book. “What Was Artificial Intelligence?” was buried treasure. In this mediastudies.press edition, Jansen’s prescient autopsy of AI self-selling—the rhetoric of the masculinist sublime—is reprinted with a new introduction. Now an open access book, “What Was Artificial Intelligence?” is a message in a bottle, addressed to Musk, Bezos, and the latest generation of AI myth-makers

What is Computational Intelligence and where is it going?

What is Computational Intelligence (CI) and what are its relations with Artificial Intelligence (AI)? A brief survey of the scope of CI journals and books with ``computational intelligence'' in their title shows that at present it is an umbrella for three core technologies (neural, fuzzy and evolutionary), their applications, and selected fashionable pattern recognition methods. At present CI has no comprehensive foundations and is more a bag of tricks than a solid branch of science. The change of focus from methods to challenging problems is advocated, with CI defined as a part of computer and engineering sciences devoted to solution of non-algoritmizable problems. In this view AI is a part of CI focused on problems related to higher cognitive functions, while the rest of the CI community works on problems related to perception and control, or lower cognitive functions. Grand challenges on both sides of this spectrum are addressed