8,677 research outputs found
Dialectical and heuristic arguments: presumptions and burden of proof.
Presumption is a complex concept in law, affecting the dialogue setting. However, it is not clear how presumptions work in everyday argumentation, in which the concept of âplausible argumentationâ seems to encompass all kinds of inferences. By analyzing the legal notion of presumption, it appears that this type of reasoning combines argument schemes with reasoning from ignorance. Presumptive reasoning can be considered a particular form of reasoning, which needs positive or negative evidence to carry a probative weight on the conclusion. For this reason, presumptions shift the burden of providing evidence or explanations onto the interlocutor. The latter can provide new information or fail to do so: whereas in the first case the new information rebuts the presumption, in the second case, the absence of information that the interlocutor could reasonably provide strengthen the conclusion of the presumptive reasoning. In both cases the result of the presumption is to strengthen the conclusion of the reasoning from lack of evidence.
As shown in the legal cases, the effect of presumption is to shift the burden of proof to the interlocutor; however, the shift a presumption effects is only the shift of the evidential burden, or the burden of completing the incomplete knowledge from which the conclusion was drawn. The burden of persuasion remains on the proponent of the presumption. On the contrary, reasoning from definition in law is a conclusive proof, and shifts to the other party the burden to prove the contrary. This crucial difference can be applied to everyday argumentation: natural arguments can be divided into dialectical and presumptive arguments, leading to conclusions materially different in strength
Presumption in Parliamentary Debate: Examining Whately\u27s Ideas and their Application to an Emerging and Evolving Debate Style
Presumption as a part of formal debate is examined in this paper, which discusses Richard Whately\u27s ideas about presumption and burden of proof in argumentation, how these ideas have been applied as paradigms and judging criteria in competitive debate, and how these same ideas fit into the practice of parliamentary debate. General conclusions about broad applications of debate rules are drawn, then, from this example, and suggestions are made for future study
Burden of proof
ABSTRACT. This paper presents an analysis of the concept of burden of proof in argument. Relationship of burden of proof to three traditional informal fallacies is considered: (i) argumentum ad hominem (ii) petitio principii and (iii) argumentum ad ignorantiam. Other topics discussed include persuasive dialogue, pragmatic reasoning, legal burden of proof, plausible reasoning in regulated disputes, rules of dialogue, and the value of reasoned dialogue. KEY WORDS. Argumentation, persuasion, dialogue, fallacies, rhetoric, informal logic, pragmatics, presumption. It has been shown by Whately, Perelman, Johnstone, Hintikka, Barth and Krabbe, and Meyer, that philosophical argumentation is based on a framework of i nteractive question-answer dialogue between two speakers who take opposing sides on a controversial issue. Of course, this tradition is no novelty in philosophy, and is most closely identified with Socratic dialogue as a model of philosophical argument. If one takes this conception of philosophical argument seriously, traditional informal fallacies like the petitio principii, argumentum ad hominem, and argumentum ad ignorantiam are revealed as (a) not fallacies in many instances, but forms of plausible reasoning that can be reasonable arguments to shift a burden of proof, and (b) extremely important types of criticism in argumentation that can have the legitimate function of shifting a burden or weight of evidence against, or in favor of presumptions in an argument. However, these traditional categories of argument called informal fallacies can only be themselves revealed as deeply interesting and fundamental objects of study for philosophy once some headway has been made in understanding the underlying concept of burden of proof in argument. But the literature offers more questions than answers on the subject of burden of proof. The arguments of this paper are motivated by an interest in trying to provide answers for the following six questions. 1. How does burden of proof get set initially in reasoned dialogue? Argumentation 2 (1988) 233-254
Presumptions in argumentation:a systematic analysis
Take some statement p that is objectively uncontroversial (e.g., âThe Earth is globe-shapedâ), and that you accept for that reason. Suppose, however, that your interlocutor is not convinced: she remains sceptical, or advances non-p. How should a reasonable discussion about p be structured? Should you (and only you) have the burden of proof and provide reasons, despite pâs objective plausibility? Should the burden allocation be symmetrical? Or should only those who reject plausible positions carry probative obligations? This dissertation studies the latter proposal. Some philosophers, legal scholars, argumentation theorists, and rhetoricians have argued that there is a set of dialectically privileged propositions, i.e., âpresumptions,â that asymmetrically allocate the burden(s) of proof. I analyse this âdeontic functionâ in connection to: presumptionâs other functions (such as harm reduction and enabling dialogical progress), defeating conditions, the argument from ignorance, and justificatory strength. In general, I argue that the standard accounts of âdeontic functionâ require revisions and qualifications. In particular, I show that presumption entails distinct pragmatic, deontic, and dialogical functions, different defeating conditions, and distinct conceptions of justificatory strengthâdepending on whether the presumption is âpracticalâ (e.g., âWe should proceed as if it will rain and bring an umbrella (although this is not certain)â) or âcognitiveâ (e.g., âThe Earth is globe-shapedâ)
Kidney Sales and the Burden of Proof
Janet Radcliffe Richardsâ The Ethics of Transplants outlines a novel framework for moral inquiry in practical contexts and applies it to the topic of paid living kidney donation. In doing so, Radcliffe Richards makes two key claims: that opponents of organ markets bear the burden of proof, and that this burden has not yet been satisfied. This paper raises four related objections to Radcliffe Richardsâ methodological framework, focusing largely on how Radcliffe Richards uses this framework in her discussion of kidney sales. We conclude that Radcliffe Richardsâ method of inquiry hinders our ability to answer the very question that it ought to help us resolve: What is there best reason to do, all things considered
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Emerging infectious diseases: coping with uncertainty
The worldâs scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this framework should have reasoning at its centre and, specifically, that forms of reasoning beyond deduction and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles, I have presented a case for treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of argument that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging disease. In this paper, I want to extend that analysis by highlighting the unique features of these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions of uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent with the reasoning practices of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging infectious diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UKâs BSE crisis, a crisis that posed a significant threat to both human and animal health
Presuming and Presumption in Everyday Argumentation: A response to Godden and Walton
In response to critique by Godden and Walton, this essay delineates the role of moral motivation in the commitment structure of ordinary presumptive inferences. It defends the capacity of ordinary presumptions to support discursive structures within which everyday argumentation can address defeasible claims and enable alignments and realignments in probative obligations, i.e., burdens of proof
Presumptions and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing and Accusing
This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of ACCUSING and PROPOSING reveals striking differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison highlights significant contrasts between the way presumptions figure in legal reasoning as opposed to deliberation; the comparison also raises theoretically important questions about the norms governing persuasive argumentation. This paper is based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts
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