60,299 research outputs found
Buying Private Data without Verification
We consider the problem of designing a survey to aggregate non-verifiable
information from a privacy-sensitive population: an analyst wants to compute
some aggregate statistic from the private bits held by each member of a
population, but cannot verify the correctness of the bits reported by
participants in his survey. Individuals in the population are strategic agents
with a cost for privacy, \ie, they not only account for the payments they
expect to receive from the mechanism, but also their privacy costs from any
information revealed about them by the mechanism's outcome---the computed
statistic as well as the payments---to determine their utilities. How can the
analyst design payments to obtain an accurate estimate of the population
statistic when individuals strategically decide both whether to participate and
whether to truthfully report their sensitive information?
We design a differentially private peer-prediction mechanism that supports
accurate estimation of the population statistic as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in
settings where agents have explicit preferences for privacy. The mechanism
requires knowledge of the marginal prior distribution on bits , but does
not need full knowledge of the marginal distribution on the costs ,
instead requiring only an approximate upper bound. Our mechanism guarantees
-differential privacy to each agent against any adversary who can
observe the statistical estimate output by the mechanism, as well as the
payments made to the other agents . Finally, we show that with
slightly more structured assumptions on the privacy cost functions of each
agent, the cost of running the survey goes to as the number of agents
diverges.Comment: Appears in EC 201
What proof do we prefer? Variants of verifiability in voting
In this paper, we discuss one particular feature of Internet
voting, verifiability, against the background of scientific
literature and experiments in the Netherlands. In order
to conceptually clarify what verifiability is about, we distinguish
classical verifiability from constructive veriability in
both individual and universal verification. In classical individual
verifiability, a proof that a vote has been counted can
be given without revealing the vote. In constructive individual
verifiability, a proof is only accepted if the witness (i.e.
the vote) can be reconstructed. Analogous concepts are de-
fined for universal veriability of the tally. The RIES system
used in the Netherlands establishes constructive individual
verifiability and constructive universal verifiability,
whereas many advanced cryptographic systems described
in the scientific literature establish classical individual
verifiability and classical universal verifiability.
If systems with a particular kind of verifiability continue
to be used successfully in practice, this may influence the
way in which people are involved in elections, and their image
of democracy. Thus, the choice for a particular kind
of verifiability in an experiment may have political consequences.
We recommend making a well-informed democratic
choice for the way in which both individual and universal
verifiability should be realised in Internet voting, in
order to avoid these unconscious political side-effects of the
technology used. The safest choice in this respect, which
maintains most properties of current elections, is classical
individual verifiability combined with constructive universal
verifiability. We would like to encourage discussion
about the feasibility of this direction in scientific research
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation
This Article posits that the essential role of securities regulation is to create a competitive market for sophisticated professional investors and analysts (information traders). The Article advances two related theses-one descriptive and the other normative. Descriptively, the Article demonstrates that securities regulation is specifically designed to facilitate and protect the work of information traders. Securities regulation may be divided into three broad categories: (i) disclosure duties; (ii) restrictions on fraud and manipulation; and (iii) restrictions on insider trading-each of which contributes to the creation of a vibrant market for information traders. Disclosure duties reduce information traders\u27 costs of searching and gathering information. Restrictions on fraud and manipulation lower information traders\u27 cost of verifying the credibility of information, and thus enhance information traders\u27 ability to make accurate predictions. Finally, restrictions on insider trading protect information traders from competition from insiders that would undermine information traders\u27 ability to recoup their investment in information. Normatively, the Article shows that information traders can best underwrite efficient and liquid capital markets, and, hence, it is this group that securities regulation should strive to protect. Our account has important implications for several policy debates. First, our account supports the system of mandatory disclosure. We show that, although market forces may provide management with an adequate incentive to disclose at the initial public offering (IPO) stage, they cannot be relied on to effect optimal disclosure thereafter. Second, our analysis categorically rejects calls to limit disclosure duties to hard information and self-dealing by management. Third, our analysis supports the use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption in all fraud cases even when markets are inefficient. Fourth, our analysis suggests that in cases involving corporate misstatements, the appropriate standard of care should, in principle, be negligence, not fraud
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation
This Article posits that the essential role of securities regulation is to create a competitive market for sophisticated professional investors and analysts (information traders). The Article advances two related theses-one descriptive and the other normative. Descriptively, the Article demonstrates that securities regulation is specifically designed to facilitate and protect the work of information traders. Securities regulation may be divided into three broad categories: (i) disclosure duties; (ii) restrictions on fraud and manipulation; and (iii) restrictions on insider trading-each of which contributes to the creation of a vibrant market for information traders. Disclosure duties reduce information traders\u27 costs of searching and gathering information. Restrictions on fraud and manipulation lower information traders\u27 cost of verifying the credibility of information, and thus enhance information traders\u27 ability to make accurate predictions. Finally, restrictions on insider trading protect information traders from competition from insiders that would undermine information traders\u27 ability to recoup their investment in information. Normatively, the Article shows that information traders can best underwrite efficient and liquid capital markets, and, hence, it is this group that securities regulation should strive to protect. Our account has important implications for several policy debates. First, our account supports the system of mandatory disclosure. We show that, although market forces may provide management with an adequate incentive to disclose at the initial public offering (IPO) stage, they cannot be relied on to effect optimal disclosure thereafter. Second, our analysis categorically rejects calls to limit disclosure duties to hard information and self-dealing by management. Third, our analysis supports the use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption in all fraud cases even when markets are inefficient. Fourth, our analysis suggests that in cases involving corporate misstatements, the appropriate standard of care should, in principle, be negligence, not fraud
Blockchain: A Graph Primer
Bitcoin and its underlying technology Blockchain have become popular in
recent years. Designed to facilitate a secure distributed platform without
central authorities, Blockchain is heralded as a paradigm that will be as
powerful as Big Data, Cloud Computing and Machine learning. Blockchain
incorporates novel ideas from various fields such as public key encryption and
distributed systems. As such, a reader often comes across resources that
explain the Blockchain technology from a certain perspective only, leaving the
reader with more questions than before. We will offer a holistic view on
Blockchain. Starting with a brief history, we will give the building blocks of
Blockchain, and explain their interactions. As graph mining has become a major
part its analysis, we will elaborate on graph theoretical aspects of the
Blockchain technology. We also devote a section to the future of Blockchain and
explain how extensions like Smart Contracts and De-centralized Autonomous
Organizations will function. Without assuming any reader expertise, our aim is
to provide a concise but complete description of the Blockchain technology.Comment: 16 pages, 8 figure
Homo Datumicus : correcting the market for identity data
Effective digital identity systems offer great economic and civic potential. However, unlocking this potential requires dealing with social, behavioural, and structural challenges to efficient market formation. We propose that a marketplace for identity data can be more efficiently formed with an infrastructure that provides a more adequate representation of individuals online. This paper therefore introduces the ontological concept of Homo Datumicus: individuals as data subjects transformed by HAT Microservers, with the axiomatic computational capabilities to transact with their own data at scale. Adoption of this paradigm would lower the social risks of identity orientation, enable privacy preserving transactions by default and mitigate the risks of power imbalances in digital identity systems and markets
Vote buying revisited: implications for receipt-freeness
In this paper, we analyse the concept of vote buying based
on examples that try to stretch the meaning of the concept. Which ex-
amples can still be called vote buying, and which cannot? We propose
several dimensions that are relevant to qualifying an action as vote buy-
ing or not. As a means of protection against vote buying and coercion,
the concept of receipt-freeness has been proposed. We argue that, in or-
der to protect against a larger set of vote buying activities, the concept
of receipt-freeness should be interpreted probabilistically. We propose a
general definition of probabilistic receipt-freeness by adapting existing
definitions of probabilistic anonymity to voting
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