896 research outputs found
The first automated negotiating agents competition (ANAC 2010)
Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations between people and automated agents we organized the first automated negotiating agents competition (ANAC 2010). The purpose of the competition is to facilitate the research in the area bilateral multi-issue closed negotiation. The competition was based on the Genius environment, which is a General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation. The first competition was held in conjunction with the Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-10) and was comprised of seven teams. This paper presents an overview of the competition, as well as general and contrasting approaches towards negotiation strategies that were adopted by the participants of the competition. Based on analysis in post--tournament experiments, the paper also attempts to provide some insights with regard to effective approaches towards the design of negotiation strategies
What to bid and when to stop
Negotiation is an important activity in human society, and is studied by various disciplines, ranging from economics and game theory, to electronic commerce, social psychology, and artificial intelligence. Traditionally, negotiation is a necessary, but also time-consuming and expensive activity. Therefore, in the last decades there has been a large interest in the automation of negotiation, for example in the setting of e-commerce. This interest is fueled by the promise of automated agents eventually being able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators.Every year, automated negotiation agents are improving in various ways, and there is now a large body of negotiation strategies available, all with their unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, some agents are able to predict the opponent's preferences very well, while others focus more on having a sophisticated bidding strategy. The problem however, is that there is little incremental improvement in agent design, as the agents are tested in varying negotiation settings, using a diverse set of performance measures. This makes it very difficult to meaningfully compare the agents, let alone their underlying techniques. As a result, we lack a reliable way to pinpoint the most effective components in a negotiating agent.There are two major advantages of distinguishing between the different components of a negotiating agent's strategy: first, it allows the study of the behavior and performance of the components in isolation. For example, it becomes possible to compare the preference learning component of all agents, and to identify the best among them. Second, we can proceed to mix and match different components to create new negotiation strategies., e.g.: replacing the preference learning technique of an agent and then examining whether this makes a difference. Such a procedure enables us to combine the individual components to systematically explore the space of possible negotiation strategies.To develop a compositional approach to evaluate and combine the components, we identify structure in most agent designs by introducing the BOA architecture, in which we can develop and integrate the different components of a negotiating agent. We identify three main components of a general negotiation strategy; namely a bidding strategy (B), possibly an opponent model (O), and an acceptance strategy (A). The bidding strategy considers what concessions it deems appropriate given its own preferences, and takes the opponent into account by using an opponent model. The acceptance strategy decides whether offers proposed by the opponent should be accepted.The BOA architecture is integrated into a generic negotiation environment called Genius, which is a software environment for designing and evaluating negotiation strategies. To explore the negotiation strategy space of the negotiation research community, we amend the Genius repository with various existing agents and scenarios from literature. Additionally, we organize a yearly international negotiation competition (ANAC) to harvest even more strategies and scenarios. ANAC also acts as an evaluation tool for negotiation strategies, and encourages the design of negotiation strategies and scenarios.We re-implement agents from literature and ANAC and decouple them to fit into the BOA architecture without introducing any changes in their behavior. For each of the three components, we manage to find and analyze the best ones for specific cases, as described below. We show that the BOA framework leads to significant improvements in agent design by wining ANAC 2013, which had 19 participating teams from 8 international institutions, with an agent that is designed using the BOA framework and is informed by a preliminary analysis of the different components.In every negotiation, one of the negotiating parties must accept an offer to reach an agreement. Therefore, it is important that a negotiator employs a proficient mechanism to decide under which conditions to accept. When contemplating whether to accept an offer, the agent is faced with the acceptance dilemma: accepting the offer may be suboptimal, as better offers may still be presented before time runs out. On the other hand, accepting too late may prevent an agreement from being reached, resulting in a break off with no gain for either party. We classify and compare state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions. We propose new acceptance strategies and we demonstrate that they outperform the other conditions. We also provide insight into why some conditions work better than others and investigate correlations between the properties of the negotiation scenario and the efficacy of acceptance conditions.Later, we adopt a more principled approach by applying optimal stopping theory to calculate the optimal decision on the acceptance of an offer. We approach the decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic process. We determine the optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes and we present an approach to estimate the expected range of offers when the type of opponent is unknown. We show that the proposed approach is able to find the optimal time to accept, and improves upon all existing acceptance strategies.Another principal component of a negotiating agent's strategy is its ability to take the opponent's preferences into account. The quality of an opponent model can be measured in two different ways. One is to use the agent's performance as a benchmark for the model's quality. We evaluate and compare the performance of a selection of state-of-the-art opponent modeling techniques in negotiation. We provide an overview of the factors influencing the quality of a model and we analyze how the performance of opponent models depends on the negotiation setting. We identify a class of simple and surprisingly effective opponent modeling techniques that did not receive much previous attention in literature.The other way to measure the quality of an opponent model is to directly evaluate its accuracy by using similarity measures. We review all methods to measure the accuracy of an opponent model and we then analyze how changes in accuracy translate into performance differences. Moreover, we pinpoint the best predictors for good performance. This leads to new insights concerning how to construct an opponent model, and what we need to measure when optimizing performance.Finally, we take two different approaches to gain more insight into effective bidding strategies. We present a new classification method for negotiation strategies, based on their pattern of concession making against different kinds of opponents. We apply this technique to classify some well-known negotiating strategies, and we formulate guidelines on how agents should bid in order to be successful, which gives insight into the bidding strategy space of negotiating agents. Furthermore, we apply optimal stopping theory again, this time to find the concessions that maximize utility for the bidder against particular opponents. We show there is an interesting connection between optimal bidding and optimal acceptance strategies, in the sense that they are mirrored versions of each other.Lastly, after analyzing all components separately, we put the pieces back together again. We take all BOA components accumulated so far, including the best ones, and combine them all together to explore the space of negotiation strategies.We compute the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and we study the interaction between components. We find that combining the best agent components indeed makes the strongest agents. This shows that the component-based view of the BOA architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing negotiating agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By varying the BOA components we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the negotiation result, and thus analyze the significance of each. The bidding strategy is by far the most important to consider, followed by the acceptance conditions and finally followed by the opponent model.Our results validate the analytical approach of the BOA framework to first optimize the individual components, and then to recombine them into a negotiating agent
Intelligent Agents for Automated Cloud Computing Negotiation
Presently, cloud providers offer “off-the-shelf” Service Level Agreements (SLA), on a “take it or leave it” basis. This paper, alternatively, proposes customized SLAs. An automated negotiation is needed to establish customized SLAs between service providers and consumers with no previous knowledge of each other. Traditional negotiations between humans are often fraught with difficulty. Thus, in this work, the use of intelligent agents to represent cloud providers and consumers is advocated. Rubinstein’s Alternating Offers Protocol offers a suitable technical solution for this challenging problem. The purpose of this paper is to apply the state-of-the-art in negotiation automated algorithms/agents within a described Cloud Computing SLA framework, and to evaluate the most appropriate negotiation approach based on many criteria
Machine Learning Approach for Optimizing Negotiation Agents
The increasing popularity of Internet and World Wide Web (WWW) fuels the rise of
electronic commerce (E-Commerce). Negotiation plays an important role in ecommerce
as business deals are often made through some kind of negotiations.
Negotiation is the process of resolving conflicts among parties having different
criteria so that they can reach an agreement in which all their constraints are
satisfied.
Automating negotiation can save human’s time and effort to solve these
combinatorial problems. Intelligent Trading Agency (ITA) is an automated agentbased
one-to-many negotiation framework which is incorporated by several one-toone
negotiations. ITA uses constraint satisfaction approach to evaluate and generate
offers during the negotiation. This one-to-many negotiation model in e-commerce
retail has advantages in terms of customizability, scalability, reusability and
robustness. Since negotiation agents practice predefined negotiation strategies,
decisions of the agents to select the best course of action do not take the dynamics of negotiation into consideration. The lack of knowledge capturing between agents
during the negotiation causes the inefficiency of negotiation while the final
outcomes obtained are probably sub-optimal. The objective of this research is to
implement machine learning approach that allows agents to reuse their negotiation
experience to improve the final outcomes of one-to-many negotiation. The
preliminary research on automated negotiation agents utilizes case-based reasoning,
Bayesian learning and evolutionary approach to learn the negotiation. The geneticbased
and Bayesian learning model of multi-attribute one-to-many negotiation,
namely GA Improved-ITA and Bayes Improved-ITA are proposed. In these models,
agents learn the negotiation by capturing their opponent’s preferences and
constraints. The two models are tested in randomly generated negotiation problems
to observe their performance in negotiation learning. The learnability of GA
Improved-ITA enables the agents to identify their opponent’s preferable negotiation
issues. Bayes Improved-ITA agents model their opponent’s utility structure by
employing Bayesian belief updating process. Results from the experimental work
indicate that it is promising to employ machine learning approach in negotiation
problems. GA Improved-ITA and Bayes Improved-ITA have achieved better
performance in terms of negotiation payoff, negotiation cost and justification of
negotiation decision in comparison with ITA. The joint utility of GA Improved-ITA
and Bayes Improved-ITA is 137.5% and 125% higher than the joint utility of ITA
while the negotiation cost of GA Improved-ITA is 28.6% lower than ITA. The
negotiation successful rate of GA Improved-ITA and Bayes Improved-ITA is 10.2%
and 37.12% higher than ITA. By having knowledge of opponent’s preferences and
constraints, negotiation agents can obtain more optimal outcomes. As a conclusion,
the adaptive nature of agents will increase the fitness of autonomous agents in the dynamic electronic market rather than practicing the sophisticated negotiation
strategies. As future work, the GA and Bayes Improved-ITA can be integrated with
grid concept to allocate and acquire resource among cross-platform agents during
negotiation
An Evolutionary Approach for Learning Opponent's Deadline and Reserve Points in Multi-Issue Negotiation
The efficiency of automated multi-issue negotiation depends on the available information about the opponent. In a competitive negotiation environment, agents do not reveal their parameters to their opponents in order to avoid exploitation. Several researchers have argued that an agent's optimal strategy can be determined using the opponent's deadline and reserve points. In this paper, we propose a new learning agent, so-called Evolutionary Learning Agent (ELA), able to estimate its opponent's deadline and reserve points in bilateral multi-issue negotiation based on opponent's counter-offers (without any additional extra information). ELA reduces the learning problem to a system of non-linear equations and uses an evolutionary algorithm based on the elitism aspect to solve it. Experimental study shows that our learning agent outperforms others agents by improving its outcome in term of average and joint utility
Complex negotiations in multi-agent systems
Los sistemas multi-agente (SMA) son sistemas distribuidos donde entidades autónomas llamadas
agentes, ya sean humanos o software, persiguen sus propios objetivos. El paradigma de SMA ha
sido propuesto como la aproximación de modelo apropiada para aplicaciones como el comercio
electrónico, los sistemas multi-robot, aplicaciones de seguridad, etc. En la comunidad de SMA, la
visión de sistemas multi-agente abiertos, donde agentes heterogéneos pueden entrar y salir del
sistema dinámicamente, ha cobrado fuerza como paradigma de modelado debido a su relación
conceptual con tecnologías como la Web, la computación grid, y las organizaciones virtuales.
Debido a la heterogeneidad de los agentes, y al hecho de dirigirse por sus propios objetivos, el
conflicto es un fenómeno candidato a aparecer en los sistemas multi-agente.
En los últimos años, el término tecnologías del acuerdo ha sido usado para referirse a todos aquellos
mecanismos que, directa o indirectamente, promueven la resolución de conflictos en sistemas
computacionales como los sistemas multi-agente. Entre las tecnologías del acuerdo, la negociación
automática ha sido propuesta como uno de los mecanismos clave en la resolución de conflictos
debido a su uso análogo en la resolución de conflictos entre humanos. La negociación automática
consiste en el intercambio automático de propuestas llevado a cabo por agentes software en nombre
de sus usuarios. El objetivo final es conseguir un acuerdo con todas las partes involucradas.
Pese a haber sido estudiada por la Inteligencia Artificial durante años, distintos problemas todavía
no han sido resueltos por la comunidad científica todavía. El principal objetivo de esta tesis es
proponer modelos de negociación para escenarios complejos donde la complejidad deriva de (1) las
limitaciones computacionales o (ii) la necesidad de representar las preferencias de múltiples
individuos. En la primera parte de esta tesis proponemos un modelo de negociación bilateral para el
problema deSánchez Anguix, V. (2013). Complex negotiations in multi-agent systems [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/21570Palanci
- …