Uniquely classify BGP Route Target Filters for EVPN and L3VPN networks

The present disclosure relates to systems and methods to uniquely classify Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Route Target Filters for Ethernet Virtual Private Network (EVPN) and Layer 3 Virtual Private Network (L3VPN) networks. This includes a new mechanism for a BGP node to request the advertisement of selective EVPN or L3VPN routes based on a configured Route Target import list. This solution proposes to encode AFI SAFI fields in a RT Filter NLRI along with route target values, a new AFI SAFI based RT Filter capability which BGP speakers can negotiate to enable each of them to encode and decode this new RTFilter update message, and a new mechanism where the BGP receiver processes this RT Filter Update message containing the AFI SAFI information and advertise the selective EVPN, L3VPN routes from BGP RIB based on the route target, AFI and SAFI requested

Internet Censorship: An Integrative Review of Technologies Employed to Limit Access to the Internet, Monitor User Actions, and their Effects on Culture

The following conducts an integrative review of the current state of Internet Censorship in China, Iran, and Russia, highlights common circumvention technologies (CTs), and analyzes the effects Internet Censorship has on cultures. The author spends a large majority of the paper delineating China’s Internet infrastructure and prevalent Internet Censorship Technologies/Techniques (ICTs), paying particular attention to how the ICTs function at a technical level. The author further analyzes the state of Internet Censorship in both Iran and Russia from a broader perspective to give a better understanding of Internet Censorship around the globe. The author also highlights specific CTs, explaining how they function at a technical level. Findings indicate that among all three nation-states, state control of Internet Service Providers is the backbone of Internet Censorship. Specifically, within China, it is discovered that the infrastructure functions as an Intranet, thereby creating a closed system. Further, BGP Hijacking, DNS Poisoning, and TCP RST attacks are analyzed to understand their use-case within China. It is found that Iran functions much like a weaker version of China in regards to ICTs, with the state seemingly using the ICT of Bandwidth Throttling rather consistently. Russia’s approach to Internet censorship, in stark contrast to Iran and China, is found to rely mostly on the legislative system and fear to implement censorship, though their technical level of ICT implementation grows daily. TOR, VPNs, and Proxy Servers are all analyzed and found to be robust CTs. Drawing primarily from the examples given throughout the paper, the author highlights the various effects of Internet Censorship on culture – noting that at its core, Internet Censorship destroys democracy

The Internet's unexploited path diversity

The connectivity of the Internet at the Autonomous System level is influenced by the network operator policies implemented. These in turn impose a direction to the announcement of address advertisements and, consequently, to the paths that can be used to reach back such destinations. We propose to use directed graphs to properly represent how destinations propagate through the Internet and the number of arc-disjoint paths to quantify this network's path diversity. Moreover, in order to understand the effects that policies have on the connectivity of the Internet, numerical analyses of the resulting directed graphs were conducted. Results demonstrate that, even after policies have been applied, there is still path diversity which the Border Gateway Protocol cannot currently exploit.Comment: Submitted to IEEE Communications Letter

An Internet Heartbeat

Obtaining sound inferences over remote networks via active or passive measurements is difficult. Active measurement campaigns face challenges of load, coverage, and visibility. Passive measurements require a privileged vantage point. Even networks under our own control too often remain poorly understood and hard to diagnose. As a step toward the democratization of Internet measurement, we consider the inferential power possible were the network to include a constant and predictable stream of dedicated lightweight measurement traffic. We posit an Internet "heartbeat," which nodes periodically send to random destinations, and show how aggregating heartbeats facilitates introspection into parts of the network that are today generally obtuse. We explore the design space of an Internet heartbeat, potential use cases, incentives, and paths to deployment

A randomized solution to BGP divergence

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an interdomain routing protocol that allows each Autonomous System (AS) to define its own routing policies independently and use them to select the best routes. By means of policies, ASes are able to prevent some traffic from accessing their resources, or direct their traffic to a preferred route. However, this flexibility comes at the expense of a possibility of divergence behavior because of mutually conflicting policies. Since BGP is not guaranteed to converge even in the absence of network topology changes, it is not safe. In this paper, we propose a randomized approach to providing safety in BGP. The proposed algorithm dynamically detects policy conflicts, and tries to eliminate the conflict by changing the local preference of the paths involved. Both the detection and elimination of policy conflicts are performed locally, i.e. by using only local information. Randomization is introduced to prevent synchronous updates of the local preferences of the paths involved in the same conflict.National Science Foundation (ANI-0095988, EIA-0202067, ITR ANI-0205294); Sprint Labs; Motorola Lab