The Problem of Mental Action

In mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and developing a first positive model, concentrating on epistemic mental actions and epistemic self-control. Action initiation is a functionally adequate form of self-deception; mental actions are a specific form of predictive control of effective connectivity, accompanied and possibly even functionally mediated by a conscious “epistemic agent model”. The overall process is aimed at increasing the epistemic value of pre-existing states in the conscious self-model, without causally looping through sensory sheets or using the non-neural body as an instrument for active inference

Modes and models in disorders of consciousness science

The clinical assessment of non-communicative brain damaged patients is extremely difficult and there is a need for paraclinical diagnostic markers of the level of consciousness. In the last few years, progress within neuroimaging has led to a growing body of studies investigating vegetative state and minimally conscious state patients, which can be classified in two main approaches. Active neuroimaging paradigms search for a response to command without requiring a motor response. Passive neuroimaging paradigms investigate spontaneous brain activity and brain responses to external stimuli and aim at identifying neural correlates of consciousness. Other passive paradigms eschew neuroimaging in favour of behavioural markers which reliably distinguish conscious and unconscious conditions in healthy controls. In order to furnish accurate diagnostic criteria, a mechanistic explanation of how the brain gives rise to consciousness seems desirable. Mechanistic and theoretical approaches could also ultimately lead to a unification of passive and active paradigms in a coherent diagnostic approach. In this paper, we survey current passive and active paradigms available for diagnosis of residual consciousness in vegetative state and minimally conscious patients. We then review the current main theories of consciousness and see how they can apply in this context. Finally, we discuss some avenues for future research in this domai

“What is it like to be a bat?”—a pathway to the answer from the integrated information theory

What does it feel like to be a bat? Is conscious experience of echolocation closer to that of vision or audition? Or do bats process echolocation nonconsciously, such that they do not feel anything about echolocation? This famous question of bats' experience, posed by a philosopher Thomas Nagel in 1974, clarifies the difficult nature of the mind–body problem. Why a particular sense, such as vision, has to feel like vision, but not like audition, is totally puzzling. This is especially so given that any conscious experience is supported by neuronal activity. Activity of a single neuron appears fairly uniform across modalities and even similar to those for non-conscious processing. Without any explanation on why a particular sense has to feel the way it does, researchers cannot approach the question of the bats' experience. Is there any theory that gives us a hope for such explanation? Currently, probably none, except for one. Integrated information theory has potential to offer a plausible explanation. IIT essentially claims that any system that is composed of causally interacting mechanisms can have conscious experience. And precisely how the system feels is determined by the way the mechanisms influence each other in a holistic way. In this article, I will give a brief explanation of the essence of IIT. Further, I will briefly provide a potential scientific pathway to approach bats' conscious experience and its philosophical implications. If IIT, or its improved or related versions, is validated enough, the theory will gain credibility. When it matures enough, predictions from the theory, including nature of bats' experience, will have to be accepted. I argue that a seemingly impossible question about bats' consciousness will drive empirical and theoretical consciousness research to make big breakthroughs, in a similar way as an impossible question about the age of the universe has driven modern cosmology

Awake Reactivation of Prior Experiences Consolidates Memories and Biases Cognition.

After experiences are encoded into memory, post-encoding reactivation mechanisms have been proposed to mediate long-term memory stabilization and transformation. Spontaneous reactivation of hippocampal representations, together with hippocampal-cortical interactions, are leading candidate mechanisms for promoting systems-level memory strengthening and reorganization. While the replay of spatial representations has been extensively studied in rodents, here we review recent fMRI work that provides evidence for spontaneous reactivation of nonspatial, episodic event representations in the human hippocampus and cortex, as well as for experience-dependent alterations in systems-level hippocampal connectivity. We focus on reactivation during awake post-encoding periods, relationships between reactivation and subsequent behavior, how reactivation is modulated by factors that influence consolidation, and the implications of persistent reactivation for biasing ongoing perception and cognition

Consciousness and cortical responsiveness: a within-state study during non-rapid eye movement sleep.

When subjects become unconscious, there is a characteristic change in the way the cerebral cortex responds to perturbations, as can be assessed using transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (TMS-EEG). For instance, compared to wakefulness, during non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep TMS elicits a larger positive-negative wave, fewer phase-locked oscillations, and an overall simpler response. However, many physiological variables also change when subjects go from wake to sleep, anesthesia, or coma. To avoid these confounding factors, we focused on NREM sleep only and measured TMS-evoked EEG responses before awakening the subjects and asking them if they had been conscious (dreaming) or not. As shown here, when subjects reported no conscious experience upon awakening, TMS evoked a larger negative deflection and a shorter phase-locked response compared to when they reported a dream. Moreover, the amplitude of the negative deflection-a hallmark of neuronal bistability according to intracranial studies-was inversely correlated with the length of the dream report (i.e., total word count). These findings suggest that variations in the level of consciousness within the same physiological state are associated with changes in the underlying bistability in cortical circuits

Resting state functional thalamic connectivity abnormalities in patients with post-stroke sleep apnoea: a pilot case-control study

OBJECTIVE: Sleep apnoea is common after stroke, and has adverse effects on the clinical outcome of affected cases. Its pathophysiological mechanisms are only partially known. Increases in brain connectivity after stroke might influence networks involved in arousal modulation and breathing control. The aim of this study was to investigate the resting state functional MRI thalamic hyper connectivity of stroke patients affected by sleep apnoea (SA) with respect to cases not affected, and to healthy controls (HC). PATIENTS AND METHODS: A series of stabilized strokes were submitted to 3T resting state functional MRI imaging and full polysomnography. The ventral-posterior-lateral thalamic nucleus was used as seed. RESULTS: At the between groups comparison analysis, in SA cases versus HC, the regions significantly hyper-connected with the seed were those encoding noxious threats (frontal eye field, somatosensory association, secondary visual cortices). Comparisons between SA cases versus those without SA, revealed in the former group significantly increased connectivity with regions modulating the response to stimuli independently to their potentiality of threat (prefrontal, primary and somatosensory association, superolateral and medial-inferior temporal, associative and secondary occipital ones). Further significantly functionally hyper connections were documented with regions involved also in the modulation of breathing during sleep (pons, midbrain, cerebellum, posterior cingulate cortices), and in the modulation of breathing response to chemical variations (anterior, posterior and para-hippocampal cingulate cortices). CONCLUSIONS: Our preliminary data support the presence of functional hyper connectivity in thalamic circuits modulating sensorial stimuli, in patients with post-stroke sleep apnoea, possibly influencing both their arousal ability and breathing modulation during sleep

fMRI Evidence for Default Mode Network Deactivation Associated with Rapid Eye Movements in Sleep

System-specific brain responses—time-locked to rapid eye movements (REMs) in sleep—are characteristically widespread, with robust and clear activation in the primary visual cortex and other structures involved in multisensory integration. This pattern suggests that REMs underwrite hierarchical processing of visual information in a time-locked manner, where REMs index the generation and scanning of virtual-world models, through multisensory integration in dreaming—as in awake states. Default mode network (DMN) activity increases during rest and reduces during various tasks including visual perception. The implicit anticorrelation between the DMN and task-positive network (TPN)—that persists in REM sleep—prompted us to focus on DMN responses to temporally-precise REM events. We timed REMs during sleep from the video recordings and quantified the neural correlates of REMs—using functional MRI (fMRI)—in 24 independent studies of 11 healthy participants. A reanalysis of these data revealed that the cortical areas exempt from widespread REM-locked brain activation were restricted to the DMN. Furthermore, our analysis revealed a modest temporally-precise REM-locked decrease—phasic deactivation—in key DMN nodes, in a subset of independent studies. These results are consistent with hierarchical predictive coding; namely, permissive deactivation of DMN at the top of the hierarchy (leading to the widespread cortical activation at lower levels; especially the primary visual cortex). Additional findings indicate REM-locked cerebral vasodilation and suggest putative mechanisms for dream forgetting

SLEEPING WHILE AWAKE: A NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION ON SLEEP DURING WAKEFULNESS.

Il sonno e la veglia vengono comunemente considerati come due stati distinti. L\u2019alternanza tra essi, la cui presenza \ue8 stata dimostrata in ogni specie animale studiata fino ad oggi, sembra essere una delle caratteristiche che definisce la nostra vita. Allo stesso tempo, per\uf2, le scoperte portate alla luce negli ultimi decenni hanno offuscato i confini tra questi due stati. I meccanismi del sonno hanno sempre affascinato i neurofisiologi, che infatti, nell\u2019ultimo secolo, li hanno caratterizzati in dettaglio: ora sappiamo che all\u2019attivit\ue0 del sonno sottost\ue0 una specifica attivit\ue0 neuronale chiamata slow oscillation. La slow oscillation, che \ue8 costituita da (ancora una volta) un\u2019alternanza tra periodi di attivit\ue0 e periodi di iperpolarizzazione e silenzio neuronale (OFF-periods), \ue8 la modalit\ue0 base di attivazione del cervello dormiente. Questa alternanza \ue8 dovuta alla tendenza dei neuroni surante lo stato di sonno, di passare ad un periodo silente dopo un\u2019attivazione iniziale, una tendenza a cui viene dato il nome di bistabilit\ue0 neuronale. Molti studi hanno dimostrato come la bistabilit\ue0 neuronale tipica del sonno ed i relativi OFF-periods, possano accadere anche durante la veglia in particolari condizioni patologiche, nelle transizioni del sonno e durante le deprivazioni di sonno. Per questo motivo, se accettassimo che la bistabilit\ue0 neuronale e gli OFF-periods rappresentino una caratteristica fondamentale del sonno, allora dovremmo ammettere che stiamo assistendo ad un cambio di paradigma: da una prospettiva neurofisiologica il sonno pu\uf2 intrudere nella veglia. In questa tesi ho analizzato i nuovi -fluidi- confini tra sonno e veglia e le possibili implicazioni di questi nel problema della persistenza personale attraverso il tempo. Inoltre, ho studiato le implicazioni cliniche dell\u2019intrusione di sonno nella veglia in pazienti con lesioni cerebrali focali di natura ischemica. In particolare, i miei obiettivi sono stati: 1) Dimostrare come la bistabilit\ue0 neuronale possa essere responsabile della perdita di funzione nei pazienti affetti da ischemia cerebrale e come questo potrebbe avere implicazioni nello studio della patofisiologia dell\u2019ischemia cerebrale e nella sua terapia; 2) Stabilire le basi per un modello di sonno locale presente nella vita di tutti i giorni: la sensazione di sonnolenza. Infatti, essa potrebbe riflettere la presenza di porzioni di corteccia in stato di sonno, ma durante lo stato di veglia; 3) Difendere il criterio biologico di identit\ue0, che troverebbe nell\u2019attivit\ue0 cerebrale la continuit\ue0 necessaria al mantenimento della nostra identit\ue0 nel tempo.Sleep and wakefulness are considered two mutually exclusive states. The alternation between those two states seems to be a defining characteristic of our life, a ubiquitous phenomenon demonstrated in every animal species investigated so far. However, during the last decade, advances in neurophysiology have blurred the boundaries between those states. The mechanisms of sleep have always intrigued neurophysiologists and great advances have been made over the last century in understanding them: we now know that the defining characteristic underlying sleep activity is a specific pattern of neuronal activity, namely the slow oscillation. The slow oscillation, which is characterized by the periodic alternation between periods of activity (ON-periods) and periods of hyperpolarization and neuronal silence (OFF-periods) is the default mode of activity of the sleeping cortex. This alternation is due to the tendency of neurons to fall into a silent period after an initial activation; such tendency is known as \u201cbistability\u201d. There is accumulating evidence that sleep-like bistability, and the ensuing OFF-periods, may occur locally in the awake human brain in some pathological conditions, in sleep transition, as well as after sleep deprivation. Therefore, to the extent that bistability and OFF periods represents the basic neuronal features of sleep, a paradigm shift is in place: from a neurophysiological perspective sleep can intrude into wakefulness. In this thesis, I explore the fluid boundaries between sleep and wakefulness and investigate their possible implications on the problem of personal persistence over time. Moreover, I study the clinical implications of the intrusion of sleep into wakefulness in patients with focal brain injury due to stroke. Specifically, I aim to: 1) show how the sleep-like bistability can be responsible for the loss of function in stroke patients. This may have implications for understanding the pathophysiology of stroke and helping to foster recovery; 2) establish the basis for a model of local sleep that might be present in the everyday life, id est the sensation of sleepiness. Indeed, sleepiness could reflect islands of sleep during wakefulness; 3) advocate the biological criterion of identity, in which the continuity necessary for maintaining ourselves over time could be represented by never resting activity in the brain