Metamorphic malware detection based on support vector machine classification of malware sub-signatures

Achieving accurate and efficient metamorphic malware detection remains a challenge. Metamorphic malware is able to mutate and alter its code structure in each infection that can circumvent signature matching detection. However, some vital functionalities and code segments remain unchanged between mutations. We exploit these unchanged features by the mean of classification using Support Vector Machine (SVM). N-gram features are extracted directly from malware binaries to avoid disassembly, which these features are then masked with the extracted known malware signature n-grams. These masked features reduce the number of selected n-gram features considerably. Our method is capable to accurately detect metamorphic malware with ~99 accuracy and low false positive rate. The proposed method is also superior to commercially available anti-viruses for detecting metamorphic malware

Metamorphic Malware Detection Based on Support Vector Machine Classification of Malware Sub-Signatures

Achieving accurate and efficient metamorphic malware detection remains a challenge. Metamorphic malware is able to mutate and alter its code structure in each infection, with some vital functionality and codesegment remain unchanged. We exploit these unchanged features for detecting metamorphic malware detection using Support Vector Machine(SVM) classifier. n-gram features are extracted directly from sample malware binaries to avoid disassembly, which are then masked with the extracted Snort signature n-grams. These masked features reduce considerably the number of selected n-gram features. Our method is capable to accurately detect metamorphic malware with ~99 % accuracy and low false positive rate. The proposed method is also superior than commercially available anti-viruses in detecting metamorphicmalware

ELISA: ELiciting ISA of Raw Binaries for Fine-grained Code and Data Separation

Static binary analysis techniques are widely used to reconstruct the behavior and discover vulnerabilities in software when source code is not available. To avoid errors due to mis-interpreting data as machine instructions (or vice-versa), disassemblers and static analysis tools must precisely infer the boundaries between code and data. However, this information is often not readily available. Worse, compilers may embed small chunks of data inside the code section. Most state of the art approaches to separate code and data are rooted on recursive traversal disassembly, with severe limitations when dealing with indirect control instructions. We propose ELISA, a technique to separate code from data and ease the static analysis of executable files. ELISA leverages supervised sequential learning techniques to locate the code section(s) boundaries of header-less binary files, and to predict the instruction boundaries inside the identified code section. As a preliminary step, if the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) of the binary is unknown, ELISA leverages a logistic regression model to identify the correct ISA from the file content. We provide a comprehensive evaluation on a dataset of executables compiled for different ISAs, and we show that our method is capable to identify code sections with a byte-level accuracy (F1 score) ranging from 98.13% to over 99.9% depending on the ISA. Fine-grained separation of code from embedded data on x86, x86-64 and ARM executables is accomplished with an accuracy of over 99.9%