Byzantine Agreement Given Partial Broadcast

This paper considers unconditionally secure protocols for reliable broadcast among a set of n players, where up to t of the players can be corrupted by a (Byzantine) adversary but the remaining h = n - t players remain honest. In the standard model with a complete, synchronous network of bilateral authenticated communication channels among the players, broadcast is achievable if and only if 2n/h < 3. We show that, by extending this model by the existence of partial broadcast channels among subsets of b players, global broadcast can be achieved if and only if the number h of honest players satisfies 2n/h < b + 1. Achievability is demonstrated by protocols with communication and computation complexities polynomial in the size of the network, i.e., in the number of partial broadcast channels. A respective characterization for the related consensus problem is also give

Exact Byzantine Consensus on Arbitrary Directed Graphs Under Local Broadcast Model

We consider Byzantine consensus in a synchronous system where nodes are connected by a network modeled as a directed graph, i.e., communication links between neighboring nodes are not necessarily bi-directional. The directed graph model is motivated by wireless networks wherein asymmetric communication links can occur. In the classical point-to-point communication model, a message sent on a communication link is private between the two nodes on the link. This allows a Byzantine faulty node to equivocate, i.e., send inconsistent information to its neighbors. This paper considers the local broadcast model of communication, wherein transmission by a node is received identically by all of its outgoing neighbors, effectively depriving the faulty nodes of the ability to equivocate. Prior work has obtained sufficient and necessary conditions on undirected graphs to be able to achieve Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model. In this paper, we obtain tight conditions on directed graphs to be able to achieve Byzantine consensus with binary inputs under the local broadcast model. The results obtained in the paper provide insights into the trade-off between directionality of communication links and the ability to achieve consensus

The Impact of RDMA on Agreement

Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) is becoming widely available in data centers. This technology allows a process to directly read and write the memory of a remote host, with a mechanism to control access permissions. In this paper, we study the fundamental power of these capabilities. We consider the well-known problem of achieving consensus despite failures, and find that RDMA can improve the inherent trade-off in distributed computing between failure resilience and performance. Specifically, we show that RDMA allows algorithms that simultaneously achieve high resilience and high performance, while traditional algorithms had to choose one or another. With Byzantine failures, we give an algorithm that only requires $n \geq 2f_P + 1$ processes (where $f_P$ is the maximum number of faulty processes) and decides in two (network) delays in common executions. With crash failures, we give an algorithm that only requires $n \geq f_P + 1$ processes and also decides in two delays. Both algorithms tolerate a minority of memory failures inherent to RDMA, and they provide safety in asynchronous systems and liveness with standard additional assumptions.Comment: Full version of PODC'19 paper, strengthened broadcast algorith

Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators

We consider games that have (k,t)-robust equilibria when played with a mediator, where an equilibrium is (k,t)-robust if it tolerates deviations by coalitions of size up to k and deviations by up to $t$ players with unknown utilities. We prove lower bounds that match upper bounds on the ability to implement such mediators using cheap talk (that is, just allowing communication among the players). The bounds depend on (a) the relationship between k, t, and n, the total number of players in the system; (b) whether players know the exact utilities of other players; (c) whether there are broadcast channels or just point-to-point channels; (d) whether cryptography is available; and (e) whether the game has a $k+t)-punishment strategy; that is, a strategy that, if used by all but at most$k+t$ players, guarantees that every player gets a worse outcome than they do with the equilibrium strategy