20 research outputs found

    Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL

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    In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the latter. Then we distinguish between static theories that study the unchanging beliefs of a certain agent and dynamic theories that investigate not only the constraints that can reasonably be imposed on the doxastic states of a rational agent but also rationality constraints on the changes of doxastic state that may occur in such agents. An additional distinction is that between non-introspective theories and introspective ones. Non-introspective theories investigate agents that have opinions about the external world but no higher-order opinions about their own doxasticnstates. Standard AGM-type theories as well as the currently existing versions of Segerberg’s dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) are non-introspective. Hintikka-style doxastic logic is of course introspective but it is a static theory. Thus, the challenge remains to devise doxastic theories that are both dynamic and introspective. We outline the semantics for truly introspective dynamic doxastic logic, i.e., a dynamic doxastic logic that allows us to describe agents who have both the ability to form higher-order beliefs and to reflect upon and change their minds about their own (higher-order) beliefs. This extension of DDL demands that we give up the Preservation condition on revision. We make some suggestions as to how such a non-preservative revision operation can be constructed. We also consider extending DDL with conditionals satisfying the Ramsey test and show that Gärdenfors’ well-known impossibility result applies to such a framework. Also in this case, Preservation has to be given up

    On the Role of the Research Agenda in Epistemic Change

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    The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent's beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent's epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view-a view that we identify as a "Quinean dogma" - is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent's research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person's questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology

    Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision

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    Relation-changing modal operators

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    We study dynamic modal operators that can change the accessibility relation of a model during the evaluation of a formula. In particular, we extend the basic modal language with modalities that are able to delete, add or swap an edge between pairs of elements of the domain. We define a generic framework to characterize this kind of operations. First, we investigate relation-changing modal logics as fragments of classical logics. Then, we use the new framework to get a suitable notion of bisimulation for the logics introduced, and we investigate their expressive power. Finally, we show that the complexity of the model checking problem for the particular operators introduced is PSpace-complete, and we study two subproblems of model checking: formula complexity and program complexity.Fil: Areces, Carlos Eduardo. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Fervari, Raul Alberto. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Hoffmann, Guillaume Emmanuel. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

    Yet More Modal Logics of Preference Change and Belief Revision

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    We contrast Bonanno's `Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework' \cite{Bonanno07:briatfTV} with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communic

    Exploring the power of converse events

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    Dynamic epistemic logic as viewed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki (DEL) and propositional dynamic logic (PDL) offer different semantics of events. On the one hand, DEL adds dynamics to epistemic logic by introducing so-called event models as syntactic objects into the language. On the other hand, PDL has instead transition relations between possible worlds. This last approach allows to easily introduce converse events. In this paper we add epistemics to this, and call the resulting logic epistemic dynamic logic (EDL). We show that DEL can be translated into EDL thanks to this use of the converse operator: it enables us to translate the structure of the event model directly within a particular axiomatization of EDL, without having to refer to a particular epistemic event model in the language (as done in DEL). It follows that EDL is more expressive and general than DEL and we characterize semantically and syntactically in EDL this embedding of DEL
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