Automated analysis of security protocols with global state

Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to maintain a global, non-monotonic state, e.g., in the form of a database or register. However, most existing automated verification tools do not support the analysis of such stateful security protocols - sometimes because of fundamental reasons, such as the encoding of the protocol as Horn clauses, which are inherently monotonic. A notable exception is the recent tamarin prover which allows specifying protocols as multiset rewrite (msr) rules, a formalism expressive enough to encode state. As multiset rewriting is a "low-level" specification language with no direct support for concurrent message passing, encoding protocols correctly is a difficult and error-prone process. We propose a process calculus which is a variant of the applied pi calculus with constructs for manipulation of a global state by processes running in parallel. We show that this language can be translated to msr rules whilst preserving all security properties expressible in a dedicated first-order logic for security properties. The translation has been implemented in a prototype tool which uses the tamarin prover as a backend. We apply the tool to several case studies among which a simplified fragment of PKCS\#11, the Yubikey security token, and an optimistic contract signing protocol

Automated analysis of security protocols with global state

Security APIs, key servers and protocols that need to keep the status of transactions, require to maintain a global, non-monotonic state, e.g., in the form of a database or register. However, most existing automated verification tools do not support the analysis of such stateful security protocols - sometimes because of fundamental reasons, such as the encoding of the protocol as Horn clauses, which are inherently monotonic. A notable exception is the recent tamarin prover which allows specifying protocols as multiset rewrite (msr) rules, a formalism expressive enough to encode state. As multiset rewriting is a "low-level" specification language with no direct support for concurrent message passing, encoding protocols correctly is a difficult and error-prone process. We propose a process calculus which is a variant of the applied pi calculus with constructs for manipulation of a global state by processes running in parallel. We show that this language can be translated to msr rules whilst preserving all security properties expressible in a dedicated first-order logic for security properties. The translation has been implemented in a prototype tool which uses the tamarin prover as a backend. We apply the tool to several case studies among which a simplified fragment of PKCS#11, the Yubikey security token, and an optimistic contract signing protocol

Relating process languages for security and communication correctness (extended abstract)

Process calculi are expressive specification languages for concurrency. They have been very successful in two research strands: (a) the analysis of security protocols and (b) the enforcement of correct message-passing programs. Despite their shared foundations, languages and reasoning techniques for (a) and (b) have been separately developed. Here we connect two representative calculi from (a) and (b): we encode a (high-level) π-calculus for multiparty sessions into a (low-level) applied π-calculus for security protocols. We establish the correctness of our encoding, and we show how it enables the integrated analysis of security properties and communication correctness by re-using existing tools

Symbolically Analyzing Security Protocols Using Tamarin

During the last three decades, there has been considerable research devoted to the symbolic analysis of security protocols and existing tools have had considerable success both in detecting attacks on protocols and showing their absence. Nevertheless, there is still a large discrepancy between the symbolic models that one specifies on paper and the models that can be effectively analyzed by tools. In this paper, we present the Tamarin prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols. Tamarin takes as input a security protocol model, specifying the actions taken by the agents running the protocol in different roles (e.g., the protocol initiator, the responder, and the trusted key server), a specification of the adversary, and a specification of the protocol’s desired properties. Tamarin can then be used to automatically construct a proof that the protocol fulfills its specified properties, even when arbitrarily many instances of the protocol’s roles are interleaved in parallel, together with the actions of the adversary

Verification of Stateful Cryptographic Protocols with Exclusive OR

International audienceIn cryptographic protocols, in particular RFID protocols, exclusive-or (XOR) operations are common. Due to the inherent complexity of faithful models of XOR, there is only limited tool support for the verification of cryptographic protocols using XOR. In this paper, we improve the TAMARIN prover and its underlying theory to deal with an equational theory modeling XOR operations. The XOR theory can be combined with all equational theories previously supported, including user-defined equational theories. This makes TAMARIN the first verification tool for cryptographic protocols in the symbolic model to support simultaneously this large set of equational theories, protocols with global mutable state, an unbounded number of sessions, and complex security properties including observational equivalence. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by analyzing several protocols that rely on XOR, in particular multiple RFID-protocols, where we can identify attacks as well as provide proofs

A Bibliometric Analysis of the Literature on Utility and Security Tokens

With the advancement of technology and the advent of the internet, a great digital revolution began. Faced with this scenario of technological innovation, the economic sector is increasingly looking for the use of efficient tools, which provide improvements from a financial perspective. Currently, digital assets and the token economy are already part of the reality of this new digital age, the choice of the present work stems from the interest in analyzing and understanding the diversity of scientific productions that are consolidated in the journals, indexed in databases, for such analysis uses the bibliometric method, which makes it possible to analyze the intellectual production on the topic of interest in a more robust and temporal way, allowing the quantification of the impact and relevance of scientific productions. This study aims to implement bibliometric resources using the R Project software, searching for data in the Scopus and Web of Science databases, having as keywords Security Token and Utility Token. The bibliometric application showed significant results, making it possible to quantify important data, as the year of beginning of publications containing the theme, main authors, documents and most cited authors, words most frequently used in titles, collaboration by country, among other information that add scientific research in a positive and considerable way

Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions

We address a problem that arises in cryptographic protocol analysis when the equational properties of the cryptosystem are taken into account: in many situations it is necessary to guarantee that certain terms generated during a state exploration are in normal form with respect to the equational theory. We give a tool-independent methodology for state exploration, based on unification and narrowing, that generates states that obey these irreducibility constraints, called contextual symbolic reachability analysis, prove its soundness and completeness, and describe its implementation in the Maude-NPA protocol analysis tool. Contextual symbolic reachability analysis also introduces a new type of unification mechanism, which we call asymmetric unification, in which any solution must leave the right side of the solution irreducible. We also present experiments showing the effectiveness of our methodology.S. Escobar and S. Santiago have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MEC/MICINN under grant TIN 2010-21062-C02-02, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. The following authors have been partially supported by NSF: S. Escobar, J. Meseguer and R. Sasse under grants CCF 09- 05584, CNS 09-04749, and CNS 09-05584; D. Kapur under grant CNS 09-05222; C. Lynch, Z. Liu, and C. Meadows under grant CNS 09-05378, and P. Narendran and S. Erbatur under grant CNS 09-05286.Erbatur, S.; Escobar Román, S.; Kapur, D.; Liu, Z.; Lynch, C.; Meadows, C.; Meseguer, J.... (2012). Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions. En Computer Security - ESORICS 2012. Springer Verlag (Germany). 7459:73-90. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_5S73907459IEEE 802.11 Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical (PHY) Specifications (1999)Abadi, M., Cortier, V.: Deciding knowledge in security protocols under equational theories. Theor. 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