Optimizing the robustness of electrical power systems against cascading failures

Electrical power systems are one of the most important infrastructures that support our society. However, their vulnerabilities have raised great concern recently due to several large-scale blackouts around the world. In this paper, we investigate the robustness of power systems against cascading failures initiated by a random attack. This is done under a simple yet useful model based on global and equal redistribution of load upon failures. We provide a complete understanding of system robustness by i) deriving an expression for the final system size as a function of the size of initial attacks; ii) deriving the critical attack size after which system breaks down completely; iii) showing that complete system breakdown takes place through a first-order (i.e., discontinuous) transition in terms of the attack size; and iv) establishing the optimal load-capacity distribution that maximizes robustness. In particular, we show that robustness is maximized when the difference between the capacity and initial load is the same for all lines; i.e., when all lines have the same redundant space regardless of their initial load. This is in contrast with the intuitive and commonly used setting where capacity of a line is a fixed factor of its initial load.Comment: 18 pages including 2 pages of supplementary file, 5 figure

Adjacent Graph Based Vulnerability Assessment for Electrical Networks Considering Fault Adjacent Relationships Among Branches

Security issues related to vulnerability assessment in electrical networks are necessary for operators to identify the critical branches. At present, using complex network theory to assess the structural vulnerability of the electrical network is a popular method. However, the complex network theory cannot be comprehensively applicable to the operational vulnerability assessment of the electrical network because the network operation is closely dependent on the physical rules not only on the topological structure. To overcome the problem, an adjacent graph (AG) considering the topological, physical, and operational features of the electrical network is constructed to replace the original network. Through the AG, a branch importance index that considers both the importance of a branch and the fault adjacent relationships among branches is constructed to evaluate the electrical network vulnerability. The IEEE 118-bus system and the French grid are employed to validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant U1734202National Key Research and Development Plan of China under Grant 2017YFB1200802-12National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 51877181National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61703345Chinese Academy of Sciences, under Grant 2018-2019-0

False Data Injection Attacks on Phasor Measurements That Bypass Low-rank Decomposition

This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures, submitted to 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm

Network hierarchy evolution and system vulnerability in power grids

(c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.The seldom addressed network hierarchy property and its relationship with vulnerability analysis for power transmission grids from a complex-systems point of view are given in this paper. We analyze and compare the evolution of network hierarchy for the dynamic vulnerability evaluation of four different power transmission grids of real cases. Several meaningful results suggest that the vulnerability of power grids can be assessed by means of a network hierarchy evolution analysis. First, the network hierarchy evolution may be used as a novel measurement to quantify the robustness of power grids. Second, an antipyramidal structure appears in the most robust network when quantifying cascading failures by the proposed hierarchy metric. Furthermore, the analysis results are also validated and proved by empirical reliability data. We show that our proposed hierarchy evolution analysis methodology could be used to assess the vulnerability of power grids or even other networks from a complex-systems point of view.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft