Playing In Between: Patents’ Brokers In Markets For Technology

We here argue that patent brokers do not only stay in between supply and demand of innovation, but play in between executing complex transactions and taking entrepreneurial risk. In doing so they serve a support function to R&D managers of firms adopting various approaches to technological change. We discuss how economic and sociological theories explain brokerage and its existence. Our qualitative analysis of the current practice of patent brokerage in the U.S. finds only partial evidence in support of such argumentations. We conclude with our own proposition, suggesting that even in very dense environments, the bridging role of intellectual property intermediaries is that of market makers, who leverage their specific investment to play in between technology demand and supply.Open Innovation intermediaries patents intellectual property

Technology market intermediaries to facilitate external technology exploitation: The case of IP auctions

Recently the phenomena of external technology exploitation (ETE) has started to attract attention from scholars, businesses and politicians likewise alongside with a growth of the markets for technology. However, the markets for technology are still characterized by inhibiting obstacles that lead to high transaction costs, thus prohibit efficient transactions and result in market failure. Although, on the one hand the presence of obstacles lead to high transaction costs, the large market potential on the other hand provides incentives for technology market intermediaries (TMI) to develop new exploitation models to facilitate ETE transactions by reducing transaction costs. Throughout this paper we address the general research question of whether and how new exploitation models can actually facilitate ETE. To address this question, in a first step we generate insights into TMIs acting on the markets for technology and derived a conceptual basis for a further understanding of TMIs. Having carried out a detailed review of the literature, we develop a theory based typology for six TMI archetypes. Throughout this exercise we gain insights into the variety of different functions TMIs have on the markets for technology and various new ways how TMIs try to facilitate ETE transactions. Throughout the second part of this paper, we focus on IP auctions as one particular business model of the archetype “IP Broker”. We investigate this “young” business model presenting first insights into two qualitative studies. In a first step we derive a generic IP auction process based on a qualitative, empirical analysis of IP auction processes. We then translate these results into a theory based process view and derive a generic IP auction process as a specific type of an ETE process. Having thus generated a close understanding of the transaction process, we presented results from four cases of successful transactions, i.e. where patents were sold for particular high prices from two SMEs and two MNCs. The case studies are analyzed according to four main aspects including characteristics of the companies that exploited patented technologies (including motives and selection processes), the patented technology as such, the organization of the transaction and the companies’ perceptions regarding the success of the transactions. --

The Licensing Function of Patent Intermediaries

The contemporary patent marketplace is a complex ecosystem comprised of innovators and manufacturers who are often connected by a varied group of intermediaries. While there are a variety of intermediary business models—such as patent assertion entities and defensive aggregators—each facilitates a variant of a similar licensing transaction, connecting a set of patents held by a patent owner with a product or service offered by a prospective licensee. One explanation for the prevalence of intermediaries is that they engage in practices tantamount to arbitrage, acquiring patents and then licensing them at a profit because they enjoy greater success in patent litigation than patent holders would on their own. This paper advances an additional explanation: some intermediaries may serve a function analogous to a platform trading in non-exclusive licenses, overcoming search and valuation costs to facilitate licensing. This paper focuses on the use of two contract terms in intermediaries’ dealings with technology market participants: revenue sharing in patent acquisition and non-exclusive licensing. The Federal Trade Commission’s Patent Entity Activity Study reported that intermediaries used both of these terms. Building on those findings, this paper argues that intermediaries that use both provisions may, under some conditions, operate in a manner analogous to a two-sided platform. First, this paper examines how participants in a technology market would value non-exclusive licenses granted ex post, after the licensed product is already on the market. The paper argues that—in addition to the avoidance of litigation costs— the reduction of uncertainty can also drive licensee demand. Next, the paper proposes that use of revenue sharing allows patent holders to experience network effects from the number of prospective licensees accessed through the intermediary, which may make the intermediary more attractive than licensing unilaterally. Finally, this paper argues that the conduct of a patent licensing intermediary using these contract features can be analogized to the practices of other licensing intermediaries such as performing rights organizations and patent pools. These observations suggest that one explanation for the success of some intermediary models—as well as one aspect of their conduct that may influence competition in technology markets—is their ability to connect patent holders and prospective licensees with a greater number of potential trading partners than they would otherwise be able to connect with on their own

Global Rules for Global Health: Why We Need An Independent, Impartial WHO

Over the past few years the World Health Organization (WHO) has been undergoing a significant reform process. The immediate trigger was a budget crisis in 2010 that spurred massive lay-offs at the global agency. But at a more fundamental level, deeper systematic changes in global health governance have made reform imperative. While WHO reform draws relatively little attention outside diplomatic circles in Geneva, at stake are critical issues that will impact public health everywhere. This article’s key messages are: Recent outbreaks of MERS highlight the need for a global response to infectious disease The WHO has had a crucial role in developing rapid information sharing on new infectious threats and fair arrangements for access to drugs and vaccines and to research and development The WHO is the only international agency that can broker such global rules but is badly underfunded to perform this core function The MERS outbreaks offer an opportunity to reform WHO financing

Fair pay/play in the UK voice-over industries: a survey of 200+ voice-overs

This is the final version. Available from the publisher via the DOI in this record.The emergence of online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms, which have introduced Uber-like business models for the commissioning of creative content, brings both threats and opportunities to the UK creative economy. This research investigates the impact of these platforms from the perspective of a specific market: the UK voice-over industries. This is done by analyzing levels of remuneration, recruitment and contractual practices as well as the role played by intellectual property rights in monetizing the work of voice-over performers. This pilot study follows two recent reforms of EU regulations: the first regards fairness in relation to authors’ and performers’ remuneration (via intellectual property rights); the second focuses on fairness and transparency in the contractual terms and conditions practiced by online intermediation services (such as online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms).[1] This research is also preceded by a report on the remuneration of creative labour in the digital environment published by the World Intellectual Property Organization[2] and important seminal academic work on this question.[3] In a two-part analysis, this study demonstrates that online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms defeat the framework of intellectual property (copyright and performers’ rights) on a global scale. The research findings are outlined in two reports. The first report (this document) analyzes the findings of the online survey carried by the research team to capture the experience of voice-over performers on remuneration, recruitment, contract and intellectual property. The second report contrasts these results with a review of online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms’ terms and conditions, scheduled to be released by January 2020. The results of the survey show that: online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms are perceived very negatively by voice-over performers; the use of written contracts, summarizing the key aspects of a transaction is extremely rare; and, there is a critical lack of awareness of intellectual property rights within voice-over performers paired with a perceived lack of representation by unions or organizations to defend and advance their rights. At the same time, the survey also evidences that the UK voice-over market is extremely versatile, and contributes to an impressive range of cultural, communication and entertainment sectors. The survey thus evidences that the UK voice-over industries are a key contributor to the country’s creative economy. As such, national policy-makers must take measures to safeguard the market’s resilience in the global digital environment, which in this case, includes addressing the role and impact of online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms. The research concludes that the contractual terms currently practiced by online peer-to-peer recruitment platforms pose a threat to the UK intellectual property framework. However, preliminary investigation also suggests that these platforms could become an opportunity to introduce principles of contractual best practice on a global scale, should their terms and conditions be appropriately revised. [1] Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (Text with EEA relevance.). PE/51/2019/REV/1. OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92–125; Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (Text with EEA relevance) PE/56/2019/REV/1 OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57–79. [2] Alexander Cuntz, Creators’ Income Situation in the Digital Age, Economic Research Working Paper No 49 (WIPO, 2018). [3] Focusing on the UK and EU studies, Martin Kretschmer and others, UK Authors’ Earnings and Contracts 2018: A Survey of 50,000 Writers, CREATe, 2019); Lucie Guibault and others, Remuneration of authors and performers for the use of their works and the fixations of their performances (Study for European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology, 2015); Lucie Guibault and Olivia Salamanca (Europe Economics), Remuneration of authors of books and scientific journals, translators, journalists and visual artists for the use of their works (Study for European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology, 2016). On creators use of intellectual property: Townley and others, Creating Economy: Enterprise, Intellectual Property and the Valuation of Goods (OUP, 2018).Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC

Towards durable multistakeholder-generated solutions: The pilot application of a problem-oriented policy learning protocol to legality verification and community rights in Peru

This paper reports and reflects on the pilot application of an 11-step policy learning protocol that was developed by Cashore and Lupberger (2015) based on several years of Cashore’s multi-author collaborations. The protocol was applied for the first time in Peru in 2015 and 2016 by the IUFRO Working Party on Forest Policy Learning Architectures (hereinafter referred to as the project team). The protocol integrates insights from policy learning scholarship (Hall 1993, Sabatier 1999) with Bernstein and Cashore’s (2000, 2012) four pathways of influence framework. The pilot implementation in Peru focused on how global timber legality verification interventions might be harnessed to promote local land rights. Legality verification focuses attention on the checking and auditing of forest management units in order to verify that timber is harvested and traded in compliance with the law. We specifically asked: How can community legal ownership of, and access to, forestland and forest resources be enhanced? The protocol was designed as a dynamic tool, the implementation of which fosters iterative rather than linear processes. It directly integrated two objectives: 1) identifying the causal processes through which global governance initiatives might be harnessed to produce durable results ‘on the ground’; 2) generating insights and strategies in collaboration with relevant stakeholders. This paper reviews and critically evaluates our work in designing and piloting the protocol. We assess what seemed to work well and suggest modifications, including an original diagnostic framework for nurturing durable change. We also assess the implications of the pilot application of the protocol for policy implementation that works to enhance the influence of existing international policy instruments, rather than contributing to fragmentation and incoherence by creating new ones

The American Assembly: Art, Technology, and Intellectual Property

Examines intellectual property issues as the arts sector joins other sectors in the race to deal with an increasingly information-driven economy

Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code

Much of the discussion of bitcoin in the popular press has concentrated on its status as a currency. Putting aside a vocal minority of radical libertarians and anarchists, however, many bitcoin enthusiasts are concentrating on how its underlying technology – the blockchain – can be put to use for wide variety of uses. For example, economists at the Fed and other central banks have suggested that they should encourage the evolution of bitcoin’s blockchain protocol which might allow financial transactions to clear much efficiently than under our current systems. As such, it also holds out the possibility of becoming that holy grail of commerce – a payment system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of third party intermediaries. In addition, the NASDAQ and a number of issuers are experimenting with using the blockchain to record the issuing and trading of investments securities. In this Article, I examine the implications for bitcoin under the Uniform Commercial Code (the “U.C.C.”). Specifically, I consider three issues. In Part 1, I discuss the characterization of bitcoin – which I am using generically to refer to any virtual or cryptocurrency – under Article 9. The bad news is that it does not, and cannot be made to fit into, the U.C.C.’s definition of “money”. If held directly by the owner, bitcoin constitutes a “general intangible”. Unfortunately, general intangibles are non-negotiable. This could greatly impinge on bitcoin’s liquidity and, therefore, its utility as a payment system. In Part 2, I show how this may be mitigated by the rules of Article 8 governing investment securities. If the owner of bitcoin were to choose to hold it indirectly through a financial intermediary, then she and the intermediary could elect to have it treated as a “financial asset” which is super-negotiable. Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of eliminating one of the primary attractions of cryptocurrency, namely the ability to engage in financial transactions directly without a third-party intermediary. However, Article 8, may already provide a legal regime for another contemplated use for the blockchain – namely as a readily searchable means of recording the ownership and transfer of property generally. In Part 3, I explain how cryptosecurities fall squarely within Article 8\u27s definition of “uncertificated securities.” Ironically, therefore, the creation of bitcoin securities may finally breathe life to little used provisions that were invented almost 40 years ago in a failed attempt to solve a completely different problem