Knowing Things in Themselves

A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Brentano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind, the author reveals the ontological framework in which it takes place. Doing so is instrumental to illuminating acquaintance, the state that enables the direct engagement of a mind and some other thing. The author discusses this state and shows how it has the epistemic heft, with a Brentanian account of judgment, to provide the foundations of one’s knowledge of the world. A naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge is open to a compelling objection; the author presents this objection with the means of undermining it. In conclusion, the author recurs to the opening theme of the primacy of ontology and suggests that familiar misgivings about knowing things in themselves are all based on questionable—and ultimately untenable—ontological presuppositions

Metaphysical Coherentism

I defend metaphysical coherentism, according to which reality is an interdependent network, system, or web, held together by a relation philosophers call metaphysical explanation or grounding . If coherentism is true, nothing is ungrounded, things ground each other, and understanding what it is to be any given thing – a tree, a house, or a person – is grasping how it fits in: how it grounds and is grounded by its environment. Coherentism is inconsistent with a widely-accepted, orthodox view of grounding, according to which certain fundamental facts about reality asymmetrically determine everything else. In Chapter 1, I argue that this view is not supported by any compelling argument,but merely assumed. In Chapter 2, I argue that explanation should be our guide to ground. In other words, I argue that claims about the total distribution of explanations may serve as premises in arguments for conclusions about grounding. I argue, in particular, that instances in which things explain each other are proof of the fact that things ground each other. In Chapter 3, I argue for coherentism from understanding. To understand, I argue, is to recognize coherence, interconnection, and, generally, how things stand with respect to each other. We understand by grasping the complex weaving-together of relationships. Coherentism, I maintain, best accounts how we may, by discerning what grounds what, come to genuinely understand our world. In Chapter 4, I pursue an intramural debate among varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I argue that the core features of coherentism are compatible with many different intuitions about the nature of reality, and that the view can take many different forms

Grounding, Causation and the Unity of Ontological Structure

Unity is enchanting. That is, it is an enchanting idea that although reality seems to be fragmented in various ways, this apparent fragmentation belies a fundamental unity. This dissertation is an attempt at theoretically capturing such unity via the theoretical unification of causation and grounding. And this unification supports another: the unification of reality’s causal structure and reality’s hierarchical structure. To propose a unification of causation and grounding, I employ a common conception of grounding on which grounding is understood as a dependence relation. On this conception, if the Xs ground the Ys, then the existence of the Ys depends upon the existence of the Xs. Thus, grounded entities ontologically depend upon their grounds. According to the standard view on the matter, this kind of dependence is distinct from causal dependence, and thus grounding and causation are distinct dependence relations. So, on this view, dependence comes in distinct kinds: causal and ontological. Dependence thus contrasts with a relation like identity, for example, which does not admit of variegated kinds: identity, unlike dependence, is uniform in all instances, since identity does not admit of distinct kinds. The standard view thus suggests that dependence is disunified. For this view suggests that there is a robust non-uniformity between instances of dependence: a non-uniformity between the instances of dependence that are considered cases of causation and the instances of dependence that are considered cases of grounding. In critical response, I explore a revisionary view on which the distinction between causation and grounding is a false distinction. On “grounding-causation-identity” or “GCI” for short, causation and grounding are numerically identical relations: what it is for causation to hold is no different than what it is for grounding to hold. For dependence does not admit of distinct kinds, such as causal dependence and ontological dependence: just as the nature of identity does not vary across instances, for identity does not admit of distinct kinds, the nature of dependence does not vary across instances, for it also does not admit of distinct kinds. GCI thus suggests, against the standard view, that dependence is fundamentally unified. For the nature of dependence is uniform in all instances. Further, as mentioned above, this unification of causation and grounding supports a unification of causal structure and hierarchical structure. That is, the unity of ontological structure is a ramification of the unity of dependence. This is because, as it’s commonly thought, ontological structure is “built” from dependence relations: on the one hand, reality’s causal structure is built from causal relations, and on the other, reality’s hierarchical structure is built from grounding relations. Since ontological structure is built from dependence relations, the distinction between causal structure and hierarchical structure hinges on the distinction between causal dependence and ontological dependence. Thus, because the standard view holds that causal dependence is distinct from ontological dependence, this view implies that reality’s causal structure is distinct from reality’s hierarchal structure. And so this view implies that ontological structure is fundamentally disunified. In contrast, since GCI denies the distinction between causal dependence and ontological dependence, GCI thus implies that the distinction between causal structure and hierarchical structure is also a false distinction: just as dependence is of one basic nature that does not vary, ontological structure is of one basic nature that does not vary. In this sense, GCI implies that on ontological structure is fundamentally unified. The discussion throughout the dissertation consists in a multi-stage comparative analysis in which GCI is compared with the standard view as well as other alternative views: views which either portray the connection between causation and grounding differently than GCI or deny that there is any such connection. Though GCI’s rival views disagree about how or if causation and grounding are connected, these rival views are in agreement that causation and grounding are numerically distinct. In this respect, these rival views are each a specific variety of what I call “grounding-causation-non-identity” or “GCN” for short: the basic view that the relations are numerically non-identical. The standard view on the matter, discussed above, I call “common-genus-GCN.” For on this view, although the relations are numerically distinct, they are tightly connected in the respect that they are species of a common genus: the genus of dependence. On another variety of GCN, although the relations are numerically distinct, they are tightly connected in the respect that one of these relations is a species of the other: either grounding is a species of causation or causation is a species of grounding. So, one of the relations subsumes the other in the way that a genus subsumes its species. Hence, I call this view “subsumption-GCN.” Lastly, on “strict-GCN,” the relations are numerically distinct, and there is no tight ontological connection between them: causation and grounding form a gerrymandered pair of relations, not a pair which is genuinely integrated. Thus, listing the views to be discussed, the discussion consists in a comparative analysis of: GCI: The view that there is no ontological distinction between causation and grounding, thus they are numerically identical. Common-genus-GCN: The view that causation and grounding are numerically distinct, but they are tightly connected in the respect that they are species of the same genus. Subsumption-GCN: The view that causation and grounding are numerically distinct, but they are tightly connected in the respect that one of these relations is a species of the other. Strict-GCN: The view that causation and grounding are numerically distinct relations, and there is no tight ontological connection between them. I compare these views by appeal to five main points of comparison. Thus, I present five central arguments in the discussion. And for each of these arguments, I defend a claim concerning which view is most plausible, or which views are more plausible, with respect to one of these points of comparison. These points of comparison are: How well the views explain the likeness between causation and grounding. How conceptually parsimonious the views are. How well suited the views are to the connection between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation. The ability of the views to provide an account of an anomalous dependence relation which crosses both time and ontological levels. The extent to which the views are supported or undermined by disputes about the purported differences between causation and grounding. The goal of the discussion is to establish that GCI is at least as plausible as the best rival view or views, and so GCI is to be taken just as seriously. Thus the discussion presents considerations which favor GCI over rival views, considerations which favor GCI and rival views equally, and considerations which threaten GCI. And as I propose, these considerations balance out in such a way that GCI is just as serious of a view as the alternatives. The dissertation is arranged as follows. Chapter 1 provides the background of the discussion via an outline of grounding and a host of related issues. Further, chapter 1 motivates the discussion by explaining the similarities between causation and grounding. As it is explained, since the relations bear such remarkable and systematic similarities, it is worth asking why they bear these similarities. For it would seem reasonable to think that the relations are connected in some way which explains these similarities. In chapter 2, the first four central arguments are discussed. The “argument from likeness” (quite obviously) focuses upon the first point of comparison: how well the views explain the likeness between causation and grounding. I draw two conclusions from this point of comparison. Firstly, I conclude that strict-GCN is the least plausible view in question. As this argument goes, it speaks in favor of a view if the view can explain the similarities between the relations and it speaks against a view if it cannot. Thus, because strict-GCN is the only view of the four which cannot explain the similarities, it is the least plausible. Because of this, strict-GCN is left out the discussion from this point on. Concerning the second conclusion which I draw from the first point of comparison, I argue as follows. GCI, common-genus-GCN and subsumption-GCN offer equally plausible explanations of the similarities between causation and grounding. Therefore, these views are equally plausible with respect to this point of comparison. Chapter 2 then presents the “argument from parsimony,” which (quite obviously) focuses upon the second point of comparison: how conceptually parsimonious the views are, where a theory’s conceptual parsimony, or lack thereof, is a matter of how many primitive notions it employs. As before, I draw two conclusions from this point of comparison. Firstly, I argue that because common-genus-GCN is less conceptually parsimonious than GCI and subsumption-GCN, common-genus-GCN is the least plausible with respect to this point of comparison. Secondly, I argue that this point of comparison favors GCI and subsumption-GCN equally: since neither of these views employ fewer primitive notions than the other, they are conceptually parsimonious to the same extent. Chapter 2 then present the “argument from explanation” which focuses on the third point of comparison: how well suited the views are to the connection between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation. As it is commonly thought, causation corresponds to causal explanation and grounding correspond to metaphysical explanation. As I suggest, if the distinction between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation holds, or if it clear what this distinction amounts to, this speaks in favor of GCN and against GCI. For GCN is better suited to the distinction between these kinds of explanation. This is because if one adopts GCN (in any variety), then one can treat the distinction between causal and metaphysical explanation such that it reflects the distinction between causation and grounding. And in this case, if one adopts GCI, then one must treat causal explanation and metaphysical explanation such that they fail to reflect the identity of causation and grounding. Conversely, if the distinction between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation does not hold, or if it is not clear what this distinction amounts to, this speaks in favor of GCI and against GCN (in all varieties). For GCI is better suited to the lack of distinction between these kinds of explanation, or it not being clear what this distinction amounts to. This is because if one adopts GCI, then one can treat the lack of distinction between causal and metaphysical explanation such that it reflects the identity between causation and grounding. And in this case, if one adopts GCN, then one must treat causal explanation and metaphysical explanation such that they fail to reflect the non-identity between causation and grounding. As I argue, it is not clear what the distinction between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation amounts to, and so the distinction can be plausibly denied. Thus, GCI is better suited to the connection between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation, and so this point of comparison favors GCI over GCN. Lastly, chapter 2 presents the “argument from double-crossers,” which focuses upon the fourth point of comparison: the ability of the views to provide an account of an anomalous dependence relation which crosses both time and ontological levels. I call such dependence relations “double-crosser” relations. Because double-crossers cross both time and ontological levels, they qualify as both causal relations and grounding relations. As I argue, because double-crossers have this dual status, they pose a serious challenge to all varieties of GCN. For all varieties of GCN rely on the idea that one of the features which individuates grounding is the ordering that grounding imposes. And this means that all varieties of GCN require that causal relations cannot impose the kind of ordering which is characteristic of grounding. However, because double-crossers qualify as causal relation and grounding relations, double-crossers are causal, though they impose the ordering that is characteristic of grounding. So all varieties of GCN fail to provide a tenable account of double-crossers. In contrast, double-crossers pose no problem for GCI. Since GCI denies the distinction between causation and grounding, GCI denies that there is any feature of grounding which causal relations cannot have (in fact, GCI relies on the idea that causal relations can possess any feature of grounding, and vice versa). Thus, with respect to this point of comparison, I conclude that GCI is the most plausible view in question. Chapters 3 and 4 both discuss the fifth point of comparison: the extent to which the views are supported or undermined by disputes about the purported differences between causation and grounding. Considerations about these purported differences are crucial to the discussion. For if one thinks that the relations do indeed bear differences, then one must affirm that the distinction between causation and grounding holds. And if one affirms that the distinction holds, then one must reject GCI. For GCI relies on denying that the distinction holds. Conversely, if all the purported differences between the relations can be denied or called into substantial doubt, then the distinction between the relations can be plausibly denied. And therefore, GCI need not be rejected. Thus, the goal of the “argument from instability”—the argument which concerns the fourth point of comparison—is exactly that: showing that all the purported differences between causation and grounding can be denied or called into substantial doubt. In my terminology, because all the purported differences between the relations are argumentatively “unstable,” the distinction between the relations is argumentatively unstable. For if all the differences between the relations can be rejected or doubted, then there is no argumentatively stable foundation for affirming that the distinction holds. Since there is a wide variety of purported differences between the relations, and since many of the disputes about these differences are quite complex, the discussion of these differences spans two chapters: chapters 3 and 4. And so, the argument from instability spans chapters 3 and 4. The first part of the argument, discussed in chapter 3, addresses a cluster of argumentatively-integrated differences between causation and grounding. These differences are argumentatively-integrated in the sense that, if it’s reasonable to think that one of the differences in the cluster does not hold, this provides support for thinking that some of the other differences in the cluster do not hold. Thus my criticisms of these differences intertwine. The second part of the argument from instability, discussed in chapter 4, addresses argumentatively-unintegrated differences between the relations: differences which require their own independent criticisms. In chapter 5, I offer a general conclusion of the discussion. The discussion shows that there is a huge variety of issues to take into account, and many of these issues are quite complex and controversial. As I suggest, these considerations balance out in such a way that GCI is no less plausible than the alternative views (i.e. common-genus-GCN and subsumption-GCN). Thus, GCI is to be taken just as seriously. I then close the discussion by elaborating some interesting ramifications of GCI

Inheritance arguments for fundamentality

Discussion of a metaphysical sense of 'inheritance' and cognate notions relevant to fundamentality

Powers and the Metaphysics of Fundamentality

In this dissertation, I address the question of whether ground, the relation that obtains between entities e1...en and a further entity e when e ontologically depends on, and is metaphysically explained by, e1...en, should be understood causally and, if so, whether this has any substantive implications. I answer both in the affirmative. I argue that ground and causation are similar enough to motivate characterizing ground as a special kind of causation, and that this can be done if we adopt a powers-theoretic account of causation. Moreover, I argue that the resultant view of ground, what I call “powerful, existential causation,” has important consequences for the debate between foundationalists, according to whom there must exist something fundamental that grounds all else, and infinitists, according to whom being might descend infinitely with nothing fundamental. Drawing on arguments and insights of medieval philosophers such as Ibn- Sīnā, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus, I argue that if ground is understood as powerful, existential causation a strong argument can be formulated for foundationalism over infinitism. Thus, there must exist something fundamental whose existence is ungrounded, but which grounds the existence of everything else

Emergence and Causal Powers

This thesis is concerned with the theory of ontological emergence; a theory that posits a new kind of entity – usually an emergent property – that occurs in complex systems and can explain some system-level behaviour. The theory holds that these emergent entities are dependent on, but novel with respect to, the components of those systems. Such entities have been invoked to explain behaviours as diverse as symmetry breaking in molecular physics to the possibility of personal agency. As a metaphysical theory it is useful wherever there is a lack of understanding about how system-level behaviour can occur based on what we know about the parts of that system. Besides its usefulness, the theory, if true, would profoundly impact our understanding of fundamental ontology. The first half of this thesis aims to do three things: first, identify a problem that emergence can explain; second, identify what emergence must do in order to solve that problem; third, identify a theory of emergence capable of doing it. The first and second of these aims will require us to outline issues in fundamental ontology and metaphysical methodology that are critical to any assessment of the possibility of emergence. They both also require making some commitments on these issues. Among such commitments will be a commitment to an ontology of properties as causal powers. I argue that emergence is a theory of macro-properties and that the primary problem it solves is the Problem of Reduction. I thereafter defend the theory of causal powers emergence against charges that it is incoherent and inconsonant with science and natural unity; these and other conflicts are shown to be unproblematic once the theory is properly explicated. In these respects, this thesis finds no fault with the coherence of emergence. The key claims in the second half of the thesis instead pertain to the necessity of emergence to solve the problem that I have identified. The argument is that even if causal novelty, holistic effects and top-down causation are apparent in a system, a properly developed causal powers ontology can account for them without positing new fundamental properties. I develop an option called non-reductive inherence based on a theory of powers admitting a plurality of compositional principles. The thesis ends by expounding this alternative to emergence and setting out some of the trade-offs between the positions

Grounding Orthodoxy and the Layered Conception

Ground offers the hope of vindicating and illuminating an classic philosophical idea: the layered conception, according to which reality is structured by relations of dependence, with physical phenomena on the bottom, upon which chemistry, then biology, and psychology reside. However, ground can only make good on this promise if it is appropriately formally behaved. The paradigm of good formal behavior can be found in the currently dominant grounding orthodoxy, which holds that ground is transitive, antisymmetric, irreflexive, and foundational. However, heretics have recently challenged the orthodoxy. In this paper, I examine ground’s ability to vindicate the layered conception upon various relaxations of the orthodox assumptions. I argue that highly unorthodox views of ground can still vindicate the layered conception and that, in some ways, the heretical views enable ground to better serve as a guide to reality’s layering than do orthodox views of ground

Perception, Causally Efficacious Particulars, and the Range of Phenomenal Consciousness: Reply to Commentaries

This paper responds to critical commentaries on my book, Perceiving Reality (OUP, 2012), by Laura Guerrero, Matthew MacKenzie, and Anand Vaidya. Guerrero focuses on the metaphysics of causation, and its role in the broader question of whether the ‘two truths’ framework of Buddhist philosophy can be reconciled with the claim that science provides the best account of our experienced world. MacKenzie pursues two related questions: (i) Is reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) identical with the subjective pole of a dual-aspect cognition or are there alternative, perhaps better, ways of understanding this self-intimating character of mental states? (ii) Is perception constitutively intentional or is it representational? Vaidya argues that, in so far as Husserlian phenomenology and Buddhism differ in terms of their fundamental ontological commit- ments, they must be incompatible, thus rendering any cross-cultural philosophical project that seeks their rapprochement tenuous. One of my aims in Perceiving Reality is to show how accounts of perception informed by metaphysical realism can be problematic on both metaphysical and epistemological grounds, especially when relying on conceptions of consciousness that ignore its properly phenomenological features

Wittgenstein and Davidson on actions: A contrastive analysis

This paper seeks to bring out the difference between the later Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s view of actions with a special focus. Initially it contrasts their respective approaches to the correlative notions of wish, will (intention) and actions, an issue which has customarily been categorized as reason-approach of Wittgenstein as against the mental causation theory endorsed by Davidson. The ultimate aim of this paper is to integrate the ontology of actions with the semantic issue of the distinction between reference and description action-words, or that between the extensionalist and intensionalist approach to actions. The author demonstrates how Davidson in spite of conscientiously problematising the task of separating the mental causal antecedent from the action, goes on to undertake a hair-splitting analysis to sustain the split; and thereby preserve the extensional identity of actions. This extensional identity in Davidson’s scheme turns out to be as brute physical events with bare spatio-temporal outlines - lying beyond the various intensional ascriptions. For Wittgenstein on the other hand, actions are not caused by mental antecedents, but blend with wish, will and the so-called mental antecedents to forge an indissoluble whole, leaving no scope for the proposed bare extension to take shape. The paper concludes with a brief indication of McDowell’s treatment of this cause/reason polemics phrased in terms of the non-conceptualist versus conceptualist debate suggesting a new direction to engage with Wittgenstein’s insights on action