10 research outputs found

    The Taint Rabbit: Optimizing Generic Taint Analysis with Dynamic Fast Path Generation

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    Generic taint analysis is a pivotal technique in software security. However, it suffers from staggeringly high overhead. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis whether just-in-time (JIT) generation of fast paths for tracking taint can enhance the performance. To this end, we present the Taint Rabbit, which supports highly customizable user-defined taint policies and combines a JIT with fast context switching. Our experimental results suggest that this combination outperforms notable existing implementations of generic taint analysis and bridges the performance gap to specialized trackers. For instance, Dytan incurs an average overhead of 237x, while the Taint Rabbit achieves 1.7x on the same set of benchmarks. This compares favorably to the 1.5x overhead delivered by the bitwise, non-generic, taint engine LibDFT

    Fuzzing Symbolic Expressions

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    Recent years have witnessed a wide array of results in software testing, exploring different approaches and methodologies ranging from fuzzers to symbolic engines, with a full spectrum of instances in between such as concolic execution and hybrid fuzzing. A key ingredient of many of these tools is Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers, which are used to reason over symbolic expressions collected during the analysis. In this paper, we investigate whether techniques borrowed from the fuzzing domain can be applied to check whether symbolic formulas are satisfiable in the context of concolic and hybrid fuzzing engines, providing a viable alternative to classic SMT solving techniques. We devise a new approximate solver, FUZZY-SAT, and show that it is both competitive with and complementary to state-of-the-art solvers such as Z3 with respect to handling queries generated by hybrid fuzzers

    WEIZZ: Automatic grey-box fuzzing for structured binary formats

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    Fuzzing technologies have evolved at a fast pace in recent years, revealing bugs in programs with ever increasing depth and speed. Applications working with complex formats are however more difficult to take on, as inputs need to meet certain format-specific characteristics to get through the initial parsing stage and reach deeper behaviors of the program. Unlike prior proposals based on manually written format specifications, we propose a technique to automatically generate and mutate inputs for unknown chunk-based binary formats. We identify dependencies between input bytes and comparison instructions, and use them to assign tags that characterize the processing logic of the program. Tags become the building block for structure-aware mutations involving chunks and fields of the input. Our technique can perform comparably to structure-aware fuzzing proposals that require human assistance. Our prototype implementation WEIZZ revealed 16 unknown bugs in widely used programs

    WEIZZ: Automatic Grey-box Fuzzing for Structured Binary Formats

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    Fuzzing technologies have evolved at a fast pace in recent years, revealing bugs in programs with ever increasing depth and speed. Applications working with complex formats are however more difficult to take on, as inputs need to meet certain format-specific characteristics to get through the initial parsing stage and reach deeper behaviors of the program. Unlike prior proposals based on manually written format specifications, in this paper we present a technique to automatically generate and mutate inputs for unknown chunk-based binary formats. We propose a technique to identify dependencies between input bytes and comparison instructions, and later use them to assign tags that characterize the processing logic of the program. Tags become the building block for structure-aware mutations involving chunks and fields of the input. We show that our techniques performs comparably to structure-aware fuzzing proposals that require human assistance. Our prototype implementation WEIZZ revealed 16 unknown bugs in widely used programs

    Fine Grained Dataflow Tracking with Proximal Gradients

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    Dataflow tracking with Dynamic Taint Analysis (DTA) is an important method in systems security with many applications, including exploit analysis, guided fuzzing, and side-channel information leak detection. However, DTA is fundamentally limited by the Boolean nature of taint labels, which provide no information about the significance of detected dataflows and lead to false positives/negatives on complex real world programs. We introduce proximal gradient analysis (PGA), a novel, theoretically grounded approach that can track more accurate and fine-grained dataflow information. PGA uses proximal gradients, a generalization of gradients for non-differentiable functions, to precisely compose gradients over non-differentiable operations in programs. Composing gradients over programs eliminates many of the dataflow propagation errors that occur in DTA and provides richer information about how each measured dataflow effects a program. We compare our prototype PGA implementation to three state of the art DTA implementations on 7 real-world programs. Our results show that PGA can improve the F1 accuracy of data flow tracking by up to 33% over taint tracking (20% on average) without introducing any significant overhead (<5% on average). We further demonstrate the effectiveness of PGA by discovering 22 bugs (20 confirmed by developers) and 2 side-channel leaks, and identifying exploitable dataflows in 19 existing CVEs in the tested programs.Comment: To appear in USENIX Security 202

    Evaluation Methodologies in Software Protection Research

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    Man-at-the-end (MATE) attackers have full control over the system on which the attacked software runs, and try to break the confidentiality or integrity of assets embedded in the software. Both companies and malware authors want to prevent such attacks. This has driven an arms race between attackers and defenders, resulting in a plethora of different protection and analysis methods. However, it remains difficult to measure the strength of protections because MATE attackers can reach their goals in many different ways and a universally accepted evaluation methodology does not exist. This survey systematically reviews the evaluation methodologies of papers on obfuscation, a major class of protections against MATE attacks. For 572 papers, we collected 113 aspects of their evaluation methodologies, ranging from sample set types and sizes, over sample treatment, to performed measurements. We provide detailed insights into how the academic state of the art evaluates both the protections and analyses thereon. In summary, there is a clear need for better evaluation methodologies. We identify nine challenges for software protection evaluations, which represent threats to the validity, reproducibility, and interpretation of research results in the context of MATE attacks

    Bit-Level Taint Analysis

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