Methodology for back-contamination risk assessment for a Mars sample return mission

The risk of back-contamination from Mars Surface Sample Return (MSSR) missions is assessed. The methodology is designed to provide an assessment of the probability that a given mission design and strategy will result in accidental release of Martian organisms acquired as a result of MSSR. This is accomplished through the construction of risk models describing the mission risk elements and their impact on back-contamination probability. A conceptual framework is presented for using the risk model to evaluate mission design decisions that require a trade-off between science and planetary protection considerations

Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders

[Excerpt] The United States confronts a wide array of threats at U.S. borders, ranging from terrorists who may have weapons of mass destruction, to transnational criminals smuggling drugs or counterfeit goods, to unauthorized migrants intending to live and work in the United States. Given this diversity of threats, how may Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set border security priorities and allocate scarce enforcement resources? In general, DHS’s answer to this question is organized around risk management, a process that involves risk assessment and the allocation of resources based on a cost-benefit analysis. This report focuses on the first part of this process by identifying border threats and describing a framework for understanding risks at U.S. borders. DHS employs models to classify threats as relatively high- or low-risk for certain planning and budgeting exercises and to implement certain border security programs. Members of Congress may wish to use similar models to evaluate the costs and benefits of potential border security policies and to allocate border enforcement resources. This report discusses some of the issues involved in modeling border-related threats

Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress

[Excerpt] This report focuses on international and domestic human trafficking and U.S. policy responses, with particular emphasis on the TVPA and its subsequent reauthorizations. The report begins with a description of key TIP-related definitions and an overview of the human trafficking problem. It follows with an overview of major foreign policy responses to international human trafficking. The report then focuses on responses to trafficking into and within the United States, examining relief for trafficking victims in the United States and discussing U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat domestic trafficking. The report concludes with an overview of current anti-trafficking legislation and an analysis of policy issues

MANAGEMENT OF WATER EXTREMES: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON GUIDELINES FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Utilising insights gained from a literature study about the social, economic and political impacts of irrigation droughts, research done on the impacts and management of floods and water restrictions in South Africa as well as analysing the disaster management policy process in South Africa since 1994, this presentation endeavours to present some guidelines for policy and strategy development with regard to the effective management of floods and droughts. In compiling this contribution extensive use has been made from a paper presented at a workshop of the ICID Working Group on Irrigation under Drought and Water Scarcity, Tehran, by G.R. Backeberg and M.F. Viljoen.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

A Constructive Review of Basel's Proposals on Operational Risk

Risk and loss are common words that need to be clearly defined when embarking on the task of assessing operational risks. Financial institutions may rush into implementing the methodologies proposed by Basel in the hope of achieving better risk management – or simply to satisfy a regulatory request – but without giving enough thoughts to this enterprise. We show that the methodologies proposed by Basel to assess risks and calculate capital requirements are indeed poorly defined and, as far as they can be understood, misconceived. When restricting our attention to operational risks we find that their impact in the vast majority of cases is negligible compared to other risks, be they credit, market or general business risks. A few truly exceptional operational risks may, of course, lead to catastrophic consequences, but then the answer is not in an extra capital buffer that would have to be enormous to be of any use. An attempt to aggregate purely operational risks, as proposed by Basel in the so-called Advanced Measurement Approaches, is as futile as it is difficult. What matters in risk management is balancing all risks, whatever they are, against costs and revenues. And risks do not add up; it is the interaction between operational risks and other risks and the risk/reward trade-off that is of interest. Basel recognises this broader aspect of operational risk management in its guidance notes for the development of an operational risk management framework and the supervision of risk management. Recent redrafting of these notes suggest a change of emphasis from loss data collection towards more forward-looking risk assessment and comprehensive risk management.Financial Markets, Policy and Regulation, Operational Risk, Basel Accord, Capital Models, Risk Aggregation

Causality and Association: The Statistical and Legal Approaches

This paper discusses different needs and approaches to establishing ``causation'' that are relevant in legal cases involving statistical input based on epidemiological (or more generally observational or population-based) information. We distinguish between three versions of ``cause'': the first involves negligence in providing or allowing exposure, the second involves ``cause'' as it is shown through a scientifically proved increased risk of an outcome from the exposure in a population, and the third considers ``cause'' as it might apply to an individual plaintiff based on the first two. The population-oriented ``cause'' is that commonly addressed by statisticians, and we propose a variation on the Bradford Hill approach to testing such causality in an observational framework, and discuss how such a systematic series of tests might be considered in a legal context. We review some current legal approaches to using probabilistic statements, and link these with the scientific methodology as developed here. In particular, we provide an approach both to the idea of individual outcomes being caused on a balance of probabilities, and to the idea of material contribution to such outcomes. Statistical terminology and legal usage of terms such as ``proof on the balance of probabilities'' or ``causation'' can easily become confused, largely due to similar language describing dissimilar concepts; we conclude, however, that a careful analysis can identify and separate those areas in which a legal decision alone is required and those areas in which scientific approaches are useful.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/07-STS234 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Probabilistic models of planetary contamination

Likely fundamental inadequacies in the model of planetary contamination advanced by Sagan and Coleman are discussed. It is shown that a relatively minor modification of the basic Sagan-Coleman formula yields approximations that are generally adequate with data in the range of interest. This approximation formula differs from the original Sagan-Coleman version only through an initial conditioning on landing outcome. It always yields an upper (conservative) bound for the total probability of contamination, this appealing feature is lost if the conditioning on landing outcome is deleted

Introduction to Hazards Analysis, in Hazards Analysis: Reducing the Impact of Disasters - Chapter 5

The book details a systematic process of hazards identification, vulnerability determination, and consequence assessment for the natural, built, and human environment. Using a cross-disciplinary approach, this book effectively demonstrates how to use the results of vulnerability assessment, spatial analysis, and community planning to reduce adverse disaster outcomes and foster social, economic, and environmental sustainability. Throughout, the book stresses that hazards analysis is not an isolated process but one that must engage the local community

Introduction of frequency in France following the AZF accident

International audienceIn France, regulations regarding risk prevention and risk management are the result of more than 200 years of legislation, the evolution of which has often been consecutive to industrial accidents. Two years after the industrial accident of AZF (French initials for AZote Fertilisant), a new law was introduced on July 30, 2003 which described both prevention and repair of the damage caused by industrial and natural disasters. Since then, regulations have been made considerably tighter and the entire approach towards risk assessment has changed. This law has developed very interesting tools for risk assessment and risk management (some of which are unique worldwide) and has initiated the use of frequency and probability in the French system. Better information to the public, stronger regulations, new methodology for safety reports, over-hauling of land-use planning and improved accident analysis are some of the mainstays of the law. Regarding the introduction of frequencies and probabilities, as operators in France are free to choose the methodology of probability assessment, it is interesting to review the different methodologies used by operators, with their advantages and disadvantages. In the light of these elements, France's National Institute of Industrial Environment and Risks (INERIS) has developed a methodology and tools aiming at helping both operators and authorities in the assessment of accident probabilities. This methodology focuses on installation characteristics. However, to deal with the lack of input data, tools are developed to build up available generic data regarding loss of containment, initiating events, safety barrier failure rates and root causes distributions. Six years after the law of July 30, 2003 was passed, it is now possible to highlight the challenges and improvements brought about by the use of frequency and probability in risk assessment and policies developed as a result