Cooperative retransmission protocols in fading channels : issues, solutions and applications

Future wireless systems are expected to extensively rely on cooperation between terminals, mimicking MIMO scenarios when terminal dimensions limit implementation of multiple antenna technology. On this line, cooperative retransmission protocols are considered as particularly promising technology due to their opportunistic and flexible exploitation of both spatial and time diversity. In this dissertation, some of the major issues that hinder the practical implementation of this technology are identified and pertaining solutions are proposed and analyzed. Potentials of cooperative and cooperative retransmission protocols for a practical implementation of dynamic spectrum access paradigm are also recognized and investigated. Detailed contributions follow. While conventionally regarded as energy efficient communications paradigms, both cooperative and retransmission concepts increase circuitry energy and may lead to energy overconsumption as in, e.g., sensor networks. In this context, advantages of cooperative retransmission protocols are reexamined in this dissertation and their limitation for short transmission ranges observed. An optimization effort is provided for extending an energy- efficient applicability of these protocols. Underlying assumption of altruistic relaying has always been a major stumbling block for implementation of cooperative technologies. In this dissertation, provision is made to alleviate this assumption and opportunistic mechanisms are designed that incentivize relaying via a spectrum leasing approach. Mechanisms are provided for both cooperative and cooperative retransmission protocols, obtaining a meaningful upsurge of spectral efficiency for all involved nodes (source-destination link and the relays). It is further recognized in this dissertation that the proposed relaying-incentivizing schemes have an additional and certainly not less important application, that is in dynamic spectrum access for property-rights cognitive-radio implementation. Provided solutions avoid commons-model cognitive-radio strict sensing requirements and regulatory and taxonomy issues of a property-rights model

Game theory for dynamic spectrum sharing cognitive radio

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University on 21 June 2010.‘Game Theory’ is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. The theory is based on a set of tools that have been developed in order to assist with the modelling and analysis of individual, independent decision makers. These actions potentially affect any decisions, which are made by other competitors. Therefore, it is well suited and capable of addressing the various issues linked to wireless communications. This work presents a Green Game-Based Hybrid Vertical Handover Model. The model is used for heterogeneous wireless networks, which combines both dynamic (Received Signal Strength and Node Mobility) and static (Cost, Power Consumption and Bandwidth) factors. These factors control the handover decision process; whereby the mechanism successfully eliminates any unnecessary handovers, reduces delay and overall number of handovers to 50% less and 70% less dropped packets and saves 50% more energy in comparison to other mechanisms. A novel Game-Based Multi-Interface Fast-Handover MIPv6 protocol is introduced in this thesis as an extension to the Multi-Interface Fast-handover MIPv6 protocol. The protocol works when the mobile node has more than one wireless interface. The protocol controls the handover decision process by deciding whether a handover is necessary and helps the node to choose the right access point at the right time. In addition, the protocol switches the mobile nodes interfaces ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ when needed to control the mobile node’s energy consumption and eliminate power lost of adding another interface. The protocol successfully reduces the number of handovers to 70%, 90% less dropped packets, 40% more received packets and acknowledgments and 85% less end-to-end delay in comparison to other Protocols. Furthermore, the thesis adapts a novel combination of both game and auction theory in dynamic resource allocation and price-power-based routing in wireless Ad-Hoc networks. Under auction schemes, destinations nodes bid the information data to access to the data stored in the server node. The server will allocate the data to the winner who values it most. Once the data has been allocated to the winner, another mechanism for dynamic routing is adopted. The routing mechanism is based on the source-destination cooperation, power consumption and source-compensation to the intermediate nodes. The mechanism dramatically increases the seller’s revenue to 50% more when compared to random allocation scheme and briefly evaluates the reliability of predefined route with respect to data prices, source and destination cooperation for different network settings. Last but not least, this thesis adjusts an adaptive competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed auction game and a reputation-based game. This solves the fairness problems associated with spectrum sharing amongst one primary user and a large number of secondary users in a cognitive radio environment. The proposed games create a competition between the bidders and offers better revenue to the players in terms of fairness to more than 60% in certain scenarios. The proposed game could reach the maximum total profit for both primary and secondary users with better fairness; this is illustrated through numerical results

RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR WIRELESS RELAY NETWORKS

In this thesis, we propose several resource allocation strategies for relay networks in the context of joint power and bandwidth allocation and relay selection, and joint power allocation and subchannel assignment for orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems. Sharing the two best ordered relays with equal power between the two users over Rayleigh flat fading channels is proposed to establish full diversity order for both users. Closed form expressions for the outage probability, and bit error probability (BEP) performance measures for both amplify and forward (AF) and decode and forward (DF) cooperative communication schemes are developed for different scenarios. To utilize the full potentials of relay-assisted transmission in multi user systems, we propose a mixed strategy of AF relaying and direct transmission, where the user transmits part of the data using the relay, and the other part is transmitted using the direct link. The resource allocation problem is formulated to maximize the sum rate. A recursive algorithm alternating between power allocation and bandwidth allocation steps is proposed to solve the formulated resource allocation problem. Due to the conflict between limited wireless resources and the fast growing wireless demands, Stackelberg game is proposed to allocate the relay resources (power and bandwidth) between competing users, aiming to maximize the relay benefits from selling its resources. We prove the uniqueness of Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium (SNE) for the proposed game. We develop a distributed algorithm to reach SNE, and investigate the conditions for the stability of the proposed algorithm. We propose low complexity algorithms for AF-OFDMA and DF-OFDMA systems to assign the subcarriers to the users based on high SNR approximation aiming to maximize the weighted sum rate. Auction framework is proposed to devise competition based solutions for the resource allocation of AF-OFDMA aiming tomaximize either vi the sum rate or the fairness index. Two auction algorithms are proposed; sequential and one-shot auctions. In sequential auction, the users evaluate the subcarrier based on the rate marginal contribution. In the one-shot auction, the users evaluate the subcarriers based on an estimate of the Shapley value and bids on all subcarriers at once

Joint Channel Selection and Power Control in Infrastructureless Wireless Networks: A Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandit Framework

This paper deals with the problem of efficient resource allocation in dynamic infrastructureless wireless networks. Assuming a reactive interference-limited scenario, each transmitter is allowed to select one frequency channel (from a common pool) together with a power level at each transmission trial; hence, for all transmitters, not only the fading gain, but also the number of interfering transmissions and their transmit powers are varying over time. Due to the absence of a central controller and time-varying network characteristics, it is highly inefficient for transmitters to acquire global channel and network knowledge. Therefore a reasonable assumption is that transmitters have no knowledge of fading gains, interference, and network topology. Each transmitting node selfishly aims at maximizing its average reward (or minimizing its average cost), which is a function of the action of that specific transmitter as well as those of all other transmitters. This scenario is modeled as a multi-player multi-armed adversarial bandit game, in which multiple players receive an a priori unknown reward with an arbitrarily time-varying distribution by sequentially pulling an arm, selected from a known and finite set of arms. Since players do not know the arm with the highest average reward in advance, they attempt to minimize their so-called regret, determined by the set of players' actions, while attempting to achieve equilibrium in some sense. To this end, we design in this paper two joint power level and channel selection strategies. We prove that the gap between the average reward achieved by our approaches and that based on the best fixed strategy converges to zero asymptotically. Moreover, the empirical joint frequencies of the game converge to the set of correlated equilibria. We further characterize this set for two special cases of our designed game

An Agent-Based Model for Secondary Use of Radio Spectrum

Wireless communications rely on access to radio spectrum. With a continuing proliferation of wireless applications and services, the spectrum resource becomes scarce. The measurement studies of spectrum usage, however, reveal that spectrum is being used sporadically in many geographical areas and times. In an attempt to promote efficiency of spectrum usage, the Federal Communications Commission has supported the use of market mechanism to allocate and assign radio spectrum. We focus on the secondary use of spectrum defined as a temporary access of existing licensed spectrum by a user who does not own a spectrum license. The secondary use of spectrum raises numerous technical, institutional, economic, and strategic issues that merit investigation. Central to the issues are the effects of transaction costs associated with the use of market mechanism and the uncertainties due to potential interference.The research objective is to identify the pre-conditions as to when and why the secondary use would emerge and in what form. We use transaction cost economics as the theoretical framework in this study. We propose a novel use of agent-based computational economics to model the development of the secondary use of spectrum. The agent-based model allows an integration of economic and technical considerations to the study of pre-conditions to the secondary use concept. The agent-based approach aims to observe the aggregate outcomes as a result of interactions among agents and understand the process that leads to the secondary use, which can then be used to create policy instruments in order to obtain the favorable outcomes of the spectrum management