Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked.

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents' preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, fair and non-manipulable solutions. We refer to such a family as M-temporary satisfaction methods. Besides, we provide arguments to defend these methods as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.Allocation problem, indivisibilities, single-peaked preferences, standard of comparison, temporary satisfaction methods.

Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked.

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents' preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems. We analyzed the properties those methods satisfy and we provide a characterization of them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal-distance rule.Allocation problem, indivisibilities, single-peaked preferences, standard of comparison, up method.

On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices

First of all, the authors thank the Associate Editor and three anonymous Reviewers for their time to review our paper and also for their for their incisive comments and suggestions which have been very helpful to improve the contents of the paper. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades (MCIU), the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI) and the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) under the project PGC2018-097965-B-I00 and the Spanish Ministry of Science under Project ECO2017-86245-P, as well as Junta de Andalucia under Projects Grupos PAIDI SEJ426 and project P18-FR-2933.In this paper we study the class of claims problems where the amount to be divided is perfectly divisible and claims are made on indivisible units of several items. Each item has a price, and the available amount falls short to be able to cover all the claims at the given prices. We propose several properties that may be of interest in this particular framework. These properties represent the common principles of fairness, efficiency, and non-manipulability by merging or splitting. Efficiency is our focal principle, which is formalized by means of two axioms: non-wastefulness and Pareto efficiency. We show that some combinations of the properties we consider are compatible, others are not.Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades (MCIU)Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI)European Commission PGC2018-097965-B-I00Spanish Government ECO2017-86245-PJunta de Andalucia PAIDI SEJ426 P18-FR-293

Decentralized clearing in financial networks

We consider a situation in which agents have mutual claims on each other, summarized in a liability matrix. Agents' assets might be insufficient to satisfy their liabilities leading to defaults. In case of default, bankruptcy rules are used to specify the way agents are going to be rationed. A clearing payment matrix is a payment matrix consistent with the prevailing bankruptcy rules that satisfies limited liability and priority of creditors. Since clearing payment matrices and the corresponding values of equity are not uniquely determined, we provide bounds on the possible levels equity can take. Unlike the existing literature, which studies centralized clearing procedures, we introduce a large class of decentralized clearing processes. We show the convergence of any such process in finitely many iterations to the least clearing payment matrix. When the unit of account is sufficiently small, all decentralized clearing processes lead essentially to the same value of equity as a centralized clearing procedure. As a policy implication, it is not necessary to collect and process all the sensitive data of all the agents simultaneously and run a centralized clearing procedure

Contributions to cost allocation problems and scarce resources

Esta tesis est a enmarcada dentro de la Teor a de Juegos, disciplina Matem atica de gran relevancia en Econom a por su alto grado de aplicabilidad en situaciones reales, como por ejemplo las derivadas del reparto de costes y/o bene cios o la distribuci on de recursos escasos, entre muchas otras. Una de las grandes referencias que da origen a esta rama de las Matem aticas es el libro "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" de Oskar Morgenstern y John Von Neumann (Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1953)) al cual contribuy o de manera seminal con el desarrollo de los juegos m ultiples el Premio Nobel John Nash. El objetivo de esta tesis no es analizar c omo los individuos o agentes del juego toman sus decisiones sino proporcionar soluciones a los problemas planteados empleando procedimientos matem aticos que nos permiten dise~nar diferentes mecanismos o reglas que satisfacen uno o un conjunto de propiedades, tambi en llamadas axiomas, que caracterizan cada una de las reglas planteadas.This thesis is framed within Game Theory, a Mathematical discipline of great relevance in Economics due to its high degree of applicability in real situations, such as for example, those derived from the allocation of costs and/or bene ts or the distribution of scarce resources, among others. One of the great references that gives rise to this branch of Mathematics is the book "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by Oskar Morgenstern and John Von Neumann (Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1953)) to which the Nobel Laureate John Nash contributed with the development of multiple games. The objective of this thesis is not to analyze how the individuals or agents of the game make their decisions, otherwise to provide solutions to the problems proposed using mathematical procedures that allow us to design di erent mechanisms or rules that satisfy one or a set of properties, also called axioms, that characterize each one of the proposed rules

Is Theory Really Ahead of Measurement? Current Real Business Cycle Theories and Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations

In the l93Os, Dunlop and Tarshis observed that the correlation between hours and wages is close to zero. This classic observation has become a litmus test by which macroeconomic models are judged. Existing real business cycle models fail this test dramatically. Based on this result, we argue that technology shocks cannot be the sole impulse driving post-war U.S. business cycles. We modify prototypical real business cycle models by allowing government spending shocks to influence labor market dynamics in a way suggested by Aschauer (1985), Barro (1981, 1987) and Kormendi (1983), This modification can, in principle, bring the models into closer conformity with the data. While the empirical performance of the models is significantly improved, they still fail to account for the Dunlop-Tarshis observation. Accounting for that observation will require further advances in model development. Consequently, we conclude that theory is behind, not ahead of, business cycle measurement.

Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete

Free trade is not optimal for a small country that faces uncertain terms of trade if some factors are immobile - ex post, and markets for contingent claims are incomplete. The government can improve social welfare by using commercial policy that serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets. Using a combination of analytical and simulation techniques we demonstrate that optimal policy for this purpose will often have an anti-trade bias. We also show that the usual preference by economists for factor or product taxes and subsidies over tariffs and export subsidies may not be justified in this context.