Multirole Logic (Extended Abstract)

We identify multirole logic as a new form of logic in which conjunction/disjunction is interpreted as an ultrafilter on the power set of some underlying set (of roles) and the notion of negation is generalized to endomorphisms on this underlying set. We formalize both multirole logic (MRL) and linear multirole logic (LMRL) as natural generalizations of classical logic (CL) and classical linear logic (CLL), respectively, and also present a filter-based interpretation for intuitionism in multirole logic. Among various meta-properties established for MRL and LMRL, we obtain one named multiparty cut-elimination stating that every cut involving one or more sequents (as a generalization of a (binary) cut involving exactly two sequents) can be eliminated, thus extending the celebrated result of cut-elimination by Gentzen

The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games

In this paper, we study the notion of adversarial Stackelberg value for two-player non-zero sum games played on bi-weighted graphs with the mean-payoff and the discounted sum functions. The adversarial Stackelberg value of Player 0 is the largest value that Player 0 can obtain when announcing her strategy to Player 1 which in turn responds with any of his best response. For the mean-payoff function, we show that the adversarial Stackelberg value is not always achievable but ?-optimal strategies exist. We show how to compute this value and prove that the associated threshold problem is in NP. For the discounted sum payoff function, we draw a link with the target discounted sum problem which explains why the problem is difficult to solve for this payoff function. We also provide solutions to related gap problems

The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games

In this paper, we study the notion of adversarial Stackelberg value for two-player non-zero sum games played on bi-weighted graphs with the mean-payoff and the discounted sum functions. The adversarial Stackelberg value of Player 0 is the largest value that Player 0 can obtain when announcing her strategy to Player 1 which in turn responds with any of his best response. For the mean-payoff function, we show that the adversarial Stackelberg value is not always achievable but epsilon-optimal strategies exist. We show how to compute this value and prove that the associated threshold problem is in NP. For the discounted sum payoff function, we draw a link with the target discounted sum problem which explains why the problem is difficult to solve for this payoff function. We also provide solutions to related gap problems.Comment: long version of an ICALP'20 pape

A Framework for Resource Dependent EDSLs in a Dependently Typed Language (Pearl)

Idris' Effects library demonstrates how to embed resource dependent algebraic effect handlers into a dependently typed host language, providing run-time and compile-time based reasoning on type-level resources. Building upon this work, Resources is a framework for realising Embedded Domain Specific Languages (EDSLs) with type systems that contain domain specific substructural properties. Differing from Effects, Resources allows a language’s substructural properties to be encoded within type-level resources that are associated with language variables. Such an association allows for multiple effect instances to be reasoned about autonomically and without explicit type-level declaration. Type-level predicates are used as proof that the language’s substructural properties hold. Several exemplar EDSLs are presented that illustrates our framework’s operation and how dependent types provide correctness-by-construction guarantees that substructural properties of written programs hold