Fighting Cybercrime After \u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Jones\u3c/em\u3e

In a landmark non-decision last term, five Justices of the United States Supreme Court would have held that citizens possess a Fourth Amendment right to expect that certain quantities of information about them will remain private, even if they have no such expectations with respect to any of the information or data constituting that whole. This quantitative approach to evaluating and protecting Fourth Amendment rights is certainly novel and raises serious conceptual, doctrinal, and practical challenges. In other works, we have met these challenges by engaging in a careful analysis of this “mosaic theory” and by proposing that courts focus on the technologies that make collecting and aggregating large quantities of information possible. In those efforts, we focused on reasonable expectations held by “the people” that they will not be subjected to broad and indiscriminate surveillance. These expectations are anchored in Founding-era concerns about the capacity for unfettered search powers to promote an authoritarian surveillance state. Although we also readily acknowledged that there are legitimate and competing governmental and law enforcement interests at stake in the deployment and use of surveillance technologies that implicate reasonable interests in quantitative privacy, we did little more. In this Article, we begin to address that omission by focusing on the legitimate governmental and law enforcement interests at stake in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting cyber-harassment and healthcare fraud

The development and regulation of consumer credit reporting in America

In the United States today, there is at least one credit bureau file, and probably three, for every credit-using individual in the country. Over 2 billion items of information are added to these files every month, and over 2 million credit reports are issued every day. Real-time access to credit bureau information has reduced the time required to approve a loan from a few weeks to just a few minutes. But credit bureaus have also been criticized for furnishing erroneous information and for compromising privacy. The result has been 30 years of regulation at the state and federal levels. ; This paper describes how the consumer credit reporting industry evolved from a few joint ventures of local retailers around 1900 to a high technology industry that plays a supporting role in America's trillion dollar consumer credit market. In many ways the development of the industry reflects the intuition developed in the theoretical literature on information-sharing arrangements. But the story is richer than the models. Credit bureaus have changed as retail and lending markets changed, and the impressive gains in productivity at credit bureaus are the result of their substantial investments in technology. ; Credit bureaus obviously benefit when their data are more reliable, but should we expect them to attain the socially efficient degree of accuracy? There are plausible reasons to think not, and this is the principal economic rationale for regulating the industry. An examination of the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act reveals an attempt to attain an appropriate economic balancing of the benefits of a voluntary information sharing arrangement against the cost of any resulting mistakes.Consumer credit

When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations on Personal and Ecomonic Liberties Justified

The government is engaged in a homeland-security project to safeguard the population\u27s health from potential terrorist attacks. This project is politically charged because it affords the state enhanced powers to restrict personal and economic liberties. Just as governmental powers relating to intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice curtail individual interests, so too do public health powers

Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence — Have We Got the Balance Right?

That states should act to prevent domestic violence and protect victims is clearly acknowledged in international law. Yet international law confirms also that victims, perpetrators and their families have rights to privacy, to a family life and to a home. The extent to which rights to respect for private and family life should be interfered with in order to protect victims remains in dispute. With the aim of improving the protection afforded to domestic violence victims in England and Wales, in 2011–2012 the police and courts piloted the use of two new short-term protective measures; domestic violence protection notices and orders. Between 2012 and 2013 the police also piloted the domestic violence disclosure scheme, which saw prospective victims provided with information about their partner’s previous violent behaviour. The disclosure scheme and the domestic violence protection orders and notices were rolled out nationally in March 2014. In this article, consideration is given to the impact these two initiatives will have on the privacy of victims and perpetrators, an issue not considered in government evaluations of the pilots. This article analyses whether the roll-out of these new initiatives is justified, given their potential for interference in private and family life

Double Secret Protection: Bridging Federal and State Law To Protect Privacy Rights for Telemental and Mobile Health Users

Mental health care in the United States is plagued by stigma, cost, and access issues that prevent many people from seeking and continuing treatment for mental health conditions. Emergent technology, however, may offer a solution. Through telemental health, patients can connect with providers remotely—avoiding stigmatizing situations that can arise from traditional healthcare delivery, receiving more affordable care, and reaching providers across geographic boundaries. And with mobile health technology, people can use smart phone applications both to self-monitor their mental health and to communicate with their doctors. But people do not want to take advantage of telemental and mobile health unless their privacy is protected. After evaluating the applicability of current health information privacy law to these new forms of treatment, this Note proposes changes to the federal regime to protect privacy rights for telemental and mobile health users

Double Secret Protection: Bridging Federal and State Law To Protect Privacy Rights for Telemental and Mobile Health Users

Mental health care in the United States is plagued by stigma, cost, and access issues that prevent many people from seeking and continuing treatment for mental health conditions. Emergent technology, however, may offer a solution. Through telemental health, patients can connect with providers remotely—avoiding stigmatizing situations that can arise from traditional healthcare delivery, receiving more affordable care, and reaching providers across geographic boundaries. And with mobile health technology, people can use smart phone applications both to self-monitor their mental health and to communicate with their doctors. But people do not want to take advantage of telemental and mobile health unless their privacy is protected. After evaluating the applicability of current health information privacy law to these new forms of treatment, this Note proposes changes to the federal regime to protect privacy rights for telemental and mobile health users

Is there a Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide?

In Part I, the author explains that it is the adjudication between the conflicting claims of individual liberty, personal autonomy and self-determination versus the preservation of life as a societal value that is at the core of the issue posed by physician-assisted suicide. In Part II, author makes the case against suicide, noting that liberty is not absolute and the state retains powers of sovereignty to curtail an individual’s liberty in the face of a countervailing state interest. In Part III, the author discusses the relevant case law relating to the withdrawal of medical treatment. Part IV concludes with a discussion of active suicide as distinguished from passive suicide. The state’s interest in preventing overt acts of suicide is far more compelling that an individual’s interest in refusing medical care