6,414 research outputs found
Belief, Rational and Justified
It is clear that beliefs can be assessed both as to their justiļ¬cation and their rationality. What is not as clear, however, is how the rationality and justiļ¬cation of belief relate to one another. Stewart Cohen has stumped for the popular proposal that rationality and justiļ¬cation come to the same thing, that rational beliefs just are justiļ¬ed beliefs, supporting his view by arguing that ājustiļ¬ed beliefā and ārational beliefā are synonymous. In this paper, I will give reason to think that Cohenās argument is spurious. I will show that ārationalā and ājustiļ¬edā occupy two distinct semantic categories ā ārationalā is an absolute gradable adjective and ājustiļ¬edā is a relative gradable adjective ā telling against the thought that ārational beliefā and ājustiļ¬ed beliefā are synonymous. I will then argue that the burden of proof is on those who would equate rationality and justiļ¬cation, making the case that those who hold this prominent position face the diļ¬culty of explaining how rationality and justiļ¬cation come to the same thing even though ārationalā and ājustiļ¬edā are not synonymous
Creationism and evolution
In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that
ādefenders of evolution would help their case
immeasurably if they would reassure their
audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are
not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.ā We
first consider the thesis that the creationistsā
movement exploits moral concerns to spread its
ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze
their arguments and possible reasons why they are
easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two
contradictive strategies to expose the purported
moral degradation that comes with accepting the
theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim
that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other
hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as
amoral. Both objections come naturally in a
monotheistic view. But we can find similar
conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of
evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions.
Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate
mainly focuses ā understandably ā on what
constitutes good science. We consider the need for
moral reassurance and analyze reassuring
arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may
stress that science does not prescribe and is
therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the
door for the objection of amorality that evolution
ā as a naturalistic world view at least ā
supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of
morality and its relation to the acceptance of
evolution may need more empirical research
Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox
Neutralism is the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. The broad goal here is to articulate a distinct, specific kind of sorites paradox (The Observational Sorites Paradox) and show that it can be effectively treated via Neutralism
Reflections on Routley's Ultralogic Program
In this paper, I take up three tasks in turn. The first is to set out what Routley thought we should demand of an all-purpose universal logic, and some of his reasons for those demands. The second is to sketch Routley's own response to those demands. The third is to explore how else we could satisfy some of the theoretical demands Routley identified, if we are not to follow him in endorsing Routleyan Ultralogic as a foundational logic. As part of this third project, I articulate what seems to me a preferable way of going to respond to the challenges Routley correctly identifies: and while I doubt what I will have to say would have convinced Routley himself, I will try to show that the approach I prefer has several advantages over Routley's
A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality
Phenomenal intentionality theories have recently enjoyed significant attention. According to these theories, the intentionality of a mental representation (what it is about) crucially depends on its phenomenal features. We present a new puzzle for these theories, involving a phenomenon called āintentional identityā, or āco-intentionalityā. Co-intentionality is a ubiquitous intentional phenomenon that involves tracking things even when there is no concrete thing being tracked. We suggest that phenomenal intentionality theories need to either develop new uniquely phenomenal resources for handling the puzzle, or restrict their explanatory ambitions
Property Theories
Revised and reprinted; originally in Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer 133-251. -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (āthatā-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for āthe argument from intensional logicā is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the course of discussing generality, quantifying-in, learnability, referential semantics, nominalism, conceptualism, realism, type-freedom, the first-order/higher-order controversy, names, indexicals, descriptions, Matesā puzzle, and the paradox of analysis. Two first-order intensional logics are then formulated. Finally, fixed-point type-free theories of predication are discussed, especially their relation to the question whether properties may be identified with propositional functions
Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), "Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic"
Book Reviews:Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic, Oxford University Press, 2010, 586 pp., ISBN 9780199570386
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